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BANK CARD
FRAUD IN SPAIN1
ARTICLE:
Technological progress over the last two decades,
in combination with the opening up of
international borders across the internet that has
further developed human and commercial
relations, have led to the appearance of new
payment systems in the form of bank cards. These
instruments may be used at commercial shopping
centres, at the network of cash dispensers, and
now, with the development of telecommunications
networks, in the context of the internet. The mass
use of cards as a means of payment inevitably
gives rise to a significant amount of fraud. The
legal treatment of fraud under criminal law
involving bank cards requires penalties to be set
for the ways in which these categories of offenses
may be committed, and which may be applied
under these circumstances: conventional fraud,
computer fraud and burglary or housebreaking.
Introduction
At present, electronic telecommunication networks may
also be applied to payment systems. These
technological advances mean that the most extensively
used are the multiple versions of the bank card. The
dynamics of economic globalization will, in turn, expand
modern payment systems even further.
Naturally, as an effective instrument in commercial
relations, the new payments systems are subject to a
more or less complete set of legal regulations, which in
certain situations requires the implementation of
criminal legislation. For such legislation to be effective,
it is essential to study and to define the elements that
constitute the offences that may be applied to these still
relatively novel acts. This article considers the issues
relating to the fraudulent use of bank cards, because of
the scale of their use – it is significant and the most
widely used means of payment, even greater than cash
payments – and their specific regulation.
As this article will demonstrate (and the work that this
article is taken from), there is no specific provision in
Spanish criminal law relating to the use of bank cards as
a means of payment, except in the case of
misrepresentation. As a means of payment in a criminal
context, it is necessary to distinguish between the use
of the bank card at commercial establishments, for
payment over telecommunications networks, and card
abuse at automatic cash dispensers (ATM). Finally, the
fraudulent use of banks cards can imply the application
of some types of criminal offence related to
misrepresentation.
Payment in person at commercial premises 
In this part, cases are considered in which a card held in
the name of an individual is used without that person’s
consent as a means of payment at a commercial
establishment from which a product or service is
acquired, in such a way that the salesperson accepts
the payment under the belief that the real card holder is
in fact present. Doctrine2 and jurisprudence3 has
implicitly equated this method of impersonation with
the conventional offence of fraud, as regulated under
article 248.1 of the Codigo Penal (Penal Code), which
states that:
Cometen estafa los que, con ánimo de lucro, utilizaren
engaño bastante para producir error en otro,
induciéndolo a realizar un acto de disposición en
perjuicio propio o ajeno.
Fraud is committed by whoever, for personal benefit,
1 This paper forms part of the research into
Electronic means of payment - Proyectos de
Investigación sobre Medios electrónicos de pago
VA111/04 (Programa General de Apoyo a Proyectos
de Investigación de la Junta de Castilla y león) and
SEJ2004-03704 (Planes Nacionales I+D/I+D+I, del
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia). Abbreviations
(where used): CP: Código Penal/Penal Code; LOPJ:
Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial/Organic Law on
Judicial Power; TS: Tribunal Supremo/Supreme
Court; STS: Sentencia del Tribunal
Supremo/Judgment of the Supreme Court; ATS:
Auto del Tribunal Supremo/Order of the Supreme
Court; SAP: Sentencia de la Audiencia
Provincial/Judgment of the Provincial Court; RJ:
Aranzadi (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia del
TS)/Collection of Supreme Court Jurisprudence;
ROJ: Repertorio Oficial de Jurisprudencia/Official
Collection of Jurisprudence; CENDOJ: Centro de
Documentación Judicial. Consejo General del Poder
Judicial/Centre for Judicial Documentation General
Council of Judicial Power; RGDP: Revista General
del Derecho Penal/General Journal of Criminal Law.
2 Jesús Fernández Entralgo, ‘Falsificación y
utilización fraudulenta de tarjetas electrónicas’ in
Tarjetas bancarias y Derecho penal. Cuadernos de
Derecho Judicial, VI-2002, 58.
3 See, amongst others, STS of 30-10-2003 -La Ley
Juris 2004,10845-; STS 21-1-2003 La Ley Juris 2003,
1269-. 
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practices sufficient deceit to the extent that they
mislead another, inducing the latter person to make
an act of disposal to his own detriment or to that of a
third party.4
Criminal deception under Spanish law requires, in the
first place, deceitful conduct on the part of the offender
(in this case the presentation of a card thereby affirming
both an apparent ability to pay and sufficient solvency).
The deceit practiced by the active subject must be
sufficient to lead another party to be misled (the seller
is misled into thinking that they are dealing with the
person to whom the card was issued, and trusts in the
solvency of the legitimate card holder, but is not in fact
dealing with the person to whom the card was issued).
The erroneous situation in which the other party is
placed leads to an act of disposal (the transfer of goods
or the provision of services by whoever receives the
payment), which causes a loss for that person or for a
third party (the seller, the card issuer or the card holder,
according to whoever is liable to cover the costs of the
amount that is defrauded). From the subjective point of
view, the offender must act with an economic interest in
mind and with the sole aim of personal enrichment.
In recent years, it has also been made clear that there
is an obligation on the receiver of the payment to
comply with certain procedures when accepting
payment. From the perspective of the need for ‘engaño
bastante (sufficient deceit)’ in the description of the
offence, and in accordance with the general
prerequisites of the modern principle of objective
accusation, it is necessary that certain self-protection
procedures be complied with in carrying out the
payment correctly.5 In cases where the card is presented
as a form of payment at a commercial establishment,
the basic procedure requires that the seller satisfy
themselves that the person in possession of the card is
the person to whom the card was issued, and should
also check the expiry date of the card.
This tendency has been accepted in modern
jurisprudence, which has consistently failed to apply the
legal definition of fraud and has punished the offence,
where applicable, solely as misrepresentation, under
circumstances in which the victim of the deceit failed to
act with due diligence that is expected in commercial
practice when verifying the identity of the subject. A
good example of the approach taken by the judiciary is
the STS of 3 June, 2003,6 which declared as abnormal
the act of paying with a stolen bank card belonging to a
person of the opposite sex, because the sales person
made no effort to verify the identity of the card holder,
not even to establish whether the person that presented
the card was a man or a women, such that the deceit
could not be qualified as sufficient to be held as a
causal factor that helped to cause the economic
transfer.7
As well as conventional fraud, the offence of
misrepresentation of a commercial document (article
392 of the CP) may be considered, where the
manuscript signature of the actual card holder is forged
by another person on the sales receipt issued by the
bank card reader. Similarities will occur between both
categories of criminal offence. As much is established in
the Agreement of the 2nd Chamber of the Supreme
Court (Sala 2ª del Tribunal Supremo) dated 18 July 2007,
subsequently applied in the Judgment of 19 July 2007
(nº 451/2007), in which the accused, a Romanian
national, entered a jeweller’s shop in the locality of
4 The penalty established for the crime of
conventional fraud ranges from a six-month to a
three-year prison term (article 249). This same
penalty also applies to computer fraud.
5 Jesús María Silva Sánchez in Pablo Salvador
Coderch and Jesús María Silva Sánchez Simulación
y deberes de veracidad, (Civitas, Madrid, 1999), 98
and following, 387; Francisco Muñoz Conde, ‘De la
llamada estafa de crédito’ in RGDP 9, 2008, Iustel,
2 and following; Mercedes Pérez Manzano, ‘Acerca
de la imputación objetiva de la estafa’, in Hacia un
Derecho penal económico europeo. Jornadas en
honor del Profesor Klaus Tiedemann, (BOE, Madrid
1995), 285 and following.
6 Nº 807/2003 Actualidad Penal. Nº43. 17 - 23
November 2003, 2310 and following. Along the
same lines, supported by the same judgment, the
SAP of Barcelona of 25 January 2007, which deals
with practically identical circumstances (a card
bearing the name of a woman fraudulently used by
a man).
7 The failure to notice the gender of a person reflects
on the accuracy of the observations about the
accuracy of a manuscript signature, as noted in
Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, (2nd
edition, Tottel, 2007), 1.2, footnote 1.
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8 A detailed presentation may be found in M. L.
Gutierrez Francés, Fraude informático y estafa
(Ministry of Justice 1991), 336 and following, and
Ricardo M. Mata y Martín Los delitos de estafa
convencional, esstafa informática y robo en el
ámbito de los medios electrónicos de pago, 57.
Jurisprudentially, STS nº 533/2007 of 12 June Id
Cendoj: 28079120012007100455: and STS
369/2007 of 9 of May Id Cendoj:
28079120012007100374.
9 C.M. Romeo Casabona, Poder informático y
seguridad jurídica, (Madrid 1987),  47.
10 ARP 2006/43.
Tavernes Blanques (Valencia) where she made
purchases to a value of 1,399 euro and 860 euro, paying
for these purchases with the credit card of another
person. To do so, she presented the Swiss National
Identity Card of the legitimate holder of the credit card,
but which bore the photograph of the accused.
Subsequently, the accused signed the sales receipts
imitating the signature of the legitimate cardholder. This
decision followed and endorsed the comments made in
earlier judgments made by the same judicial organ.
However, if the card reader finally fails to authorize the
attempted payment once the card had been swiped and
in such a way that the perpetrator was finally unable to
sign the sales ticket, it would amount to an attempt to
falsify a commercial document (STS 25-6-98 nº
882/98). In the 1998 judgment, (STS 882/1998 25
June), the following ruling was made where the accused
entered a jeweller’s shop in Barcelona, and expressed
an interest in buying a watch. To pay for it, the accused
handed over a Master Card to the sales assistant in the
name of a United States citizen, together with the
legitimate passport of the US citizen. The accused had
replaced the photograph of the passport holder with his
own photograph. When the sales assistant requested
authorization from the bank, it was refused via the POS
(Point-of-Sale) terminal. The accused did not, therefore,
place a false signature on the sales ticket. In view of the
above, the accused handed over a second card (Visa),
which had been cloned, which enabled him to pay for
the watch. With respect to the first card, the Supreme
Court considered it as an attempted misrepresentation
of a commercial document.
As regards aiding and abetting misrepresentation, the
TS has made it clear that where more than one person
practices deceit in a commercial outlet by purchasing
goods or services with another person’s card, it does
not matter which of those accused actually signs the
sales slips; they are all guilty of misrepresentation,
because the offence does not solely consist of having
signed the sales receipt. Thus, the guilty parties are all
those who benefit from the proceeds of the crime where
there is a joint decision to commit the crime (STS de 26-
5-2002 nº 661/02).
The bank card and remote payments 
As the technical possibility of making remote payments
with cards became more widely used without the need
for the physical presence of the card holder, certain
problems have arisen that have affected the law.
Electronic procedures, especially over the internet, have
facilitated remote commercial transactions that are
normally settled with payment made by means of the
electronic transfer of the data stored on a card.
The prevailing jurisprudence provides that the deceit
at the heart of criminal deception is necessarily of a
personal nature. It may only arise as the result of a
direct relation between two people. Likewise, the error
must also be a consequence of the deceitful act being of
a psychological nature, which is only possible where
there is close personal proximity.8 Due to these
assumptions, classic or conventional estafa (fraud) is, in
such circumstances, impossible. Thus, when the new
Penal Code was approved in 1995, the legislator
included a different set of circumstances for computer-
aided criminal deception (article 248.2). Given the
personal nature of deceit and error under Spanish law,
no references were made to them in article 248.2. In
their place, it was provided that there must be a
prerequisite of manipulating computer data. The subject
must achieve the unauthorized disposal of an asset
through the manipulation of computer data. Property
assets are thus construed as objects, the manipulation
of which will affect their value in such a way as
eventually to cause loss to the property of a third party.
The transfer implies that accountable assets pass
initially to the property of the offender, and that the
effect is to cause actual loss.
The offence of electronic fraud describes the
circumstances relating to fraudulent payments made
over the internet, in which the offender uses a cloned
card or the information obtained from a legitimate card
to obtain goods or services using the card details of
another person, thereby causing an innocent person to
be charged for the payment. The broad concept of
computer manipulation basically corresponds to that
proposed by Romeo,9 in the sense of a wrongful
modification of the result of an automated process at
any of the stages of computer processing or
programming with the aim of personal benefit and
causing loss to a third party.
An alternative to this broad concept of computer
manipulation has arisen with the Judgement of Malaga
Criminal Court nº 3 of 19th December, 2005.10 The court
excluded the input of inappropriate data into the
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information system as an element of electronic fraud.
The case refers to acts in which the defendants:
… puestos previamente de común acuerdo en fecha
28 de noviembre del 2000 a través de la página
www.tododvd.com de la empresa Red Fénix Sistemas,
SL realizaron el pedido de un reproductor de DVD
marca Pionner modelo 530/535 con precio de venta
438 ? a nombre de Luis Pedro, ... y realizando el pago
con la tarjeta VISA núm. NUM006, de la que era titular
un tercero ajeno a los hechos, quien no había
autorizado a los acusados a utilizarla.
… having previously come to a common accord on
28th November 2000, they placed an order in the
name of Luis Pedro… on the Red Fénix website
www.tododvd.com for a Pioneer brand DVD player
model 530/535 at a sale price of €438 and made
payment for it with a VISA card number NUM006,
which belonged to a third party unconnected with the
facts, who had not authorised its use by the accused.
The court only considered the subject-matter of this
form of fraud in terms of the actions affecting the
existing data (alteration, modification, deletion) in the
system, and not the fact that the data provided,
although correct, was not provided with the authority or
agreement of the actual person whose data was used:
Por ello no cabe incluir la conducta de los acusados
en el párrafo segundo del art. 248 del Código Penal
pues los mismos no manipularon sistema o programa
informático alguno sino cuando se les solicita el
número de una tarjeta bancaria para cargar en la
cuenta asociada a la misma el importe de la compra
efectuada designan el número de una tarjeta de la
que no es titular ninguno de los acusados y es en la
creencia de que todos los datos introducidos en la
página web al hacer el pedido del reproductor de DVD
son correctos por lo que la empresa Red Fénix SL,
procede a hacer la entrega de dicho aparato en el
domicilio indicado al hacer el pedido.
It is for this reason that the conduct of the defendants
is not to be included in the second paragraph of art.
248 of the Penal Code, as the latter did not
manipulate the system or the computer programme in
any way, but when they were asked for the number of
a bank card against which to charge the said amount
to the associated bank account, they inputted the
number of a card that was not held in any of their
names. It was in the belief that all the correct data
was inputted into the web page when the order for
the DVD player was placed that led the firm Red Fénix
SL to proceed with the dispatch of the said device to
the address they specified when the order was
placed.
Were such a distinction to be upheld, all such conduct
involving the introduction of misappropriated data to
make purchases over the internet would be excluded
from the category of computer fraud, offences which
even today are being punished under that criminal
category, as applied by the Supreme Court. Thus, STS of
20.11.2001 points out that computer manipulation:
bien puede consistir en la alteración de los elementos
físicos, de aquellos que permiten su programación o
por la introducción de datos falsos
may either consist in the alteration of physical
elements, or of those that allow it to be programmed
or by inputting false data.
To date, the jurisprudence has only dealt with
circumstances referring to the use of credit cards and
bank passwords, although in the case of on-line
banking, there are no decisions, or at least none that
the authors have found, that refer to payment by mobile
telephone and what is known as electronic money. Thus,
for example, the Judgment of the Provincial Court of the
Balearic Islands num. 30/2005 (Section 2º) of 14 of April
2005, convicted a person for computer or electronic
fraud that used personal passwords without the
authorization of the account holder to make multiple
transfers using the Línea Oberta de la Caixa website to
accounts held by the banks of Banesto and La Caixa.
A peculiarity arises in this field, with regard to
electronic fraud in association with a commercial outlet.
It is a question of the circumstances under which the
offender in various ways manages to persuade the
owner or employee of an outlet to facilitate an irregular
payment. Normally, the offer involves a half share of the
benefits obtained from the sales in exchange for
collaboration. This circumstance is dealt with, for
example, in STS num. 2175/ 2001 of 20 November 2001.
Specifically, it refers to an employee of a firm who was
responsible for sending out credit cards to their owners
and who appropriated a card and proceeded to a sales
outlet, where, according to the testimony of the sales
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11 See also STS of 26 June 2006 (RJ 2006, 4925). At
the Provincial Court level, similar criminal
behaviour to those set out here may be
appreciated, for example, in the SAP of Granada of
10/11/2006 (ROJ: SAP GR 2008/2006), and in the
SAP of Alicante of 27 November 2007 (ROJ: A
2931/2007).
12 ARP 1999/4239, consulted on the Aranzadi
Westlaw Database.
13 This class of criminal offence appeared in the
second half of the 1980s as a consequence of the
proliferation of automatic cash dispensers by
banking entities. Enrique Bacigalupo Zapater,
‘Utilización Abusiva de Cajeros automáticos por
terceros no autorizados’ in Poder Judicial, Número
Especial IX: Nuevas formas de delincuencia, 85 and
following; A.M. Javato Martín, ‘Análisis de la
Jurisprudencia Penal en Materia de Medios
Electrónicos de Pago’, in Los medios electrónicos
de pago. Problemas jurídicos (Ricardo Manuel
Mata y Martín and Antonio María Javato Martín),
Comares, Granada, 2007, 375.
14 The crime of burglary (articles 237 and following of
the CP) consists in the misappropriation of goods
using methods assessed as housebreaking or
breaking and entering, which includes the use of
false keys.
15 On all these, STS of 22 January 2004, nº35/2004
(Supreme Court Sentence 22nd of January, 2004),
EDJ 2004/8295 that rectifies the criteria of the
Provincial Court of Madrid that in judgements that
led to convictions for theft and not burglary due to
it not having taken into account that the cash
dispenser from which the money was withdrawn
was situated in a booth which would have been
opened, or that it would have been necessary to
open a door or gate with the magnetic stripe.
16 For further detail on this problem, see Ricardo M.
Mata y Martín, Los delitos de estafa convencional,
estafa informática y robo en el ámbito de los
medios electrónicos de pago. El uso fraudulento de
tarjetas y otros instrumentos de pago. (Aranzadi
2007), 142 and following.
assistants, he used it to make purchases, which were
subsequently charged to the card holder’s account. The
TS upholds the similar nature of the offence described
in article 248-2 as:
quien aparenta ser titular de una tarjeta de crédito (…)
y actúa en connivencia con quien introduce los datos
en una máquina posibilitando que ésta actúe
mecánicamente está empleando un artificio para
aparecer como su titular ante el terminal bancario a
quien suministra los datos requeridos para la
obtención de fondos de forma no consentida por el
perjudicado.
whosoever appears to be the holder of a card (...) and
acts in collusion with whoever inputs the data into the
machine, thereby making it possible for it to work
automatically is using an artifice so as to register as
the owner of the bank card at the bank terminal by
inputting the owner’s data to obtain funds without the
consent of the party incurring the loss.11
At other times, that the offender creates a fictitious
commercial entity by requesting a Point-of-Sale (POS)
terminal with which to commit the fraud. Thus, in the
trial leading to the Judgment of the Provincial Court of
Valencia of 2-11-199912 (num. 4/1999), various
individuals by mutual accord considered installing a
POS terminal for a fictitious business, and by making
use of the terminal and credit cards stolen from their
owners (which they possessed in great number), made
fictitious transactions, thus obtaining the money from
the transactions. The Provincial court appreciated the
existence of a continuing offence of electronic fraud and
the continuing offence of the falsification of commercial
documents.
The use of credit cards in ATMs by thieves
There is yet another area in which the fraudulent use of
bank cards takes place: at ATMs owned by banks that
enable people to us the facilities offered at any hour of
the day. These systems have also prompted the illicit
use of bank cards, usually to obtain quantities of cash
from cash dispensers. The emergence of such new
attacks13 lacked specific provisions in relation to the
offence set out in the Penal Code. However, the
response from the judges was to analyse the offence in
relation to the physical layout of the ATMs. To begin
with, the cash dispensers were placed in an enclosed
space that required the same bank card to gain entry.
This led the courts to define the offence as burglary
using false keys.14
With the approval of the Penal Code of 1995, the
legislator understood that the solution proposed by the
courts made it possible to consider a card as a false key,
and amended the definition of false keys with the
inclusion of a final paragraph which sought to establish
a comparison between a magnetic stripe and false keys:
A los efectos del presente artículo, se consideran
llaves las tarjetas, magnéticas o perforadas y los
mandos o instrumentos de apertura a distancia.
For the purposes of the present article, both cards,
whether magnetic or perforated, and remote control
opening devices or instruments are considered keys
(article 239 in fine).
This treatment constitutes consolidated case-law;15
although the reservations expressed in legal doctrine
are not, it appears, altogether dismissed by the
amendment to the legislation. In these cases, the
application of the specific provision in the final
paragraph of article 239 has normally led to charges of
‘robo con fuerza (burglary)’ in criminal proceedings,
without entering into some of the more debateable
points that might complicate an appraisal of the actual
offence of burglary or housebreaking.16
On this point, it is worth pointing out that the
provision clearly states that it is to be considered ‘for
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the purposes of the present article’, that is, in the case
of burglary using false keys, which means it is
necessary to provide all of their general features,
specifically that force must be used ‘para acceder al
lugar donde éstas se encuentran (to gain entry to the
place where these are found)’ (article 237). The
provision in question refers to devices or instruments
for remote ‘opening’, which brings us back to the
specific context of burglary, which could also be applied
to this category of offence. Furthermore, the keys in the
Spanish Penal Code are considered false when they are
used to open a lock in the normal way in order to allow
entry into an enclosed space. However, the cards used
in cash dispensers do not have to have previously
facilitated access to an enclosed space, and in addition,
they involve other aspects that go beyond the definition
in the Code of a false key as being merely an opening
device.
In reality, the very nature of this type of offence
relates to a fraudulent act, to which the conventional
offence of fraud as defined under Spanish law does not
apply, because of the absence of personal deceit that is
required by legal doctrine and judicial precedent. In
addition, beyond any possible use as an opening
device, the purpose of the card is, naturally, to be used
in the exercise of a right to credit or to withdraw funds
through the financial entity – based on the pre-existing
legal contract between the card holder and the issuing
entity – which by using the PIN, the issuer obtains
sufficient evidence to assure itself that the legitimate
holder of the card wishes to initiate a transaction in the
ATM.
Judgment of the TS of 9 May 2007
Showing some sensitivity to the reasoning set out
above, the recent judgment of the TS of 9 May 2007
moves away from what is accepted as consolidated
jurisprudence and considers it possible to include the
improper use of bank cards at automatic cash
dispensers within the definition of computer fraud as
defined in article 248.2.17
The factual circumstances to which the judgment
refers concerned a group that was dedicated to copying
credit cards and to making fraudulent use of them for
the purposes of personal profit. To do so, they used a
procedure known as ‘skimming’ consisting of the
substitution of a magnetic band on an original or new
credit or debit card for data on an existing one which
they surreptitiously obtained by means of card readers.
Having created forged cards, they used these in
commercial establishments – presenting forged
documents to identify themselves as the owners of the
cards, and to withdraw money from the bank account of
the customers whose data they had stolen.
They also used the procedure known as ‘la siembra
(sowing)’, which consists in obtaining the victim’s PIN
number and credit card by placing somebody at a
suitable distance from a card holder at a cash dispenser
to observe the PIN, and to distract him in such a way
that he loses sight of the card when it is returned by the
machine, by which time it is removed and replaced by
another card. The victim does not notice the switched
bank card until he uses it to carry out further
operations. The bank cards obtained in this way are
used to withdraw money from cash dispensers; when
these became invalid because they have reached the
preset maximum withdrawal limit, they are used as a
resource to manufacture other cards with which to carry
out further operations.18
A number of criticisms have been made by legal
commentators on the inclusion of these circumstances
within the offence of burglary (absence of access into an
enclosed space, lack of consent to hand over the
goods), yet the judgment upholds the definition of the
facts as elements of computer fraud. The Spanish High
Court have established that the offender, by inputting
the PIN or secret number of the stolen card into an ATM,
is dishonestly identifying himself to the bank as the
rightful owner of the card, thereby prompting the bank
to transfer an amount of money voluntarily. Such an
identification
… ha de ser considerada bajo la conducta de
manipulación informática a que se refiere el tipo de la
estafa del art. 248.2 CP
… has to be considered as behaviour that amounts to
manipulation of computer data to which the category
of fraud defined under art. 248.2 Penal Code refers.
This interpretation is supported, in the words of the
Spanish High Court, by the Council Framework Decision
17 Note that is the sole judgment of the TS
pronounced in this direction. Formerly, some
decisions by the High Court (STS 185/2006)
pronounced in favour of the solution of computer
fraud although in a hypothetical or merely
dialectical manner, as the category of crime in
article 248.2 of the Penal Code has not been the
subject of the accusation.
18 For more descriptions of similar attacks, together
with additional case law from across the world, see
Stephen Mason, editor, Electronic Evidence:
Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007), 4.04-4.15.
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The courts have begun to move away from the criteria
they initially upheld, and begun to punish such conduct
as counterfeiting of legal tender.
19 2001/413/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 28
May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of
non-cash means of payment OJ L149, 2.6.2001, p.
1–4.
20 Emilio Manuel Fernández García and Juana López
Moreno, ‘La utilización…’, in Cuadernos de
Derecho Judicial VI-2002, 81.
of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of
non-cash means of payment,19 because article 3, relating
to offences and computers, covers the following:
Each Member State shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that the following conduct is a
criminal offence when committed intentionally:
performing or causing a transfer of money or
monetary value and thereby causing an unauthorised
loss of property for another person, with the intention
of procuring an unauthorised economic benefit for the
person committing the offence or for a third party, by:
- without right introducing, altering, deleting or
suppressing computer data, in particular identification
data, or
- without right interfering with the functioning of a
computer programme or system.
The defining characteristics of data manipulation as
provided for in article 3 includes identification by means
of a secret number or PIN.
Counterfeiting and the alteration of cards 
The treatment of counterfeiting and the alteration of
cards in case law has varied over time. In the Penal Code
of 1973, and in the absence of specific regulation, bank
cards were accorded the status of a mercantile
document. As a consequence, the creation of a cloned
card by forgery and the manipulation of legitimate cards
were subsumed under the articles dedicated to this type
of counterfeiting, as determined by the Supreme Court
in its judgment of 3 December 1991.20
Greater difficulties were involved in the assessment,
alteration or manipulation of the magnetic stripe on the
card, as the element that it incorporates is difficult to
equate with the concept of a document. The problem
was corrected in the Penal Code of 1995, which provides
an extensive and broad concept of a document under
article 26 that now covers magnetic stripes on cards.
However, the specific consideration of credit and debit
cards as money in article 387 of the New Penal Code will
raise questions over such an approach to the problem in
case law. The courts have begun to move away from the
criteria they initially upheld, and begun to punish such
conduct as counterfeiting of legal tender. An especially
controversial point is the alteration of the magnetic
stripe, as the Penal Code of 1995 decriminalised the
conduct previously defined as alteration of legal tender,
such that the card that has been manipulated can only
be compared in a rather laboured way to the category of
offence in article 386-1, which is the manufacture of
money, understood as the creation of new money by
counterfeiting legal tender.
The Supreme Court has put an end to debate on the
question through the Acuerdo del Pleno no
Jurisdiccional de la Sala Segunda (Agreement of the
Non-Jurisdictional Full Court Session of the Second
Chamber) issued on 28-6-2002. It opted to subsume
alterations to the magnetic stripes of an authentic card
under the offence of counterfeiting, putting forward the
following argument:
… las tarjetas de crédito o débito son medios de pago
que tienen la consideración de ‘dinero de plastic’, que
el artículo 387 del Código penal equipara a la
moneda, por lo que la incorporación a la ‘banda
magnética’ de uno de estos instrumentos de pago, de
unos datos obtenidos fraudulentamente, constituye
un proceso de fabricación o elaboración que debe ser
incardinado en el art. 386 del Código penal.
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… credit and debit cards are means of payment that
are considered ‘plastic money’, which article 387 of
the Penal Code equates with money, such that the
incorporation of data obtained in a fraudulent manner
on the ‘magnetic stripe’ of one of these instruments of
payment constitutes a process of production or
preparation that should included under art 386 of the
Penal Code.
This view was later be confirmed by a Judgement of the
Supreme Court num. 948/2002 (Criminal Chamber) of
8th July,21 in which the Supreme Court proceeded to
differentiate between the behaviour in question and
computer fraud. The reform of Organic Law 15/2003 has
endorsed the criteria of the Spanish Supreme Court, by
reintroducing the alteration of legal tender as a form of
criminal offence in article 386 of the Penal Code.
Likewise, the judicial interpretation of the concept of
money was also extended to ‘las demás tarjetas que
puedan utilizarse como medios de pago (the other cards
that may be used as means of payment)’ (cash card and
such like).
The classification of falsifying electronic bank cards as
a crime of counterfeiting legal tender is open to criticism
from two points of view. First, from the point of view of
punishment, a very harsh sentence in the case of
counterfeiting legal tender (a prison term of between 8
to 12 years, article 386 Penal Code) would be applied to
circumstances that are much less serious, such as
forgery of an isolated card or the mere possession of a
forged card to use it as an instrument of payment.
Second, from the point of view of authorization by virtue
of article 65. b. LOPJ, the competency to judge these
facts falls on the Audiencia Nacional (National Court)
with a specialized jurisdiction covering terrorism and
organized crime, which appears to be questionable.22
Hence, the Supreme Court has subsequently modified
its general doctrine in the AATS of 18 February 200423
and 21 April 2004,24 insofar as it identifies two types of
circumstances:
a. The forgery of the card (alteration or manipulation
of its magnetic stripe) and possessing forged credit
cards for making purchases or distribution
constitute counterfeiting of money and the
competent court is therefore the Audiencia Nacional
(High Court).
b.Mere possession of one or various forged cards for
their use as an instrument of payment are
subsumed under the offence of falsification of
mercantile documents and thus do not amount to
the counterfeiting of money that comes under the
jurisdiction of the Audiencia Nacional.
The European Community perspective 
There is an interest in a more effective assurance of
security for the means of payment that may clearly be
seen in the international context, especially respecting
electronic payments. In this respect there are two areas
of action of great importance for criminal regulation, the
Cybercrime Convention of 2001 and various actions of
the European Union.
The Convention on Cybercrime, drawn up in Budapest
in 2001, deals with the complex problem of computer
crime in the international context. Among its proposed
measures, it includes the harmonization of punishable
acts linked to computing that should be the subject of
criminal offences in the signatory countries. The
Convention establishes various groups of infractions
that should be incorporated into national legislation and
which it classifies into four broad categories of illicit
offences. Among these, in a second group of
behaviours, the Convention refers to computer crimes,
which include computer-related forgery and computer-
related fraud. Computer fraud (article 8) refers to the
input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer
data or any interference with the functioning of a
computer system, with a view to procuring an economic
benefit for oneself or for another person.
Furthermore, especially from European Union
institutions, the importance of payment systems has
been highlighted, which have a bearing on the criminal
legislation of the Member States. In reality, the
perspectives of the European Union are not strictly
penal, but aim to guarantee and to stimulate economic
activity, consumer protection and, to some extent, to
prevent and deal with organized crime. However,
through certain community measures that have an
effect on domestic criminal legislation, it proposes the
criminalization of certain conduct and other measures
with the aim of protecting this means of payment. Thus,
21 Nº 948/2002 in Actualidad Penal. Nº45. 2 al 8 de
diciembre de 2002, p. 3141 and following.
22 Carolina Villacampa Estiarte, ‘La falsificación de
medios de pago distintos del efectivo en el
Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Reforma del CP de
2007: ¿respetamos las demandas armonizadoras
de la Unión Europea?’, in Diario La Ley, nº 6994, 22
of July, 2008, 3 and following.
23 Id Cendoj: 28079120012004200356.
24 Id Cendoj: 28079120012004200586. See also on
this point ATS 10-3-2004, Id Cendoj:
28079120012004200420; of 1-4-2004, Id Cendoj:
28079120012004200545, of 7-12-2004 Id Cendoj:
28079120012004202326.
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25 On this matter, see Lafuente Sánchez, R. Los
servicios financieros bancarios electrónicos, (Tirant
lo Blanch 2005), 337, and Francesco Buffa,
“Moneta digitale e tutele”. Commercio elettronico
e tutela del consumatore a cura di Giuseppe
Cassano (Giuffré 2003), 178 and following.
26 Lafuente Sánchez, R., Los servicios financieros
bancarios electrónicos (Tirant lo Blanch 2005),
337.
the European Union has not ceased to show concern
and to adopt measures to prevent illicit acts with what it
refers to as ‘non-cash means of payment’.25
In view of the importance that is given to electronic
commerce for the future economic development of the
zone, various initiatives have been taken, each having a
greater degree of definition and penetration. Thus, the
Commission, on 16th April 1997, in a Communication to
the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘A
European Initiative in Electronic Commerce’
COM(97)157, proposed that certain actions be defined
and set in motion aiming to maximise the advantages of
the new technology involved in electronic commerce.
The Council also invited Member States to set up
awareness-raising campaigns and training on practical
improvements, and to create transparent consultation
mechanisms with the aim of drawing up the legal
framework and the specific actions for the promotion of
this type of commerce. Finally, it called on European
regulatory bodies to draw up more efficient working
methods with a view to ensuring interoperability and to
respond to consumer needs.
Subsequently the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, to the Council,
to the Central European Bank and to the Economic and
Social Committee on ‘A Framework for action on
combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means
of payment’ was approved. The Communication
approved by the Commission, on 1st July (COM
(1998)395) is in response to the proposal from the
Council of Europe on June 1997, in which the
Commission examined the question of fraud and
counterfeiting in relation to all non-cash means of
payment, including electronic payments, which means it
will encompass facts relating to conventional criminal
activity and facts relating to the use of the new
technologies.26 The Communication proposes a two-
pronged plan in the strategy to prevent and deal with
fraud.
The first point is a Joint Plan of Action directed, on the
one hand, at ensuring that frauds referring to all non-
cash means of payment are categorised as criminal
offences and made punishable through effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sentences in all Member
States and, on the other hand, at setting up appropriate
mechanisms for cooperation that will enable the
effective prosecution of the crimes. To that effect,
classes of behaviour are described which are considered
advisable to classify as criminal offences, whatever the
means of payment might be. The following in particular
are included among the offences listed: theft or the
forgery of a means of payment, the possession of
altered or counterfeited means of payment, the use or
acceptance of a payment in full knowledge of the facts
with the aid of a forged or stolen means of payment.
The second point of the action plan against fraud
presents various preventive measures to be studied by
all interested parties (payment card schemes, issuers,
card users, and competent authorities). Thus, from the
standpoint of prevention, it is thought that one of the
Communication’s objectives is to urge operators to
adopt more effective protection measures for the
payment instruments that they manufacture.
The concern of Community institutions for the success
of the information society, as a prerequisite for growth,
competitiveness and employment opportunities, is
expressed in the Communication from the Commission
on Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving
the Security of Information Infrastructures and
Combating Computer-related Crime-COM(2000) 890
FINAL. The Communication considers different initiatives
with respect to a wide range of objectives that comprise
part of the Information Society, which aim to improve
information infrastructures as a way of preventing and
dealing with computer crime. In reference to the Lisbon
summit of March 2000, it underlines the importance of a
transition to a competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based
economy as well as to the centrality of information
infrastructures in present-day economic life, on which
society increasingly depends, while noting, at the same
time, that these technologies may be used to commit
and to facilitate criminal activities. Security measures
must focus on adapting to these new forms of
criminality.
This makes the ever-greater proximity of computer
crime to the new categories of organized crime very
clear. Associated criminality increasingly involves a
greater number of offences among which computer
fraud is increasingly apparent. The community
institutions stated as much at the Tampere Summit, in
October 1999, at which high-Tech crime was included in
a list of areas in which a special effort had to be made
to agree on definitions, types of offences and common
sanctions. All these points are contained in
recommendation 7 of the strategy of the European
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Union for the new millennium on prevention and control
of organized crime, adopted by the JHA Council in March
2000.
An important impetus was given with the approval by
the Commission of a Framework Decision in matters
concerning non-cash means of payments. Indeed, the
Framework Decision, together with other instruments of
the European Union, will be greatly heeded in the
reform of the Penal Code proposed in the Draft Law of
2006. In accordance with the provisions of article 34 of
the Treaty on European Union (the former article K.6),
the proposal was to replace the joint action proposed by
the Commission in its Communication of 1 July 1998, on
combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means
of payment with a Framework Decision. Equally, the
Proposal for a Framework Decision also had as its aim
the inclusion of legislative changes that have been
enacted since the approval of the Communication. Thus
the Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001,
relating to the fight against fraud and the counterfeiting
of non-cash means of payment, is intended to complete
a series of measures already adopted by the Council
with the same aim. For the purposes of the Framework
Decision, means of payment are considered to be all
corporeal instruments except for legal tender, the
specific nature of which is to allow, by itself or with
another instrument, the holder or user to transfer
money or a monetary value, and which is protected
against counterfeiting or fraudulent use. This
description precludes not only money in cash
(banknotes and legal tender) but also electronic money
in its strictest sense that has no material presence.
The objective of the Framework Decision continues to
be that of ensuring, on the one hand, that all fraud with
non-cash means of payment becomes an offence
subject to effective penalties in all Member States and,
on the other hand, that mechanisms are created for
cooperation between Member States and between
services and public or private bodies with the objective
of successfully prosecuting such offences. In the
Framework Decision, any fraud involving a non-cash
means of payment is considered a criminal offence
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive
sentences throughout the Member States of the Union.
With respect to the criminal conduct, the approach of
the Framework Decision is to avoid resorting to
categorical definitions already strictly defined in the
criminal law of the Member States, because it varies by
country. Thus, the Framework Decision limits itself to
drawing up a list of different intentional behaviours that
should be considered criminal offences throughout the
Union. Different behaviours are defined according to
whether they are primarily concerned with the actual
instrument of payment or the counterfeiting of
instruments of payment, and whether it is a question of
one or more payments or of the clearing system used to
execute, collect, process, or settle payment
transactions. Thus, it includes:27
a.theft or misappropriation of an instrument of
payment,
b.the alteration or counterfeiting of an instrument of
payment with a view to its fraudulent use,
c. receiving, obtaining or transporting, sale or transfer
to another person or possession of instruments of
payment that have been misappropriated or altered
or counterfeited for fraudulent use, and
d.fraudulent use of a means of payment that has been
stolen, misappropriated, altered or counterfeited.
Offences that will also be subject to prosecution are
those using computers to make or cause a transfer of
money or monetary values that lead to unauthorized
loss of property, with the intention of procuring
economic benefit through the unauthorized inputting,
alteration, suppression or deletion of computer data –
especially personal data, or unauthorized interference in
the operation of a computer system or programme.
Other criminal offences include the manufacture, receipt
or transfer of computer programs and other devices
prepared for the commission of the former offences.
With respect to the nature of the penalties to be
adopted in this field, it is envisaged that the list of
conducts be categorised as criminal offences
throughout the Member States. As a consequence,
Member States should establish criminal penalties for
these offences, according to whether they are
committed by natural or by legal persons. The
expression that is so well liked in EU documents
reiterates that the penalties must be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive. They will not necessarily
imply prison terms, except for the most serious cases
for which extradition can be justified. The Member
States enjoy a certain leeway when defining the
seriousness of an offence and the nature and severity of
27 Francesco Buffa, ‘Moneta digitale e tutele’ in
Commercio elettronico e tutela del consumatore
(Editor Giuseppe Cassano) (Giuffré 2003), 179-80.
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28 For an incomplete treatment of how some Member
States have implemented the various EU Directives
(that nevertheless runs to over 450 pages), see a
paper by Stephen Mason, ‘The implementation of
Community regulations in national legislation: IT
offences in the strict sense of the word and
offences committed using IT’, prepared for a
judicial seminar entitled: Investigation,
Prosecution and Judgment of Information
Technology Crime: Legal framework and criminal
policy in the European Union, held for judges and
public prosecutors specializing in dealing with
cybercrime, organized within the framework of the
European Judicial Training Network, (Tuesday 25
November 2008 to Friday 28 November 2008 at the
Hôtel Jean de Bohême, Durbuy, Belgium), and
available as a free download from
http://www.stephenmason.eu/training-for-
lawyers/judicial-training/.
29 Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee, the European
Central Bank and Europol - A new EU Action Plan
2004-2007 to prevent fraud on non-cash means of
payment {SEC(2004) 1264} (Text with EEA
relevance)/* COM/2004/0679 final */.
30 http://www.congreso.es.
the applicable penalties.28
Finally, as the work of the Commission on these
means of payment has continued, a further
Communication was issued from the Commission.29 The
Commission considers that cooperation between all the
agencies involved is a fundamental principle in order to
prevent and deal with fraud in an effective manner. In
fact, greater cooperation is desirable between public
authorities and the private sector in the Member States.
With the aim of ensuring an effective exchange of
information at a European level, the Commission stated
that clarification of community and national legislation
in the field of data protection is needed in the area of
fraud prevention.
The draft reform of the Penal Code
The economic significance of payment systems and the
high volume of fraud drew the attention of the legislator
to this field, and particularly the attention of the
criminal legislator. Hence, the Draft Law to reform the
Penal Code of 15 December, 2006,30 is intended to
amend criminal regulation of these matters. It sought to
add a specific element to the field of frauds under
article 248: the use of bank cards or related data. The
draft law fell into abeyance as the legislative term came
to an end, but parts of it may be found in the
programme of criminal measures for the present
legislature, and in any case, it points to the way in
which possible criminal reforms may be introduced in
this field.
In a general way, the Explanatory Memorandum of the
draft law goes a long way to justifying its proposals on
the basis of the commitments and obligations that
European integration implies for the criminal justice
system. Among the areas subject to community
harmonisation is that of the means of payment, which
lies behind the new regulation. The Explanatory
Memorandum of the project points out that:
La causa central que explica su acotado alcance ha de
ser buscada fundamentalmente en los compromisos y
obligaciones que la integración europea suponen
para la justicia penal en toda su dimensión penal,
procesal, judicial y policial. La importante vertiente
del derecho penal ha venido recogiendo al paso de su
aparición cuantas orientaciones comunes, plasmadas
en los diferentes instrumentos jurídicos de la Unión
Europea, determinaban modificaciones u adiciones al
Código penal, y eso explica buena parte de las
alteraciones del Código. Pero además, en los últimos
años, especialmente a partir del Tratado de
Ámsterdam en 1997, el llamado Tercer Pilar fortaleció
la importancia de hacer efectiva la cooperación
policial y judicial en materia penal, lo cual exigía
necesariamente la armonización o aproximación de
las leyes estatales en materia penal, y por esa razón
se han ido produciendo Decisiones marco sobre un
amplio catálogo de problemas penales, Decisiones
que empujan a una necesaria similitud de las
formulaciones de delitos y responsabilidades en los
derechos internos.
The central reason that explains its highly defined
scope is to be found in the commitments and
obligations entailed by European integration for
criminal justice in all of its dimensions, be they
criminal, procedural, judicial or police related. This
important vector of criminal law has brought together
many common perspectives since its emergence,
expressed in the different legal instruments of the
European Union, which determined modifications and
additions to the Penal Code, and these explain a good
part of the amendments to the Code. But in addition,
in recent years, especially since the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1997, the so-called Third Pillar
strengthened the importance of ensuring effective
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
which necessarily required the harmonisation or
approximation of State laws on criminal matters, and
for that reason Framework Decisions have been
drafted in response to a wide range of criminal
problems, Decisions that work towards a much-
needed similarity in the formulation of offences and
liabilities in domestic rights.
Committing fraud through the use of misappropriated
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cards or their corresponding data has been added to the
reform of criminal legislation relating to the group of
criminal offences that constitute fraud under article 248.
Thus, the first paragraph of article 248 maintains the
conventional definition of estafa (fraud by false
representation), but in the second paragraph, a list of
comparable circumstances is included, through the
expression ‘También se consideran reos de estafa’ (also
considered crimes of fraud), followed by four letters
under which four other cases of fraud are specified.
Electronic fraud is consigned to letter a), the second
paragraph of the article in question, which previously
constituted the sole circumstance envisaged under this
specific legal reference. The regulation of electronic
fraud does not vary, but its applicability does as a
consequence of the newly incorporated criminal
categories. Under letter c), the misuse of credit and
debit cards or the data recorded thereon to carry out
transactions of any kind causing loss to another person
are specifically defined as criminal offences. One
consequence of this proposed regulation, incorporated
as a further individual category of fraud, that of making
a fraudulent payment through the use of card – differing
from the offence of computer fraud, is that the criminal
regulation of fraudulent uses of means of payment are
widened to an even greater extent.
The use of the identifying data on a card is expressly
included under the punitive category, in a different way
than the use of the card itself. This implies, on the one
hand, the reinforcement of the thesis – now upheld by
the courts – that fraudulent use of the data on a card
that falsely attributes the payment of a transaction to
the card holder is punishable as an offence of fraud. In
addition, it supposes the absence of the actual
possession of the card by the criminal, which therefore
implies an on-line or remote payment, which in principle
should be treated as computer fraud. However, the
specific prevision of this new circumstance supersedes
this category – on the basis of the speciality principle –
for which reason this particular provision would be
applied on the grounds of the fraudulent use of another
person’s card. By doing so, the offence of electronic
fraud currently described under article 248.2 is, to a
great extent, devoid of any practical content.
With reference to the act of forging instruments of
payment, the project chose to separate them from the
framework of counterfeiting legal tender, bringing them
under the offence of forgery of documents. To that end,
a new section was created, section 4º, in Chapter II of
Title XVIII of Book II that has as its title ‘The falsification
of credit and debit cards and travellers cheques’. A new
article, 3999 bis, is included in it, which contains three
types of criminal behaviour:
a.forgery, either by copying or by reproduction, of
credit or debit cards or travellers cheques;
b.possessing such forged items in an amount that
suggests they are destined for distribution or
trafficking; and
c. the fraudulent use of these forged instruments of
payment on the part of whoever has not intervened
in their forgery.
The considerable reduction of penalties should be
highlighted among the positive aspects of the draft law31
as well as the exclusion under all circumstances
involving the forgery of bank cards of the procedural
competency of the Audiencia Nacional or National
Court.
© Ricardo M. Mata y Martín and 
Antonio Mª. Javato Martín, 2009
31 The punishment is a prison term of between four to
eight years for the first offence – as against eight
to twelve years and a fine as contained at present
in article 386, with the possibility of selecting the
upper half of the range when the forged items
affect a great many people or when the acts were
committed as part of a criminal organization
dedicated to these activities. The same
punishment is imposed in the case of a repeat
offence, whereas the use of forged credit or debit
cards or travellers cheque is punishable by a prison
term of between two to five years.
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False friends are a well known hazard. The same
word can sometimes even be pronounced the
same way in two different languages, but the
meaning can be utterly different. For instance,
Italian and Spanish are very similar languages,
and the word ‘burro’ is pronounced the same way
in both, but actually means ‘butter’ in Italian and
‘donkey’ in Spanish. An Italian tourist who is
having breakfast in a Spanish hotel, the popular
story goes, should not be surprised to be
presented with some bread and a donkey, if he
asks for bread and butter in his mother language.
False friends can also be a danger in the IT law world.
The same words often have different meaning in IT law
and in the general practice.
Consider the meaning of ‘copy’, for instance. A copy in
the physical world is an object that can, generally, be
recognised as such, something in itself different from
the original. This is not at all true in the digital world. A
file, whatever its content, is just a string of zeros and
ones, or of letters and numbers, if you want. If you ask
Alice for Bob’s mobile telephone number, you will not
expect Alice to answer that she cannot give it to you,
because Bob kept his number for himself, and all she
has is a accurate copy of that number. A copy of a
number is the same number again. The same is true for
digital files: they are numbers. The verb ‘to copy’ can be
employed in order to describe the process that allows a
computer user to replicate a file from the hard disk to
her USB device, but the output of such a process is not
a copy in any sense of the word: it is, in fact, a perfect
duplicate. There is no way to tell for certain which is the
‘original’.
This has significant legal implications. In some
countries, such as Italy, there is no formal provision that
prevents a person from executing digital cheques. The
cheque is basically a text: any technician will tell you
that it can be digitally signed very much like anything
else. The lawyer will not find anything against it in the
law, either. But still the answer is no: a cheque cannot
be digitally signed. A digitally signed document is just a
file, as any other file, and can be duplicated endless
times. One cheque could be duplicated one hundred
times and cashed in one hundred different banks, and
nobody would be able to identify the original one. A
digital signature is, therefore, an unsuitable tool
whenever the legal properties of a document stem from
its uniqueness.1
This is a field where neither the law nor IT can walk
alone. A digital signature affixed to a cheque is
technically feasible, and the law (at least in some
countries) does not forbid it. What happens here is that
a legal feature of the cheque is incompatible with a
technical feature of a digital signature. The question is
whether the proposition in italics belongs to IT or the
law. The point is, the lawyer must understand the
technology, because the of the interaction of technology
and law, as Albert de Lapradelle, a professor of
International Law, is understood to have written on the
changes in the law of naval warfare for the Conference
By Ugo Bechini
BREAD AND DONKEY FOR BREAKFAST
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1 The problem can be solved creating infrastructures
that hold an authoritative copy of the document.
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on The Hague in 1907:
Ce ne sont pas les philosophes avec leurs théories, ni
les juristes avec leurs formules, mais les ingénieurs
avec leurs inventions qui font le droit et le progrès du
droit.
It is not the philosophers and their theories, and
lawyers with their formulas, but the engineers with
their inventions which are the right and the progress
of law.
The ‘signature’ is another dangerous false friend. Unless
biometric technologies are in place (and the quality of
the biometric technology may be the subject of a
challenge), anybody who gains control of the token and
the PIN can create signatures that are, in themselves,
genuine digital signatures. A mansucript signature links
a document to a person, while a digital signature does
not: it links a document to a device. The missing link is
provided by the law; it is the law (in some countries,
and if some conditions are fulfilled) that determine
whether the document is binding to a particular person.
It is a virtual legal technique that holds somebody
responsible for a statement even if it does not come, in
any meaningful sense, from the same person. There is
nothing inherently wrong in this. In most jurisdictions,
for instance, companies are liable for the actions of their
executives, even if they act against the resolutions of
the board. This is a reasonable burden for business
organisations, in the interest of providing for the speed
of a transaction.
The burden would be deemed quite acceptable in the
case of digital signatures, if adequate use policies were
in place and duly followed in everyday life. This means
that each user would have to retain both the signature
token, and secure the PIN without recording it. In this
perspective, such a practice could somehow fill the
existing gap between IT (that cannot guarantee that the
signature comes from a given person) and the law (that
assumes so). This is not about theoretical legal
concepts, but about their acceptability in the context of
a well-functioning and consistent legal environment.
The Italian case is rather special. Millions of smart
cards have been issued, and basically every owner of a
business (including small rural shops) has one. They are
used for tedious bureaucratic chores that can only be
performed with digital signatures. It is not surprising
that the owners of the signature tokens are not thrilled
by the burden. Most of the smart cards, that are usually
blue in colour, are retained in piles in accountants’
offices, each of them with a small yellow Post-It note
with the PIN written on it (perhaps look-conscious
Italians would go for more subtle and fashionable
nuances, if they considered the smart cards really
important). If on-line rumours2 are to be taken at face
value, most of the people do not even know that a smart
card exists in their name.
Nevertheless, lawmakers go on assuming that
documents signed with such smart cards are
tantamount to documents signed with a manuscript
signature. This is what the law provides, and a new
significant implementation was introduced in 2008 that
pushed things even further with Decreto-legge 25
giugno 2008, n. 112 Disposizioni urgenti per lo sviluppo
economico, la semplificazione, la competitività, la
stabilizzazione della finanza pubblica e la perequazione
Tributaria (Decree June 25 2008, n. 112),3 approved with
Legge 6 agosto 2008, n. 133, Conversione in legge, con
modificazioni, del decreto-legge 25 giugno 2008, n. 112,
recante disposizioni urgenti per lo sviluppo economico,
la semplificazione, la competitività, la stabilizzazione
della finanza pubblica e la perequazione tributaria4 (Law
August 6 2008, n. 133, article 36, paragraph 1bis). The
text of the law is full of technicalities that require a deep
knowledge of some obscure details of the Italian legal
system. The relevant part of article 36, paragraph 1bis
reads as follows:
1-bis. L’atto di trasferimento di cui al secondo comma
dell’articolo 2470 del codice civile può essere
sottoscritto con firma digitale, nel rispetto della
normativa anche regolamentare concernente la
sottoscrizione dei documenti informatici, ed e’
depositato, entro trenta giorni, presso l’ufficio del
registro delle imprese nella cui circoscrizione e’
stabilita la sede sociale, a cura di un intermediario
abilitato ai sensi dell’articolo 31, comma 2-quater,
della legge 24 novembre 2000, n. 340.
1-bis. The transfer deed mentioned by Article 2470 of
the Civil Code can be signed with a digital signature,
in accordance with the rules about the signature of
electronic documents, and filed within thirty days, at
the office Registration Court in whose area is
established the head office of the company, through
an authorized agent according to the provision of
Article 31, paragraph 2-c, of the Law of 24 November
2 http://punto-informatico.it/423980/PI/Lettere/chi-
smart-card-ai-commercialisti.aspx;
http://www.interlex.it/docdigit/faq/faq42.htm -
http://www.interlex.it/docdigit/nonlosa.htm.
3 Pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 147 del 25
giugno 2008 - Suppl. Ordinario n.152/L.
4 Pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 195 del 21
agosto 2008 - Suppl. Ordinario n. 196.
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The possibilities are almost endless: the employee
you just dismissed signs; the employee that your
accountant just dismissed signs too, and dead
people might also sign.
5 Legge 12 agosto 1993, n. 310: Norme per la
trasparenza nella cessione di partecipazioni e nella
composizione della base sociale delle società di
capitali, nonchè nella cessione di esercizi
commerciali e nei trasferimenti di proprietà dei
suoli. (Pubblicata nella G.U. n. 195 del 20 agosto
1993) (Law 12 August 1993 number 310).
6 Civil Law Notaries (CLN) are to be found in
countries that adopt the Latin Notarial system:
about 90 counties that sum up about 55 per cent of
the world’s population. The Civil Law Notary is a
lawyer that has already (albeit not always) been
admitted to the bar; he or she is, at the same time,
an officer of the state and a professional. The
foremost task of the CNL is not the mere
identification of the parties. He is also responsible,
and liable, for an array of different issues related to
the contract. For instance, in real estate
transactions, if the seller was not the legitimate
owner of the estate, the CLN will be required to
refund the buyer. The same will occur if he fails to
properly take care of the mortgages. The CLN must
ensure that the results of the agreement are in
accordance with the provisions of every applicable
law, and explain to the parties the value, legal
effects and consequences of the agreement. In
most countries, he is also required to collect taxes,
and the CLN is personally responsible for paying
the taxes if the job is not properly done. In some
jurisdictions, a CLN is even liable upon failing to
inform the parties about an available tax
deduction. If a house does not match the building
and zoning regulations, liability can sometimes
arise. If a sum of money comes from a source that
cannot be clearly identified, state agencies in
charge of money laundering investigations are
informed. These tasks are performed not only in
the interest of the parties, but in the general public
interest, as it keeps litigation at comparatively
incredibly low levels in all the areas covered by the
work of the CLN.
7 The Italian Companies’ House; it records a wide
array of events during the life of a company,
including share transfers, that are not legally
effective until registered.
8 The full text appeared in Le Società (Milan),
6/2009, p. 738, with an assenting comment by
Vincenzo Salafia, former President of the Corte
d’Appello of Milan, the most authoritative Italian
court in company law. Every Italian Court
(Tribunale) has a judge called the Giudice del
Registro, who is in charge of the Registro delle
Imprese. If any dispute arises about a registration,
the Giudice del Registro decides; the decision can
be overturned by a full Tribunale.
2000, n. 340.
Briefly put: since 1993,5 every sale of a share in an
Italian limited liability company (srl, società a
responsabilità limitata) must be notarized. This
requirement can appear to be far too formal, but it was
part of an attempt to prevent the mafia and other
criminal organisations buying into legitimate
businesses. It is difficult to deny that such a strategic
goal justifies much more than a few annoying
bureaucratic steps. Moreover, the problem, as will be
demonstrated later in this article, lies not the security
level in itself, but in the equivalence (or, better, lack
thereof) between two different procedures, both of
them requiring the use of digital signatures.
In the traditional procedure, still in use, people must
sign a deed before a Civil Law Notary,6 usually drafted
by the CLN himself; it is the notary’s duty to prepare a
digitally signed copy of the deed and send it to the
Registro delle Imprese.7 The data are introduced
automatically into the register, as they are already
presented in XML format and do not require any kind of
manual editing. In the new procedure, the deed is
digitally signed by the parties themselves, and sent to
an accountant, who forwards it to the Registro delle
Imprese. The data processing is the same, but there is a
significant difference: in the new procedure, nobody can
be certain who really signs the deeds. The possibilities
are almost endless: the employee you just dismissed
signs; the employee that your accountant just
dismissed signs too, and dead people might also sign.
In a country where Civil Law Notaries operate, there is
an additional set of differences between a notarized
document and a document that has not been notarized.
The Civil Law Notary is a publicly appointed official who
usually drafts the document, and is responsible to
ascertain that the parties fully understood the
document. Without a CLN, people may sign files they
never read. People might sign files they did not
understand. People may sign poorly drafted files. There
is a lack of proper and impartial legal information. This
is exactly what Mr Giuseppe Limitone in the Vicenza
Court considered in Ordinanza del Giudice del Registro,
April 21st 2009, n. 6/09,8 in which he refused the
registration of a transfer that had been executed in
accordance with the new procedure. The details of the
case are not available in the decision. However, it is
certain that an application was made to delete the
registration of the share transfer because it was not
notarized. It appears the action was initiated by the
seller. This seems to be the case, because the judge is
on record as responding to an argument presented by
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the resistant (only the company is allowed to make an
application to have a registration deleted) by stating
that anybody who as an interest in the matter can take
action, and this would be enough. Nevertheless, he
goes on to make it absolutely clear that the ‘preteso
cedente’ (the purported seller) can take action.
The court began by pointing out that, if the legislature
intended to make share transfers that are only digitally
signed by the parties fit for registration, they fell short
of their target. It was the view of the court that the new
law, seen in the context of the Italian legal system, was
a failure. The traditional procedure provides a check of
the lawfulness of the contract and verification of the
actual (not virtual) identity of the real signer, and this is
vital in order to preserve the reliability of the register.
The new procedure does not prescribe any of the safety
features that have been in place for some time, but at
the same time it does not explicitly state that they are
not required: therefore the court held that the general
rules apply, which means that no data can be entered in
the register without the controlling mechanisms. In
other words, as the old and the new procedure live side
by side, it cannot be imagined that the law may want to
leave people free to choose to be scrutinized or not.
The Vicenza court resolved the matter in a
straightforward manner. The new law does not mention
notarization, but this is a general requirement for any
document presented for registration. This means that
the new procedure requires the document to be
notarized. The court determined that the only possible
applicaiton of the law would be the following:
1. the parties digitally sign the deed;
2. the digital signatures are executed before a notary;
3. the notary certifies the digital signature;
4. the document is sent to the accountant’s office;
5. the notary relays it to the Registro delle Imprese.
The first, fourth and fifth steps are provided by the new
law and are retained; however, the court added steps
two and three as requirements to enable a share
transfer to be registered – the digital signature must be
executed before a Civil Law Notary and officially
certified.9
It is not known at the time of writing if this
interpretation will be widely accepted by Italian courts,
or whether Parliament will modify the legislation in the
light of the decision by the Vicenza Court. The
framework in which this case arose may be unique to
the Italian legal system, but the underlying message is
not. A digital signature cannot always be considered as
equal to a manuscript signature, especially a notarized
one. Whether the passing of Decreto-legge 25 giugno
2008, n. 112 indicated a deliberate change in the legal
philosophy of the Italian state, or whether this was a
mistake, it was big enough to make a judge sitting in
the Vicenza Court of a small (albeit historical) Italian city
stand up, and present the overwhelming majority of his
country’s Parliament with a breath of reality: that if a
digital signature is to have any legal effect, it is
necessary to demonstrate as false the proposition
asserted by technicians that the private key of a digital
signature, when used, proves it has been used the
person whose key it is. This presumption can only carry
any weight in law if a notary attests to the fact that the
private key was used by the person whose key it was. If
Parliament decides to change the law and overturn this
decision, it will, in effect, be overturning the laws that
were enacted to prevent criminal organizations from
buying into legitimate business.
© Ugo Bechini, 2009
9 Digital signatures have been notarized in Italy
since 1997: Decreto del Presidente della
Repubblica 10 novembre 1997, n. 513 Regolamento
contenente i criteri e le modalità per la formazione,
l’archiviazione e la trasmissione di documenti con
strumenti informatici e telematici a norma
dell’articolo 15, comma 2, della legge 15 marzo
1997, n. 59 (G. U. 13 marzo 1998, serie generale, n.
60) (Presidential Decree 10 November 1997
number 513, article 16).
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Companies conducting business throughout the
United States wanting to implement an electronic
signature process (for customers, employees or
suppliers) are provided little guidance from the
electronic signature statutory schemes across the
country. Those electronic signature laws,
essentially two bodies of statutory law, provide
that electronic signatures and electronic records
may not be denied legal effect solely because
they are in electronic form.2 These laws do not
give greater status to signatures or records in
electronic form. Further, and more significantly,
these laws do not describe any processes which,
if followed, would result in enforceable contracts.
This article seeks to help those wanting to design and
implement an effective electronic signature process by
describing six perspectives from which a proposed
electronic signature process should be evaluated. This
six-point framework takes into account the legal and
practical aspects beyond just the electronic signature
laws, such as the rules of evidence. Examining the risks
of an electronic signature process from these six
perspectives allows one to match the mitigation
measures for each risk with the level of risk acceptable
for a given electronic signature process. For example,
most will agree that an electronic signature process to
buy a low priced book need not be as secure as an
electronic signature process to buy an expensive item or
for authorizing the disclosure of very sensitive
information. This six-point framework helps to
distinguish each risk to focus more clearly on the
optimal way to mitigate each distinct risk.
The framework will help to answer the three
fundamental questions that should be addressed for
any proposed electronic signature process. This article
includes an in-depth discussion of the essential
elements that should be included in an electronic
contracting process that will result in admissible
evidence to enforce terms and conditions in records
signed electronically in the United States of America,
whether the electronic signature process is governed by
the Federal electronic signature law or a particular
state’s enactment of the model electronic signature law.3
Critical risks and questions
Framework for evaluating the risks 
Companies often approach their legal advisors for
guidance on what steps an effective electronic signature
process4 should include. In seeking this guidance,
companies have described a range of risks they
associate with an electronic signature process. There
are essentially five distinct risks for an electronic
signature process, each of which should be examined
relative to those same risks in dealing with paper and
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1 The authors would also like to thank the editor for
his valuable input in editing this article as well as
Vita Zeltser, an associate of Locke Lord Bissell &
Liddell LLP, for her assistance.
2 The two bodies of laws are the federal act, the
Electronic Signatures In Global and National
Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C §70001 and following
(referred to as ESIGN) and the various state
enactments of the version of the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, as published by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (referred to as UETA). Forty seven states and
the District of Columbia have enacted some version
of UETA.
3 There are significant differences between ESIGN the
federal electronic signature law and the version of
UETA adopted by forty-seven states and the
District of Columbia. Except as expressly identified
in this article, the differences are not significant for
the topics described in this article. For example,
UETA addresses when an electronic record is
deemed to be sent by the sender and received by
the addressee. The federal ESIGN law is silent on
the topic.
4 Throughout this article references to an ‘electronic
signature process’ should be read to include the
required disclosures of required terms, the delivery
of the executed documents to the other party as
well as the archival process for these records.
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manuscript signatures. These five risks and the benefit
of examining each risk in context in this fashion
comprise the Six-Point Framework identified below and
discussed in more detail further below:
1. Authentication Risk – This is the risk that the signer5
signing a record, accepting delivery of a record or
providing a record is an imposter using a false
identity; the records then being unenforceable by
the user6 against the person the user thought it was
dealing with via electronic means.
2.Repudiation Risk – This is the risk that the signer
claims that the electronic records that were signed
were altered after they were signed, such that the
person against whom enforcement is sought
attempts to repudiate the actual terms and
conditions in the signed electronic record.
3.Admissibility Risk – This is the risk that the other
party to a transaction successfully challenges the
admissibility of the necessary records, such as the
signed contract, acknowledgment of receipt of
certain disclosures, on the grounds of reliability.
4.Compliance Risk – This is the risk that the records
signed or presented do not comply with other
substantive laws, such as laws mandating certain
content in documents to be presented or signed or
do not comply with the basic requirements of ESIGN
and UETA for delivery for such records.
5.Adoption Risk – This is the risk that in managing the
risks above, an electronic signature process is so
burdensome that the intended users are not
satisfied with the process or find ways to avoid
certain steps in the process, thereby undermining
the process.
6.Relative Risk - In examining the risks above, users
should evaluate the risk with a proposed electronic
signature process relative to the corresponding risk
in the process using paper and a manuscript
signature, in the belief that an electronic signature
process may not be risk free, but should not, on the
whole, be any riskier than the paper and manuscript
signature process, if feasible.
For the reasons explained below, it is possible to design
an electronic signature process which is no riskier than,
and in some areas, significantly less risky than, using
paper and a manuscript signature. By examining the
risks from these perspectives, it is easier to assess the
particular risk and then determine the optimal means to
mitigate the risk.
Critical questions
In reviewing a proposed electronic signature process,
the following three fundamental questions should be
considered:
a.Will the transactions executed using the proposed
electronic signature process be in compliance with
the applicable laws governing the use of electronic
signatures and delivery of related electronic
records, including the required consumer
disclosures and consents, if any?
b.Will the records presented, signed, secured,
archived and retrieved using the proposed
electronic signature process be admissible in court
(or arbitration) to enforce the terms and conditions
in such records?
c. Will the terms and conditions in electronic
documents signed using the proposed electronic
signature process be enforceable against each
signing party?
Subject to a subtle but important caveat, if each of the
three questions above cannot be answered affirmatively,
the electronic signature process should be re-examined,
and appropriate changes made to the process. The
transactions conducted through electronic means
should be as compliant, generate records as admissible
and result in terms as enforceable, as would be the case
if those same records were completed on paper with
manuscript signatures. In other words, aside from all
the other applicable contract principles, such as
capacity, fraud, duress, mistake, unconscionability, the
records signed using the electronic signature process
should be as enforceable as would be the case for those
same records signed using a manuscript signature on
paper.
5 The term ‘signer’ refers to the person, often a
consumer, signing the electronic record, whether
the record is a contract, application, consent,
authorization or acknowledgement of receipt of
terms.
6 The term ‘user’ refers to the person, often a
company, that has established the electronic
signature process for enforceable and compliant
transactions.
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7 This is not to say that the concepts described in
this article do not apply to transactions with
governmental agencies. Rather, this caveat is
simply to alert the reader that certain
governmental agencies may take the position that
documents not related to transactions between
private parties may not be within the scope of
ESIGN and UETA.
8 Excluded areas are: wills, codicils, and
testamentary trusts; a state statute, regulation, or
other rule of law governing adoption, divorce, or
other matters of family law; the Uniform
Commercial Code, as in effect in any state, other
than sections 1-107 and 1-206 and Articles 2 and
2A; court orders or notices, or official court
documents required to be executed in connection
with court proceedings; notices for cancellation or
termination of utility services (including water,
heat, and power); notices of default, acceleration,
repossession, foreclosure, or eviction, or the right
to cure, under a credit agreement secured by, or a
rental agreement for, a primary residence of an
individual; notices of cancellation or termination of
health insurance or benefits or life insurance
benefits; recall notices of a product, or material
failure of a product that risks endangering health
or safety; and any document required to
accompany any transportation or handling of
hazardous materials, pesticides, or other toxic and
dangerous materials. ESIGN § 7003 (a), (b), UETA
§ 3.
9 ESIGN § 102(a).
10 ESIGN § 101(i).
11 The states that have not adopted UETA are Illinois
(adopted Electronic Commerce Security Act), New
York (adopted Electronic Signatures and Records
Act), and Washington (adopted Electronic
Authentication Act).
12 ESIGN § 102(a).
13 ESIGN § 102(a).
Excluded areas
The focus of this article is on transactions between
private parties, which include consumers. Excluded from
the scope of this article are the following areas:
a.transactions dealing with the specific areas of the
law expressly excluded from the federal ESIGN law
and the state enactments of UETA, as described
immediately below;
b.transactions dealing with any governmental agency
where that agency is acting as a market participant;
c. execution of documents required by any
governmental agencies which are not related to
transactions between private parties, even if those
documents are permitted to be filed with such an
agency exclusively through electronic means, such
as documents required to be filed with or
maintained for inspection by the SEC or FDA;7 or
d.records subject to any other law which specifies a
particular method of verification or
acknowledgment of receipt, such as requiring
delivery by registered mail, return receipt required.
ESIGN and UETA do not apply to contracts and records
that are governed by laws and regulations in only a few
select areas.8 Given the preemption provisions in ESIGN,
the federal law, the states have limited authority to
expand the scope of the areas excluded from ESIGN or
the state enactment of UETA.9
Notwithstanding the foregoing exceptions, ESIGN
(and UETA), when applied with other laws such as
Revised article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
provide a mechanism for the use of electronic
signatures and records in many of the most common
business and consumer transactions, including
contracts and records involving: (i) sales and leases of
goods; (ii) insurance applications; (iii) mortgage loan
documentation; and (iv) banking and investment
transactions. ESIGN, the federal law, specifically applies
to the business of insurance.10 Given the similarity
between ESIGN and UETA, insurance companies and
other firms regulated under the state insurance codes,
may adopt a uniform, national electronic signature
process.
Legal analysis
ESIGN and UETA compared
For all purposes relevant to the analysis in this article,
except as noted otherwise, the analysis under ESIGN
(the federal statute), the relevant enacted version of
UETA in 47 states and even under the non-UETA states,
is essentially the same.11 For those states that have
adopted electronic signature laws governing interstate
commerce inconsistent with ESIGN in areas relevant to
the issues discussed in this article, ESIGN’s broad
preemption provisions will preempt such state laws.12
For those states that have not adopted any electronic
signature laws, ESIGN will govern as a result of its
broad preemption provisions.13
The legal effect of electronic signatures
ESIGN recognizes that an electronic signature may be as
legally effective as a signature applied on paper with a
manuscript signature. ESIGN does not give electronic
signatures a special status in the law. Rather, ESIGN
states that a signature may not be denied legal effect
solely because it is in electronic form. The foundational
provision of ESIGN acknowledging electronic signatures
provides, at § 101(a), the following:
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any statute,
regulation, or other rule of law (other than this
title and title II), with respect to any transaction in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-
(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating
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to such transaction may not be denied legal
effect, validity, or enforceability solely because
it is in electronic form; and
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not
be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because an electronic
signature or electronic record was used in its
formation.
Thus, assuming ESIGN or UETA14 applies to the
transaction, each gives equal recognition to electronic
signatures as given to manuscript signatures on paper.
Electronic signature defined
When a signature is created using a ‘sound, symbol or
process’ that is ‘attached to or logically associated with’
a contract or other record by a signer with intent, such
signature will be legally effective. For clarity, phrases
such as ‘legally effective’ are used, rather than the
statutory language of ESIGN, which states, ‘not be
denied legal effect solely because such signature is an
electronic signature.’ ESIGN § 106(5) defines an
‘electronic signature’ as:
Electronic signature.--The term “electronic signature”
means an electronic sound, symbol, or process,
attached to or logically associated with a contract or
other record and executed or adopted by a person
with the intent to sign the record.
ESIGN § 106(4) defines ‘electronic record’ as:
Electronic record.--The term “electronic record” means
a contract or other record created, generated, sent,
communicated, received, or stored by electronic
means.
ESIGN § 106(9) defines ‘record’ as:
Record.--The term “record” means information that is
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an
electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form.
Thus, an electronic signature may consist of an
electronic sound or symbol, such as an individual saying
‘I agree,’ or typing ‘I agree’ or the person’s name or
following some other process, such as clicking ‘I agree,’
which is attached to or logically associated with
information inscribed: (i) on a tangible medium, such as
the tangible, hard copy of an authorization; or (ii) stored
in an electronic medium retrievable in a perceivable
form, such as the electronic record containing the
identical information as contained in the tangible hard
copy delivered to the consumer. Another form of
electronic signature is to say or select ‘yes’ over the
telephone to accept terms and conditions contained in a
writing acknowledged by the person so signing.15
Users may select from a variety of ways to generate
the signer’s actual signature. The electronic signature
process should clearly inform the signer that using such
an electronic sound, symbol, or process is how the
signer expresses his or her consent to sign such
documents thereby evidencing his or her intent to be
bound to such terms and conditions.
Evidence of the signer’s intent to sign the record
(which is required if the signer signs on paper with a
manuscript signature) may be inferred (as it is with a
manuscript signature on paper) from words close to the
place of the signature where such words indicate in
14 ESIGN § 101(a); UETA § 7(a).
15 See for example, Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless
Serv., Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007) where an
electronic signature process was recognized
whereby terms and conditions contained in a
printed booklet in a box in the consumer’s
possession for a consumer product are accepted
by the consumer selecting ‘yes’ over the
telephone. While the court recognized the
electronic signature process, the terms of the
contract were not enforced for reasons having
nothing to do with the electronic signature
process.
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16 ‘ESIGN Consent’ refers to the disclosure required
by ESIGN to be provided to a signer who is a
‘consumer’ as defined by ESIGN, to which that
signer must consent as a condition to the user
providing one or more consumer disclosures
required by law (referred to as a Special Consumer
Disclosure) to that signer exclusively via electronic
means, where such consent is given in a way that
demonstrates the signer’s ability to reasonably
obtain access to information in electronic form the
Special Consumer Disclosures will be provided.
17 UETA §8(a) and ESIGN §7001(c). Providing Special
Consumer Disclosures exclusively through
electronic means is slightly complicated by the fact
that a few states have included in their enactment
of UETA provisions similar to those in the Federal
ESIGN Act, as well as the fact that a federal law
may require many Special Consumer Disclosures.
For this reason, users are well advised to comply
with the Federal ESIGN Act ESIGN Consent
provisions discussed further below. See for
example, Ala. Code 1975, § 8-1A-8(e).
18 ESIGN §7001(c).
clear and conspicuous terms the signer’s intent to sign
and be bound. For example, the text in the ESIGN
Consent16 could include the following text to explain the
legal significance of the signer using the electronic
signature process to create his or her electronic
signature:
By [describe method used to consent, e.g., selecting ‘I
AGREE’], you confirm that you have the computer
hardware and software to obtain access to electronic
records in the form that important disclosures will be
provided to you in connection with [describe
transactions], and you consent to receiving consumer
disclosures related to [describe transaction]
exclusively through electronic means.
Accordingly, pursuant to ESIGN and UETA, an electronic
signature process where the significance of the process
is clear may not be denied legal effect solely because it
is in electronic form. Similarly, a document relating to
such a transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity or enforceability solely because an electronic
signature was used to sign such a document and
subsequently stored as an electronic record, rather than
in hard copy.
Consumer disclosures
On this topic of providing consumer disclosures
exclusively by electronic means, there is a significant
difference between the Federal ESIGN Act and UETA as
enacted by many of the states. Both bodies of law (the
federal ESIGN and the state enactments of UETA) permit
consumer disclosures which are required by some other
law to be given exclusively through electronic means,
but the Federal ESIGN Act, and some, but not all, states
which have enacted UETA, specify the process and the
content for obtaining the consumer’s consent to receive
certain consumer disclosures exclusively through
electronic means.17
ESIGN provides that, upon consent by the consumer,
certain information relating to a transaction or
transactions in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, which is required by a statute, regulation, or
rule of law (other than ESIGN) to be provided or made
available to a consumer in writing (referred to as a
Special Consumer Disclosure) may be delivered
exclusively via electronic means, provided that the
recipient of the Special Consumer Disclosure is first
provided, and agrees to, the ESIGN Consent.18 Whether a
particular transaction requires a Special Consumer
Disclosure, and how the ESIGN Consent is provided in
connection with the required Special Consumer
Disclosure, must be determined on a transaction-by-
transaction basis. The user should identify which
documents are Special Consumer Disclosures that
require the need for the ESIGN Consent in the context of
each type of transaction to be completed using the
electronic signature process. The ESIGN provisions
describing a Special Consumer Disclosure and the
contents of the ESIGN Consent are set out in § 7001(c):
If a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires
that information relating to a transaction or
transactions in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce be provided or made available to a
consumer in writing, the use of an electronic record to
provide or make available (whichever is required)
such information satisfies the requirement that such
information be in writing if--
(A) the consumer has affirmatively consented to
such use and has not withdrawn such consent;
(B) the consumer, prior to consenting, is provided
with a clear and conspicuous statement--
(i) informing the consumer of (I) any right or
option of the consumer to have the record
provided or made available on paper or in
nonelectronic form, and (II) the right of the
consumer to withdraw the consent to have the
record provided or made available in an
electronic form and of any conditions,
consequences (which may include termination
of the parties' relationship), or fees in the event
of such withdrawal;
(ii) informing the consumer of whether the
consent applies (I) only to the particular
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transaction which gave rise to the obligation to
provide the record, or (II) to identified
categories of records that may be provided or
made available during the course of the parties’
relationship;
(iii) describing the procedures the consumer
must use to withdraw consent as provided in
clause (i) and to update information needed to
contact the consumer electronically; and
(iv) informing the consumer (I) how, after the
consent, the consumer may, upon request,
obtain a paper copy of an electronic record, and
(II) whether any fee will be charged for such
copy;
(C) the consumer--
(i) prior to consenting, is provided with a
statement of the hardware and software
requirements for access to and retention of the
electronic records; and
(ii) consents electronically, or confirms his or
her consent electronically, in a manner that
reasonably demonstrates that the consumer
can access information in the electronic form
that will be used to provide the information that
is the subject of the consent; and
(D) after the consent of a consumer in accordance
with subparagraph (A), if a change in the
hardware or software requirements needed to
access or retain electronic records creates a
material risk that the consumer will not be able
to access or retain a subsequent electronic
record that was the subject of the consent, the
person providing the electronic record--
(i) provides the consumer with a statement of
(I) the revised hardware and software
requirements for access to and retention of the
electronic records, and (II) the right to withdraw
consent without the imposition of any fees for
such withdrawal and without the imposition of
any condition or consequence that was not
disclosed under subparagraph (B)(i); and
(ii) again complies with subparagraph (C).
The signer’s affirmative consent to the ESIGN Consent
must exhibit the signer’s ability to obtain access to
information in the manner that the Special Consumer
Disclosures will be provided. For example, if the
required disclosure (a truth in lending disclosure for
example) will be posted at a secure web site accessible
only after the signer is given a unique access code, the
signer should be given that unique access code during
the ESIGN Consent process to confirm that the unique
access code in fact allowed the signer to obtain access
to the secure site where the Special Consumer
Disclosures, such as the truth in lending statement, will
be posted.
If the signer consents to receive such disclosures
electronically but does not reasonably demonstrate his
or her ability to obtain access to the information in the
manner the Special Consumer Disclosures are provided,
then the Special Consumer Disclosures are likely to be
ineffective and therefore the basis for providing the
required disclosures exclusively by electronic means
could fail. Failure to comply with the ESIGN consumer
disclosure requirements does not, however, render void
or voidable the underlying transaction. ESIGN §
101(c)(3) provides:
Effect of failure to obtain electronic consent or
confirmation of consent.--The legal effectiveness,
validity, or enforceability of any contract executed by a
consumer shall not be denied solely because of the
failure to obtain electronic consent or confirmation of
consent by that consumer in accordance with
paragraph (1)(C)(ii).
Failure to comply with the ESIGN consumer disclosure
requirements could, however, subject the user to
regulatory sanctions for failing to provide the required
disclosures (such as the truth in lending notice in the
example above) in accordance with applicable law.
There may also be civil remedies available to signers if
the disclosures are deemed to have not been given
effectively. Not all notices or documents that users are
required to provide to signers are Special Consumer
Disclosures subject to the ESIGN disclosure
requirements above. For such notices and documents
which are not such Special Consumer Disclosures, the
signer only needs to agree to receive such notices and
documents exclusively via electronic means.
The user must first determine whether, for a given
transaction, there are any Special Consumer Disclosures
and, where there are, the electronic signature process:
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(1) must present the appropriate ESIGN Consent to the
signer, (2) should record that the signer consented to
receive Special Consumer Disclosures exclusively
through electronic means in a way that reasonably
demonstrates the ability of the signer to obtain access
to information in the electronic format the actual Special
Consumer Disclosures will be provided or made
available to the signer, and (3) for the Special Consumer
Disclosures, provide or make available to the signer
such disclosures in that same format. Taking these
actions would allow the user to provide Special
Consumer Disclosures in accordance with the
requirements of ESIGN.
Use of an electronic process to complete transactions
requiring Special Consumer Disclosures, or other
documents containing mandated terms such as pre-
approved forms, can actually reduce the user’s
compliance risk, compared to the conventional
approach of paper and manuscript signatures. An
automated electronic signature process allows the user
to specify each document which must be presented and
signed, as an acknowledgment of receipt or otherwise,
as a condition to completing the transaction. Further, for
an automated electronic signature process, the user can
specify each particular which field in a record, such as
an application for insurance, which must be completed
as a condition to completing the entire transaction (as
well as the nature of the information completed in such
field, such as state of residence in a state where the
user’s products are not available). Thus, the user may
configure the electronic signature process to prevent
incomplete or non-compliant transactions from being
submitted to the user for review. This can significantly
improve the user’s ability to comply with the
requirements for such regulated transactions, and
reduce risk while at the same time improve the rate of
successfully completed transactions.
Verifications and acknowledgements
Verifications and acknowledgments required by law are
expressly permitted to be delivered in electronic form
under ESIGN in certain circumstances. ESIGN §
101(c)(2)(B) provides:
Verification or acknowledgment.--If a law that was
enacted prior to this Act expressly requires a record to
be provided or made available by a specified method
that requires verification or acknowledgment of
receipt, the record may be provided or made available
electronically only if the method used provides
verification or acknowledgment of receipt (whichever
is required).
Thus, if a law requires a disclosure to be provided by a
certain method, which requires acknowledgment of
receipt, such as delivery by first class mail, with proof of
delivery required, such verification or acknowledgment
may be given electronically if, and only if, the electronic
method for providing such verification or
acknowledgment also provides verification or
acknowledgment of receipt. For example, the electronic
signature process should be configured so that the
consumer, before reviewing the verification or
acknowledgement, must confirm receipt.
Record retention – sufficiency of electronic records
There are two record retention issues addressed by
ESIGN. The first relates to the requirement that, where a
statute requires a contract or other document to be in
writing, the electronic record may be denied legal effect
if all the parties or persons cannot reproduce it for
reference entitled to the contract. The relevant section
of ESIGN § 101(e) provides:
Accuracy and Ability To Retain Contracts and Other
Records.-- Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a
statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires that a
contract or other record relating to a transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce be in writing,
the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of an
electronic record of such contract or other record may
be denied if such electronic record is not in a form
that is capable of being retained and accurately
reproduced for later reference by all parties or
persons who are entitled to retain the contract or
other record.
Thus, if a user is going to rely exclusively on the
archived electronic record to satisfy the statutory
requirement that a contract or other document be in
writing, failure to maintain the record in a form capable
of being retrieved by all parties for later reference, could
jeopardize the enforceability of the transaction to which
such record relates. Users may satisfy this requirement
by making the electronic record available to the signer
for the required period of time, or the user may send a
copy of the document or documents, in hard copy or
electronically, so the user is not relying on the signer’s
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ability to obtain access to the electronic record
maintained by the user.
In contrast, the second record retention issue relates
to the user satisfying statutory record retention
obligations. The user may electronically store the record
(whether that record was initially in tangible form and
later converted to an electronic form or initially in
electronic form) of a transaction and thereby satisfy the
statutory record retention requirement, provided certain
conditions are met. ESIGN, § 101(d) provides:
Retention of Contracts and Records.--
(1) Accuracy and accessibility.--If a statute, regulation,
or other rule of law requires that a contract or other
record relating to a transaction in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce be retained, that
requirement is met by retaining an electronic
record of the information in the contract or other
record that--
(A) accurately reflects the information set forth in
the contract or other record; and
(B) remains accessible to all persons who are
entitled to access by statute, regulation, or rule
of law, for the period required by such statute,
regulation, or rule of law, in a form that is
capable of being accurately reproduced for later
reference, whether by transmission, printing, or
otherwise.
(2) Exception.--A requirement to retain a contract or
other record in accordance with paragraph (1) does
not apply to any information whose sole purpose is
to enable the contract or other record to be sent,
communicated, or received.
(3) Originals.--If a statute, regulation, or other rule of
law requires a contract or other record relating to a
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce to be provided, available, or retained in
its original form, or provides consequences if the
contract or other record is not provided, available,
or retained in its original form, that statute,
regulation, or rule of law is satisfied by an
electronic record that complies with paragraph (1).
ESIGN permits a user to satisfy its record retention
obligations relating to transactions by retaining
documents exclusively through electronic means. These
ESIGN record retention requirements do not affect the
user’s record retention practices, except for those
records relating to transactions to be retained
exclusively through electronic means. Thus, if the user is
satisfying the record retention obligations imposed on it
by other laws by storing hard copies, ESIGN will not
impose additional obligations.
As noted above, ESIGN does permit the user to satisfy
its record retention obligations under applicable laws by
retaining only the electronic records if the requirements
of Section 101(e) of ESIGN are met. Thus, if documents
in the audit trail,19 which are required by law to be
retained, are retained exclusively in electronic media,
and are available to the regulators having jurisdiction
over the user and such electronic records are available
as described in Section 101(e) of ESIGN, the user may
not be required to print and retain hard copies of these
documents.
Notarizations
Signatures to be notarized may be notarized using an
electronic notary process, providing that all other
requirements of the notary laws are satisfied. ESIGN §
101(g) provides:
Notarization and Acknowledgment.--If a statute,
regulation, or other rule of law requires a signature or
record relating to a transaction in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce to be notarized,
acknowledged, verified, or made under oath, that
requirement is satisfied if the electronic signature of
the person authorized to perform those acts, together
with all other information required to be included by
other applicable statute, regulation, or rule of law, is
attached to or logically associated with the signature
or record.
As stated further above, with limited exceptions,
signatures will not be denied legal effect solely because
they are electronic. Thus, if a law requires a signature to
be notarized, either or both the signature to be
notarized and the signature of the notary may be
electronic signatures. All the other requirements for
notarizing signatures (such as the notary must witness
1 ‘Audit trail’ is a collective reference to the records
containing the processes and details involved in
each significant step of a given transaction
involving a user including, the process of each
signer accessing, completing, executing and
transmitting each document to be signed in
connection with the transaction, the user’s process
for authenticating each signer of each document
for that transaction and all documents executed or
resulting from the process, all as cryptographically
sealed.
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Having signatures notarized is
another form of authentication of the
identity of the signer.
20 UETA § 11, Official Commentary.
the person sign the document) must be met.
The official commentary to relevant provision in UETA
(which is consistent with the notary provision in ESIGN)
explains more about satisfying the notary requirement:
This section permits a notary public and other
authorized officers to act electronically, effectively
removing the stamp/seal requirements. However, the
section does not eliminate any of the other
requirements of notarial laws, and consistent with the
entire thrust of this Act, simply allows the signing and
information to be accomplished in an electronic
medium.
For example, Buyer wishes to send a notarized Real
Estate Purchase Agreement to Seller via e-mail. The
notary must appear in the room with the Buyer, satisfy
him/herself as to the identity of the Buyer, and swear
to that identification. All that activity must be
reflected as part of the electronic Purchase Agreement
and the notary's electronic signature must appear as
a part of the electronic real estate purchase contract.20
While ESIGN and UETA permit the notary requirements
to be satisfied exclusively through electronic means,
this does not require notaries to use electronic
signatures or obligate private third parties requiring
notarized signatures to accept the electronic signature
of the notary.
Risk analysis framework and mitigation 
Different categories of transactions present different
risk profiles. For example, a transaction where a
consumer authorizes the release of highly sensitive
health or financial information to the person signing the
release, presents a much greater risk of forgery than
does a transaction for the purchase of a low-priced
book. Likewise, a transaction for a consumer to sign an
authorization to release sensitive health or financial
information to an insurance company for underwriting
purposes presents, as a practical matter, a lower forgery
risk than if the sensitive information were to be released
to the person signing, because the forger has less
opportunity to benefit from the disclosure to the third
party than from the disclosure directly to the forger, and
therefore there is less incentive for a forger in the first
instance. Because of these differences, when designing
an electronic signature process, one should critically
review the risks from various perspectives. The
framework below identifies the six perspectives.
Authentication risk
This is the risk that a signer is in fact not the person he
or she claims to be. A user may authenticate the identity
of each signer in various ways. The identity of each
person to sign should be verified. Such verification
steps may include confirmation of the identity of such
person from a trusted source, such as a single sign-on
process deployed by, or otherwise determined to be
reliable by the user. Alternatively, the results from an
identity verification process conducted by an
independent third party can be used for this purpose,
such as a consumer reporting agency or other trusted
third party offering such services. A further method can
be used, such as the answer to a shared secret question
that the user determines adequately verifies the identity
of the signer. Having signatures notarized is another
form of authentication of the identity of the signer. If
there are documents required to be notarized, the
electronic signature process should allow the notary
verifying another signer’s signature to enter the notary’s
signature and other credentials, in accordance with
applicable state notary laws.
The method and results used to authenticate each
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signer should be included in the archived signing
session, or audit trail, which should then securely
archived and capable of being retrieved securely. Where
the user opts not to include the authentication process
in the audit trail, the user may need to have access to
other reliable evidence to establish the actual identity of
the person completing the transaction.
As a practical matter, users should also critically
evaluate the likelihood of forgers, or even signers who
seek to disavow a given transaction claiming that a
forger signed the documents. Consider, for example, the
authentication risk in the context of applications for
automobile insurance. The question that needs
addressing is the likelihood of a consumer seeking to
recover a payment for a covered claim contesting that
he or she did not sign the application documents (which
would include certain elections and waivers of
coverage). To claim that a forger signed the documents
would result in there being no cover, albeit for a
different reason. Furthermore, it might also be useful to
assess what motive a person have to forge the signature
of another person for insurance cover on the car of the
person whose signature is forged.21
At least one court has addressed this risk.22 In Kerr,
the employer sought to enforce a mandatory arbitration
provision against an employee. The question was
whether the employee did in fact sign the electronic
record agreeing to be bound to the mandatory
arbitration provisions. The court held that in light of the
employee’s credible claims that she did not sign the
record containing the mandatory arbitration provisions
combined with the employer’s opportunity to sign such
record using the employee’s credentials, the mandatory
arbitration provisions would not be enforced against the
employee. Had the employee’s supervisor not had such
ready access to the employee’s user name and
password to obtain access to the secure site where the
record in question was presented for signature, the
court may have reached a different conclusion.
Repudiation risk
This is the risk of a signer acknowledging that he or she
signed a document, but claims that the electronic
signature is attached to or logically associated with a
document containing terms and conditions different
than those in the document the signer signed. The risk
is that the signer repudiates the terms and conditions in
the document attached to or logically associated with
his or her signature and thereby reduces the chance
that the document will be admissible and, if admitted
into evidence, that the tier of fact will be persuaded that
the signer did not agree to be bound by all such terms
and conditions.
The electronic signature process should deploy
readily available technology that can reduce the
repudiation risk far below the repudiation risk
associated with paper documents and manuscript
signatures. The electronic signature process should
cryptographically seal each document upon execution of
that document by each signer, thereby rendering such
document unalterable without detection. Documents
electronically sealed in this fashion are likely to pass
the admissibility threshold (for which, see the
discussion below) and once such documents are
admitted into evidence, users are likely to have
meaningful, persuasive evidence as to why such
document could not have been alerted without
detection.
Each encrypted document should be securely stored
in such a way that it cannot be viewed without
overcoming at least industry standard security
safeguards applicable to the document in question. For
each transaction, whether the transaction involves two
or more parties, the electronic signature process should
record the date and time of each significant step and
the identity of the person taking each such step and
each particular step taken by that party, where such
record is part of the audit trail. The audit trail for each
transaction should include each document presented
and signed during a given transaction where each such
document signed having been encrypted as described
above. Relevant parts of the audit trail should also be
encrypted using industry standard encryption
technology to render those portions of the audit trail
unalterable without detection.23
Admissibility risk
This is the risk that a court refuses to admit into
evidence copies of electronic documents generated,
presented, signed, secured, archived and retrieved by
21 Admittedly, there is fraud in the automobile
insurance sector, some of which involves forgery.
Distinguishing the types of fraud and when fraud
occurs in this area is essential to determine the
mitigation measures with the actual risk presented
in a given scenario.
22 Kerr v. Dillard, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792 (D.
Kansas 2009).
23 The reader should be aware of the long-term
viability of digital signatures when archiving digital
documents protected by a digital signature, for
which, see Stefanie Fischer-Dieskau and Daniel
Wilke ‘Electronically signed documents: legal
requirements and measures for their long-term
conservation’, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 3 (2006) 40 – 44.
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24 Many states have adopted rules of evidence that
track the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). For
purposes of this discussion, all cases cited are
based on the FRE or state law that follows the FRE.
25 This would require the user to identify who, by
name and title, is qualified to testify (in person or
via an affidavit) as to how each document was
presented, signed, secured after signature to
render it unalterable without detection, archived,
retrieved and printed. This person will also testify
as to the integrity and security of each system
involved in creating, securing, archiving, retrieving
and printing the document.
26 Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company,
241 F.R.D. 534, 541-42 (D.Md 2007).
27 State v. Swinton, 268 Conn. 781, 812 (CT. 2004)
(applying the federal standard to a state case).
28 State v. Swinton at 813, 814.
29 Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm’s opinion in
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company
provides ones of the best analysis to date of the
admissibility of electronic evidence, which broadly
could include electronic signatures, 241 F.R.D. at
542; Brian W. Esler, ‘Lorraine v Markel:
unnecessarily raising the standard for admissibility
of electronic evidence, Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review’, 4 (2007) 80 -
82. See also In Re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437
(proponent failed properly to authenticate exhibits
of electronically stored business records); United
States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000)
(proponent failed to authenticate exhibits taken
from an organization’s website); St. Luke’s
Cataract and Laser Institute PA v. Sanderson, 2006
WL 1320242, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006)
(excluding exhibits because affidavits used to
authenticate exhibits showing content of web
pages were factually inaccurate and affiants lacked
personal knowledge of facts); Rambus v. Infineon
Tech. A.G., 348 F. Supp. 2d 698 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(proponent failed to authenticate computer
generated business records); Wady v. Provident
Life and Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d
1060 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (sustaining an objection to
affidavit of witness offered to authenticate exhibit
that contained documents taken from defendant’s
website because affiant lacked personal
knowledge); Indianapolis Minority Contractors
Assoc. Inc. v. Wiley, 1998 WL 1988826, at *7 (S.D.
Ind. May 13, 1998) (proponent of computer records
failed to show that they were from a system
capable of producing reliable and accurate results,
and therefore, failed to authenticate them).’
the electronic signature process. As a preliminarily
point, it is important to recognize that all of the rules of
evidence and evidentiary foundations that apply to
paper documents and manuscript signatures also apply
to electronic documents signed electronically, stored
electronically and retrieved electronically. The Federal
Rules of Evidence, or their state equivalents, govern the
admissibility of evidence and thus would govern the
admissibility of a copy of a document presented, signed,
secured, archived and retrieved by the electronic
signature process.24 The electronic signature process
should be able to satisfy the admissibility standards in
the Federal Rules of Evidence to prove the authenticity
of a document retrieved if the electronic signature
process creates a reliable record of the entire signature
process, including:
(a) the terms and conditions presented to the signer
with which the electronic signature will be
logically associated;
(b) the specific act of the signer expressing his or her
intent to be bound to those terms and conditions,
as called for in those same terms and conditions;
and
(c) the circumstances under which signatures were
obtained.
This information all goes to establish the authenticity of
the document (containing the terms and conditions)
retrieved by the electronic signature process. The
electronic signature process should enable users to
securely archive and retrieve the documents in a way to
show that the documents containing the signatures
could not have been altered without detection. The
electronic signature process should also enable the
appropriate witness on behalf of the user to provide an
affidavit or live testimony as to items (a) – (c) above. For
the reasons described below, such copies of documents
generated by the electronic signature process based on
documents presented, signed, secured, archived and
retrieved by the electronic signature process should be
as admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence as
such documents containing the same terms and
conditions generated, presented, signed in hard copy
and manuscript signature, where such paper copy is
secured, archived and retrieved using conventional
archival and retrieval methods.25
Federal Rules of Evidence
The standard for the authentication of evidence under
the Federal Rules of Evidence is contained in Rule 901,
Requirement of Authentication or Identification, which
provides that ‘the requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.’26 As stated throughout the case law regarding
the admissibility of computer generated information,
‘“reliability must be the watchword” in determining the
admissibility of computer generated evidence.’27 The
‘factors [must] effectively address a witness’ familiarity
with the type of evidence and the method used to create
it, and appropriately require that the witness be
acquainted with the technology involved in the
computer program used to generate the evidence.’28
Certain subparts of Sections 901 and 902 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence are particularly suited to
address the admission of electronic signatures and
records: Sections 901(b)(1), (3), (4) and (9), and 902(7)
and (11). Rules 901(b)(1), (3), (4) and (9) require witness
testimony to authenticate proffered evidence, while
902(7) and (11) allow for self-authentication.29
F.R.E. 901
A witness with direct knowledge, pursuant to F.R.E.
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901(b)(1), or an expert witness with learned knowledge,
pursuant to F.R.E. 901(b)(3), are certainly two fairly
straightforward methods a user could use to admit hard
copies of documents signed using the electronic
signature process. F.R.E. 901(b)(4), which permits
exhibits to be authenticated by appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics ‘is one of the most frequently used
[rules] to authenticate [electronic signatures] and other
electronic records.’30 F.R.E. 901(b)(9), which authorizes
authentication by ‘[e]vidence describing a process or
system used to produce a result and showing that the
process or system produces an accurate result’, is ‘one
method of authentication that is particularly useful in
authenticating electronic evidence stored in or
generated by computers’ and is frequently used as a
litmus test for admissibility of computer-related
information.31 ‘[It] dictates that the inquiry into the basic
foundational admissibility requires sufficient evidence
to authenticate both the accuracy of the image and the
reliability of the machine producing the image.’32
The electronic signature process should secure each
document after it is signed, as discussed above relating
to the risk of repudiation. This would also allow the user
to meet the admissibility standards under the
subsections in F.R.E. 901. The testimony of a witness
with knowledge of the specific transaction will satisfy
F.R.E. 901(b)(1), and a learned expert witness should
suffice under F.R.E. 901(b)(3). A witness knowledgeable
about the contents, substance and distinctive
characteristics of the electronic signature process of
creating, presenting, signing, securing, archiving and
retrieving the documents in question should satisfy
F.R.E. 901(b)(4), while testimony describing how the
electronic signature process accomplishes the foregoing
accurately should suffice under F.R.E. 901(b)(9).
In addition to the express language of F.R.E. 901(b)(9),
Imwinkelried’s Evidentiary Foundations provides an
eleven-step process under the Rule for the admission of
computer generated records.33 Most of the testimony
proffered under these eleven steps is a simple recitation
of facts. More challenging is step four, which requires
proof that the ‘procedure has built-in safeguards to
ensure accuracy and identify errors … regarding
computer policy and system control procedures,
including control of access to the database, control of
access to the program, recording and logging changes,
backup practices, and audit procedures to assure the
continuing integrity of the records.’34 In satisfying this
requirement or making arguments for admissibility
under 901(b)(4), the user would need to provide expert
technical testimony as to the functionality and
safeguards in the electronic signature process.
Witness testimony seeking the admission of
signatures and documents from the electronic signature
process pursuant to F.R.E. 901(b)(9) would, in all
likelihood, need to include:
a.The manner in which the user’s server or servers, as
appropriate, are used to generate electronic
signatures and documents;
b.The reliability of these servers;
c. Procedures for manual data entry and system
controls; and
d.Safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify errors
(that is, safeguards, access rules and other controls
on the environment that govern the flow of
information through its system), tamper resistant
software, use of cryptographic technology, and that
all of these meet or exceed industry standards.
Presumably, after a number of court decisions
recognizing the safeguards of a particular electronic
signature process, such as by selecting “yes” in a
recorded interactive voice recognition process as in the
Shroyer case or a clear and conspicuous online process
as in the Bell case, parties to transactions will be more
inclined to stipulate, and not disagree about the
authenticity of electronic signatures created using a
given electronic signature process. If this were to occur,
the need for witness testimony to authenticate
30 Lorraine at 544.
31 Lorraine at 549.
32 Swinton, 268 Conn. at 811.
33 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Foundations,
(LexisNexis 6th ed. 2005) 58-59, and see Stephen
Mason, Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery
& Admissibility (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007),
4.23 for further comments on Professor
Imwinkelried’s list: 1. The business uses a
computer; 2. The computer is reliable; 3. The
business has developed a procedure for inserting
data into the computer; 4. The procedure has built-
in safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify
errors; 5. The business keeps the computer in a
good state of repair; 6. The witness had the
computer readout certain data; 7. The witness
used the proper procedures to obtain the readout;
8. The computer was in working order at the time
the witness obtained the readout; 9. The witness
recognizes the exhibit as the readout; 10. The
witness explains how he or she recognizes the
readout; 11. If the readout contains strange
symbols or terms, the witness explains the
meaning of the symbols or terms for the trier of
fact.
34 In re Vee Vinhnee at 447. Opposing parties often
allege that computer records have been tampered
with and thus lack authenticity. Such claims have
been viewed as ‘almost wild-eyed
speculation…without some evidence to support
such a scenario….’ United States v. Whitaker, 127
F.3d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1997).
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35 For example see, Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless
Serv., Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007)  and Bell v.
Hollywood Entm’t Corp., 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS
3950 (2006).
36 Lorraine at 549, quoting Weinstein’s Federal
Evidence § 900.07[3].
37 Federal Rules of Evidence 902 (11) at 773 at
footnote 4.
documents may not be required in those later cases.35
F.R.E. 902
Although in a major dispute, testimony may be
necessary regarding the electronic signature process
and the authenticity of its process as noted above,
documents presented, signed, secured, archived and
retrieved using the electronic signature process may
also be admitted as self-authenticating documents
under F.R.E. 902(7). Judge Grimm in his opinion in
Lorraine v. Markel, stated, at 549, that: ‘[e]xtrinsic
evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to
admissibility is not required with respect to the
following:…(7) Trade inscriptions and the like.
Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have
been affixed in the course of business and indicating
ownership, control, or origin.’ ‘Under Rule 902(7), labels
or tags affixed in the course of business require no
authentication. The electronic signature process should
collect and record information showing the entire
signature ceremony. The identification markers alone
stored in the secure container may be sufficient to
authenticate an electronic record and electronic
signature under Rule 902(7).’36
F.R.E. 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is the
other subsection that might be considered for
authentication of documents presented, signed,
secured, archived and retrieved using the electronic
signature process’ electronic signatures. As Judge
Grimm noted at 552: ‘Rule 902(11) also is extremely
useful because it affords a means of authenticating
business records under Rule 803(6), one of the most
used hearsay exceptions, without the need for a witness
to testify in person at trial.’ The primary reason for
seeking to authenticate electronically stored
information using this rule is that it permits a written
declaration by a custodian rather than oral testimony,
which under most circumstances makes it preferable to
F.R.E. 901(b)(4) or (b)(9). F.R.E. 902(11) addresses:
Certified domestic records of regularly conducted
activity. The original or a duplicate of a domestic
record of regularly conducted activity that would be
admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by a
written declaration of its custodian or other qualified
person, in a manner complying with any Act of
Congress or rule prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, certifying that the
record-
(A) was made at or near the time of the
occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge of those matters;
(B) was kept in the course of the regularly
conducted activity; and
(C) was made by the regularly conducted activity
as a regular practice.
Rule 902(11) was designed to work in tandem with an
amendment to Rule 803(6) to allow proponents of
business records to qualify them for admittance with an
affidavit or similar written statement rather than the live
testimony of a qualified witness. In addition to the
affidavit requirements, there is a notice requirement to
afford opposing parties an opportunity to review the
document and affidavit to challenge its authenticity.37
Thus, assuming no challenge, F.R.E. 902(11) is one of the
best ways to secure the admission into evidence of
signatures and documents executed using an electronic
signature process.
As explained above, critical in the analysis of
admissibility and the overall enforceability of
documents executed using a given electronic signature
process, is the requirement of a secure method to
archive and retrieve the documents so they cannot be
altered after signature. In addition to the method or
process, there must be a credible person called by the
user who is suitably qualified to explain the process:
a.the documents submitted to enforce the transaction
are true, accurate and complete hard copies of each
document signed by each signer that accurately
reflect what the signer was presented with in
connection with each signer using the electronic
signature process;
b.the electronic signature process generates a true,
accurate and complete hard copy of the audit trail
for each transaction; and
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c. the documents submitted to enforce the transaction
were generated from electronic records that were
cryptographically sealed in such a way that each
record, as accurately represented by such hard
copies, could not have been altered without
detection, in the absence of a person using
supercomputing power to break the encryption
method used, currently thought to require several
years of such supercomputing power.
Users should consider who would be qualified, willing
and able to testify on the above items in designing the
electronic signature process.
Compliance risk
The electronic signature process should assure that:
a.Each document presented or signed by a signer
complies with the legal requirements for the
content, presentation, sequence and information to
be obtained for each such document;
b.For Special Consumer Disclosures, the signer is
provided the appropriate information to enable
them to make the informed consent in a way that
complies with the consumer disclosure
requirements of ESIGN, where such Special
Consumer Disclosure Requirements will be provided
exclusively via electronic means;
c. Each document required to be presented and
signed is in fact presented and signed as required
by law governing the particular transaction, and
d.The significance of each step in the signature
process (whether on an acknowledgement of
receipt, unilateral consent, application for goods or
services, or contract) is abundantly clear to each
signer.
The audit trail should record each step required to meet
the regulatory requirements, such as the sequence and
timing of presenting certain forms and the actual
contents of records presented. The electronic signature
process with the audit trail containing reliable,
admissible evidence that each step was taken using the
required content, a user may reduce the compliance risk
considerably lower that the risk in transactions using
paper and manuscript signatures.
The courts have been presented with a variety of
disputes where a person alleged to have electronically
sign a record disputes having signed the record. Where
the significance of the steps involved in signing a
particular record was made adequately clear to the
person challenging the enforceability, the courts have
enforced the electronic signature process. Where the
significance was not sufficiently clear to the challenger,
the courts have not enforced the terms against the
challenger.38
Adoption risk 
The adoption risk refers to the risk that the electronic
signature process, in an attempt to reduce the
authentication, repudiation, compliance and
admissibility risks, is overly burdensome, such that the
intended signers do not use the process or find
alternatives that undermine the overall effectiveness of
the proposed electronic signature process. This risk can,
and should be, managed by conducting a series of pilot
tests before introducing the electronic signature process
38 For example, see Bell v. Hollywood Entm’t Corp.,
2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3950 (2006) where the court
enforced a mandatory arbitration provision against
an executive of the defendant employer. The court
found that it was sufficiently clear to the executive
what the consequences were of selecting ‘yes’ in
the electronic signature process. See also
Brueggemann v. NCOA Select, Inc., et al., No.08-
80606, 2009 WL 1873651(S. D. Fla. June 29, 2009),
where the court enforced an electronic signature
comprised of the process of continuing to use the
website where the significance of proceeding was
made sufficiently clear to a consumer purchasing
consumer goods. In contrast, see Campbell v. Gen.
Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir.
2005), where the court concluded that the
significance of not objecting to the terms was not
sufficiently clear. The court refused to enforce the
mandatory arbitration terms against the employee.
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to potential signers for the user. By conducting tests,
the user can obtain feedback from the signers and make
the appropriate adjustments.
Relative risk
As noted throughout this article, the risks of a given
electronic signature process should be considered
relative to the risks associated with a paper and
manuscript signature. This allows the user to better
assess the risks inherent in the particular electronic
process. It is often easy to configure the electronic
signature process to reduce the risks considerably
below the corresponding risks of using paper and a
manuscript signature. For example, the electronic
signature process can be configured to prevent a record
from being signed by the signer if there are any blanks
in the record and prevent any document relating to a
transaction from being submitted to the user unless all
the required steps, including execution of or
acknowledgement of receipt of all Special Consumer
Disclosures, are fulfilled and then once signed and
securing documents from being altered without
detection. This can significantly reduce the compliance
risk below that for paper and manuscript signature.
Conclusion
The overall effectiveness of a given electronic signature
process depends on how well the user determined the
means to mitigate the risks for particular documents
and records to be presented, signed and archived. The
user who carefully considers the risks associated with
the types of transactions to be processed can design
and implement an electronic signature process that is
no riskier than, and in most cases, less risky than the
same transaction using paper and a manuscript
signature. Doing so provides greater confidence that the
electronic signature, when affixed within US, will be
admitted into evidence in a US court.
From the court decisions to date, there appears to be
a premium placed on making it very clear to the person
against whom enforcement is sought, the significance of
the act comprising the electronic signature. The clearer
the significance to the person signing, the more likely
enforcement of the electronic signature process.
Enforcement of the electronic signature process will not,
however, overcome terms and conditions otherwise
unenforceable for reasons having nothing to do with the
electronic signature process, such as unconscionable
terms in mandatory arbitration agreements.
It is to be expected that as the significance of actions
comprising the electronic signature are made clearer,
persons aiming to avoid obligations in signed
agreements will look for other ways to avoid liability,
such as challenging the admissibility of the electronic
records for various reasons. The framework described in
this article should help companies critically evaluate
those risks with the aim of determining what measures
to implement that are appropriate within the risk
assessment profile discussed in this article.
© Greg Casamento and Patrick Hatfield, 2009
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE PROCESS
Greg Casamento and Pat Hatfield are both partners in Locke
Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP, a national law firm with offices
across the United States. Greg practices in the area of
electronic commerce and related litigation matters, including e-
discovery and e-admissibility. Pat practices in the electronic
commerce, intellectual property and technology areas. The
views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do
not constitute legal advice regarding any particular set of facts,
products or services.
PHatfield@lockelord.com
GCasamento@lockelord.com
http://www.lockelord.com/
98 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
Smart cards are being increasingly used for
payment, having been issued across most of
Europe, and they are in the process of being
implemented elsewhere. These systems are
almost exclusively based on a global standard –
EMV (named after its designers: Europay,
Mastercard, Visa)1 – and commonly known as Chip
& PIN in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the
reliability of the Chip & PIN system, and the
evidence it generates, has been an increasingly
important aspect of disputes between banks and
their customers. A common simplification made
by banks when deciding whether to refund a
disputed transaction, is the assertion that cloned
smart cards will be detected, and that the correct
PIN must be entered for a transaction to succeed.
The reality is more complex, so it can be difficult
to distinguish the difference between customer
fraud,2 a third party criminal attack, and customer
negligence. This article will discuss the situations
which may cause disputed transactions to arise,
what may be inferred from the evidence, and the
effect of this on banking disputes.
The replacement of magnetic stripe cards with smart
cards for credit and debit card payments has changed
the nature of disputes between banks and their
customers over unauthorized transactions. Previously
the operation and weakness of cards was well
understood, and there was ample evidence of criminal
practice. Now, with the implementation of Chip & PIN,
the situation has become uncertain: the system is much
more complex, the level of security is less clear, and
little is known about the capabilities of criminals in
terms of committing fraud. This complicates the task of
a bank in identifying whether a customer is entitled to
be refunded.
Chip & PIN offers greater resistance to fraud when
compared with the previous magnetic stripe system, and
unlike earlier domestic smart card payment standards, it
works across national boundaries. However, the
implementation is not infallible, and its complexity
increases the likelihood of flaws. In several respects there
has also been a trade-off between cost and security,
leading to the creation of weaknesses, some of which
have been exploited by criminals, some have been
demonstrated by researchers, and the remainder are
currently assumed to be merely theoretical.
Customers who notify their bank of unauthorized
transactions are often recompensed, but sometimes the
disputed transactions are not reversed. One possible
reason is that the bank believes that the customer
authorized the transaction, and is attempting to defraud
the bank by making a spurious complaint. Statistics on
this type of fraud are not publicly reported by the
banking industry, but a fraud investigator working for a
major bank, speaking under the Chatham House rule,3
did perceive that levels are high. For example, a group
of people have been accused of committing, with the
assistance of bank insiders, fraud in the region of
US$422,000, where they opened banks accounts and
then claimed their ATM cards had been lost or stolen,
By Steven J Murdoch
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OF CHIP & PIN
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BANKING
DISPUTES
ARTICLE:
1 EMV Specifications for Payment Systems, available
at http://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx.
2 The term ‘first-party fraud’ is used within the
banking industry to describe fraud by a customer.
3 The Chatham House Rule reads as follows: ‘When
a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the
Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use
the information received, but neither the identity
nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any
other participant, may be revealed. The Chatham
House Rule may be invoked at meetings to
encourage openness and the sharing of
information’: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/
about/chathamhouserule/
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4 ‘Gang charged in $400,000 ATM scam’, Finextra
News, 31 July 2009, http://www.finextra.com/
fullstory.asp?id=20328. See also Stephen Mason,
editor, Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery &
Admissibility (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007),
4.04–4.15 for a discussion of cases regarding ATM
fraud and banking fraud across the world,
including insider fraud. The cases in this text pre-
date the introduction of Chip & PIN.
and that certain ATM withdrawals were not authorized
by them.4 The bank may alternatively believe that the
customer has acted negligently, in violation of the
account terms and conditions, by inadequately
protecting their card or PIN, or both their card and PIN.
If challenged over such a decision, arguably the bank
ought to be required to show that their position is
defensible, and that the transaction was not in fact
performed by a third-party criminal exploiting a security
vulnerability.
The bank’s decision will be based on the evidence
they have regarding the disputed transaction, the value
of the customer’s relationship with the bank, and the
perceived security of the Chip & PIN system. Much of
this evidence will be in digital form, and requires
processing and interpretation before it can be
understood. While this was also the case with magnetic
stripe payment cards, Chip & PIN increases the amount
of evidence that could be made available and its level of
complexity.
Almost all of this evidence will be held by the bank, as
is the information necessary to interpret it. Thus during
a dispute, if the bank is required or volunteers to give
this evidence to the customer, there will be questions as
how to verify the accuracy of the information, and what
conclusions can be safely drawn from a forensic
analysis. First, this article provides a simplified
introduction to Chip & PIN. Then the article sets out the
evidence created regarding transactions, and the
interpretation of the evidence is discussed to discover
whether and how card fraud has been performed.
Introduction
In addition to the visible security mechanisms – such as
the hologram, embossing, and fluorescent ink – UK
credit and debit cards incorporate a magnetic stripe.
This stores the data which is visible on the face of the
card (name, expiry date, card number, and such like). It
also holds the CVV (Card Verification Value; not to be
confused with the CVV2, which is printed on the
signature strip of the card). Prior to the use of Chip &
PIN, the data from the magnetic stripe would be read by
the point-of-sale (PoS) terminal or automated teller
machine (ATM) and sent to the bank that issued the
card to their customer (the card-holder). This bank (the
issuer) would be capable of verifying whether the CVV
they received corresponded to the one expected for that
particular card number. Thus, based only on information
which is visible on the card or a receipt, a criminal
should not be able to produce a cloned card which
evades detection.
The data read from the magnetic stripe only offers
assurance that the card is authentic. It is also necessary
to confirm that the genuine card-holder has authorized
the transactions. For PoS transactions, the cashier
would ask the customer for their signature, which they
can then compare to the one on the card. ATM
transactions are authorized by PIN. Here, the customer
enters their PIN at a keypad, which the ATM encrypts
and sends, along with the data from the magnetic
stripe, to the issuer, potentially via networks operated
by parties such as Visa, Mastercard, or VocaLink. The
bank can then compare the PIN entered with the one
stored in their records.
Magnetic stripe cards have well-known weaknesses.
Using commercially available equipment, it easy to read
details from the magnetic stripe of a card, including the
CVV, and write a perfect copy of it to a blank card. Such
a cloned card would work at an ATM, because only the
magnetic stripe is used. Criminals have exploited this
weakness in numerous ways, for example adding a
‘skimmer’ to ATMs, which records the magnetic stripe of
the card as it is inserted, and incorporates a camera to
record the PIN being entered. Together, this yields
enough information to make and use a clone in an ATM.
To use a clone in a PoS transaction, the visible security
features would also need to be copied, which takes
more effort but is well within the capabilities of
criminals, and has the advantage that the PIN is not
required.
The explanation above has been somewhat simplified
for brevity. In fact the authorization systems which verify
the CVV and PIN can be quite complex, consisting of
many components built and operated by different
parties; there will also be significant variation between
banks and even more between countries. It can be that
the issuer does not authorize the transaction at all, but
delegates this responsibility to a third party. Card and
PIN details are also likely to pass through several
different systems between the PoS terminal or ATM, and
the authorization system. However, despite this
complexity, the cards themselves use the same
technology as video and audio tapes, which means
there is good intuitive understanding of their main
security vulnerability – that if someone obtains
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possession of the card, even briefly, they can create a
perfect copy.
Chip & PIN
Chip & PIN was designed to mitigate vulnerabilities in
magnetic stripe cards, albeit with increased costs, as
well as requiring much infrastructure to be upgraded.
The cards include a magnetic stripe and the same
visible security features as before, but incorporate an
additional computer chip underneath the cards’ surface.
A terminal can interact with the chip through electrical
contacts on the face of the card. This chip is a computer
with processing power comparable to desktop
computers of the 1980s, but with additional security
functionality.
The chip has a program loaded into it, which is
designed to follow the communication conventions (a
protocol) specified by the EMV documentation, and so
be able to communicate with terminals that comply with
the EMV standard. This specification is complex,
consisting of several thousand pages, but there also will
be many thousands of additional pages which describe
the design of the chip and its software. National
industry bodies and industry members may also extend
the specification with additional material.
The chip performs three main operations: card
authentication (establishing that the card is authentic),
card-holder verification (establishing that the person
presenting the card is the authorized account holder),
and transaction authorization (establishing that there
are enough funds to complete the transaction and the
card is not cancelled).
Card authentication
The aim of card authentication is to allow the operator
of a PoS terminal (the merchant) to establish whether a
card presented is legitimate, without contacting the
issuer. This is important because in a small proportion
of UK PoS transactions, the terminal is ‘offline’ and does
not communicate with the issuer until after the
customer has left with the goods. However, since ATM
transactions should always be carried out online, card
authentication is not performed here. During card
authentication at the PoS, the card submits a
cryptographic certificate to the terminal, incorporating
the card’s account number and a digital signature. The
terminal can then check whether this certificate was
issued by a bank recognized by a payment system (e.g.
Visa or Mastercard) supported by the terminal, and
validate the digital signature.
Card-holder verification
Once the merchant is satisfied that the card is authentic,
both the card and merchant must be assured that the
person presenting the card is the legitimate account
holder. This is the role of card-holder verification, which
is normally achieved by using a PIN. The customer first
enters their PIN on a PIN entry device attached to the
PoS terminal or ATM. For PoS transactions, the PIN is
sent to the card and the card compares the PIN against
the one it stores, and returns the result of the
comparison to the terminal. If the PIN entered is
incorrect, the card will allow the PIN entry to be re-
attempted, but only up to a maximum number of tries –
normally three. For ATM transactions, the PIN is not sent
to the card, but encrypted and sent back to the issuer,
as with magnetic stripe transactions.
Transaction authorization
The final step is transaction authorization, where the
issuer, card, and merchant are assured that the card is
authentic, card-holder verification succeeded, the card
has not been cancelled, and there are adequate funds in
the customer’s account. Here, the terminal or ATM sends
the card a summary of the transaction (amount, date,
and such like). The card appends its own data, such as
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5 The details of the cryptography used are not
important for the purposes of this article, but for
further information on the design and use of
digital signatures and authentication codes, refer
to Ross J Anderson, Security Engineering, (2nd
edition, Wiley, 2008).
6 Sergei P. Skorobogatov, Semi-invasive attacks – A
new approach to hardware security analysis,
University of Cambridge Technical Report UCAM-
CL-TR-630, April 2005:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-
630.html.
the result of card-holder verification, and also its
application transaction counter (ATC), which is a value
maintained by the card, counting how many
transactions have been initiated. The card then
responds with a cryptographic authentication code. For
offline transactions, the authentication code (the
transaction certificate – TC) is stored by the terminal for
later transmission to the issuer, and the transaction is
complete. However, for online transactions, the card
sends a different type of authentication code, an
authorization request cryptogram – ARQC. The ARQC is
sent to the issuer, and it responds with a message
stating whether the ARQC is valid, incorporating an
authorization response cryptogram – ARPC. Finally, the
ARPC is sent to the card for verification, and it responds
with a TC indicating that the transaction has succeeded.
Alternatively the card can at any time send an
application authentication cryptogram (AAC) which
means the transaction has been declined.
The issuer and card share cryptographic keys which
allow them to generate and verify the cryptographic
authentication codes (ARQC, ARPC, TC, and AAC). These
keys are loaded during its ‘personalization’ process.
However, the merchant does not have these keys, so
must rely on the issuer or card to perform the
verification. This is because the digital signature keys
used in transaction authorization are symmetric,
meaning that the same key is used for both generation
and verification, and so merchants could not be trusted
with the keys. In contrast, the cryptographic keys used
for card authentication are asymmetric, meaning that
one key is used for signature generation and another
key for signature verification, and it is infeasible to
convert the latter key into the former. Thus the
merchants are all given a verification key (the public
half), but the generation key (the private half) is kept by
the bank.5
Security failures in Chip & PIN
As noted above, the process of a Chip & PIN transaction
is much more complex than magnetic stripe
transactions. In fact the description above is a simplified
version, which shows how transactions should normally
happen in the UK; for a variety of reasons the process
may diverge from the steps above, and other countries
may have different procedures. This complexity is
largely for good reasons: the additional verification
catches more types of fraud, and so allows transactions
to proceed in situations where magnetic stripe cards
could not be safely used. However, the complexity also
increases the number of ways in which security failures
could occur, and makes it more difficult to establish
what has happened when they do. This section will
summarize some of the potential security vulnerabilities
in Chip & PIN, how they may come about, and what
their effect might be.
Card vulnerabilities
While magnetic stripe cards merely act as storage, the
security of Chip & PIN depends on the cards
implementing a set of security constraints, such as not
releasing cryptographic keys or the PIN, and performing
card-holder verification correctly. If, due to a bug in the
software running on the chip, it is possible to violate
these security constraints, criminals could exploit the
weakness to commit fraud. Even if the software is
correct, before a card can be used, it must be configured
during the personalization process. If there is a mistake
or oversight in this process, the card may be left in an
unlocked state in which some security constraints are
not enforced.
Criminals must discover the vulnerabilities in order to
exploit them. This may be achieved with the help of an
insider, who learns about the vulnerability after the
cards with the security vulnerability are already issued.
The insider may even create the security vulnerability
themselves, by interfering with the software or
configuration process, or by disclosing the
cryptographic keys needed to unlock a Chip & PIN card.
Alternatively criminals could discover vulnerabilities on
their own. One technique for doing so is ‘fuzzing’, where
an automated process is used to discover security
vulnerabilities. This does not need any knowledge of the
software being tested. Fuzzing has been widely used in
other contexts by both security researchers and
criminals, and is a very effective technique.
A further approach to compromising card security is
to attack the chip itself, rather than the software. One
set of techniques are known as invasive and semi-
invasive attacks, where the chip is removed from the
card and manipulated using laboratory equipment.6
These techniques can discover confidential information
or create carefully chosen failures in the enforcement of
security constraints. Non-invasive attacks are also
possible, which do not require the chip to be removed
from the card. For example, by measuring minute
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variations in the power consumption of smart cards, it is
possible to extract cryptographic keys.7 While smart
cards do commonly incorporate defences against
attacks, they are not always effective, and criminals
regularly use these techniques to clone the smart cards
used for subscription television.8
Regardless of how the criminal has discovered the
security vulnerability, if they can extract the card’s
cryptographic keys used for transaction authorization,
they can create a clone of the card which will be
undetectable to the bank systems. A criminal does not
need to know the correct PIN to use the cloned card for
PoS transactions, because the PIN is verified by the
card, and it can be programmed to accept any PIN.
Another way a criminal could use a card would be if the
correct PIN could be extracted from a card, or if the PIN
stored on the card could be changed without the
authorization of the issuer.
Other attacks against Chip & PIN do not require the
exploitation of security vulnerabilities at all, but rely on
inherent limitations of the cards. One such approach is
the ‘relay attack’, which makes use of the fact that
smart cards do not have a display to inform the card-
holder which transaction they are authorizing.9 The
attack works as follows: the card-holder inserts their
authentic card into a compromised Chip & PIN terminal,
and at approximately the same time, the criminal inserts
a special relay card into a real Chip & PIN terminal or
ATM. As the relay card is interrogated, it passes on
messages to and from the authentic card via the
compromised terminal. Thus the real terminal or ATM
will believe the relay card is authentic. The customer will
think they are authorizing one transaction, but actually
the criminal is carrying out a far larger one, potentially
on the other side of the world.
Personalization failures
It may not be necessary to compromise the card in order
to clone a card, because all the information needed is
available at the personalization bureau (where blank
cards have keys and customer data loaded), and at the
authorization centre (where transaction authorization
messages are sent). Personalization and authorization
are both performed on behalf of the issuer, but they are
commonly sub-contracted (in whole or in part) to
specialist service providers. If a criminal is able to
interfere with or extract information from either of these
processes, they could create a cloned card without
having seen the real one.
When considering disputed transactions, banks
commonly make the assumption that exactly one copy
of each card has been produced. Therefore, if bank
records show that the transaction authorization
succeeded, then they infer that the particular card
issued to the customer was used. The bank may then
consider the customer negligent for allowing their card
to be used without authorization, and therefore liable
for the transaction. However, the assumption that
cloned cards cannot exist is not valid, even if it is
assumed that the security vulnerabilities above, which
allow card cloning, cannot or have not been exploited.
This is because the personalization bureau must have
the ability to produce cloned cards, because the process
of personalization occasionally fails due to mechanical
problems. For instance, the personalization of the chip
may have failed, or the printing on the card may be
imperfect. An operator should notice the failure, and if
they do, they will request that a second card with the
same data be produced. Procedural controls should
ensure that the damaged card is destroyed, and all
cards are accounted for. If these procedures are
followed correctly, each customer should receive exactly
one card, which complies with quality assurance
standards.
However, these procedures occasionally fail. For
example, two bank customers have contacted the
author to inform him that they each received two
identical cards in the post. This is, presumably, due to a
technical or procedural failure at the personalization
bureau. The author has read the data from the chip on
these cards. In one case, both chips appear to contain
identical information, including cryptographic keys, and
therefore are perfect clones of each other. The customer
had used one of the cards successfully, but had not
used the second one. In the other case, one chip was
functional, but the other was not active. This customer
reported that he used both cards for successful Chip &
PIN transactions, so it could be that the bank eventually
7 Stefan Mangard, Elisabeth Oswald and Thomas
Popp, Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the
Secrets of Smart Cards, (2007, Springer-Verlag
New York, Inc.).
8 Kevin Poulsen, ‘DirecTV hacker sentenced to seven
years’, SecurityFocus, 10 December 2004,
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/10103; Kim
Zetter, ‘From the Eye of a Legal Storm, Murdoch’s
Satellite-TV Hacker Tells All’, Wired News, 30 May
2008 (Condé Nast Digital),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2008
/05/tarnovsky.
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USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security
Symposium (2007, USENIX Association Berkeley,
CA, USA),
http://www.usenix.org/events/sec07/tech/drimer.ht
ml. A demonstration of the attack on a Chip & PIN
terminal was also filmed by BBC Watchdog, and
aired on 6 February 2007, 19:00, BBC One.
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(Condé Nast Digital),
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noticed the cloned card and remotely de-activated it. In
both cases the cards were visibly identical, had the
same information recorded on the magnetic stripe, and
had the same details printed on the card, including the
CVV2.
In these cases no harm was done, because the
legitimate card-holder was sent both clones of the card.
However, these instances raise the possibility that a
malicious insider could trigger the issue of a cloned
card, and retain the cloned card in order to commit
fraud. Procedural controls are supposed to stop such
activity, but clearly they are not infallible, otherwise
cloned cards would not be seen. It is unclear what
caused the cloned cards to be sent to these customers,
because both had no visible problems. It was confirmed
that both chips in one pair worked correctly; for the
other pair, the chips presumably worked correctly,
otherwise they should not be able to complete
transactions. It could be that a software bug or human
error triggered the creation of clones, but another
possibility was that a malicious insider caused it, but
failed to intercept the clone before it was dispatched.
Attacks on hardware security modules
In both the personalization and authorization centres,
cryptographic keys and PINs are processed within
hardware security modules (HSM). These are computers
running specialized software, which will disable
themselves should unauthorized interference be
detected by their enclosure. Their storage capabilities
are limited, and it would be infeasible for them to store
separate cryptographic keys for every card that was
issued. Therefore a single master key is stored, and a
cryptographic procedure called ‘key derivation’ is used
to generate a different key for each card. The key
derivation procedure takes as input the master key and
identifying information of the card (account number,
sequence number), and produces a unique derived key
(UDK). The procedure is designed so that if a person did
find out the UDK for one or more cards, such knowledge
would not provide any help in discovering the UDK for
any other cards.
The security of HSMs is therefore of critical
importance to the integrity of Chip & PIN. In addition to
their tamper resistance, the software running in HSMs
must enforce security constraints, such as permitting
cryptograms to be verified, but not allowing
cryptographic keys to be extracted. However, the
complexity of the software has led to the discovery of
numerous security vulnerabilities. Initially these were
found only by academic researchers,10 but more recently
criminals have been exploiting security vulnerabilities in
order to commit fraud. In one case reported by Verizon,
criminals had extracted cryptographic keys from an
HSM and used these to decrypt customer PINs as they
were being processed, presumably at an authorization
centre.11 If it was possible for a criminal to extract the
cryptographic keys used during the personalization or
authorization process of Chip & PIN cards, they could
create undetectable cloned cards or discover the correct
PIN for a card, or both. For example, in February 2008,
Citibank reported to the FBI that one of their ATM
authorization systems was compromised by criminals,
account details collected, and US$750,000 of fraudulent
ATM transactions carried out.12
There have been persistent rumours of a system
sometimes termed ‘Bergamot’ which is claimed to allow
criminals to obtain the PIN for a stolen card. Neither the
operation nor the existence of such a device has been
verified, although reports of its use exist.13 A journalist
for ARD Germany also investigated 18 cases of
unauthorized ATM withdrawals committed in La Palma
in January 2005. In all cases the cards were stolen, but
the customers claimed that their PIN was not written
down. Nevertheless, the bank records show the correct
PIN was used, and the customers were considered
liable. One of the criminals responsible (they were
convicted in January 2009) was interviewed by a
journalist, but refused to say how they used the card
without a PIN. Files from the Guardia Civil assumed that
the criminals used a ‘dispositivo’ (device) to obtain the
PIN, but did not give further details.14
Design constraints of EMV
The discussion above has assumed that the
authorization system will always detect cloned cards
and an incorrect PIN. However, this is not always the
case; this section will describe some scenarios in which
the authorization system will fail to detect even
imperfect cloned cards. Some of the vulnerabilities
discussed below may be a consequence of errors made
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during design and implementation, which remained
undiscovered until the system was in use. However,
others may have been identified earlier, but permitted
to remain because the risk of the vulnerability was
perceived to be smaller than the cost to resolve it, after
other checks and balances were put in place. In
designing a system, the bank will try to find an
appropriate compromise by applying only those security
measures that will at least reduce fraud by their cost.
For example, cards issued in the UK are vulnerable to
attack in offline transactions, but the UK banks agreed
that the cost of the more secure cards would be higher
than the fraud they would resolve. This is because it is
cheaper to put high-value transactions online, and put
fraud detection algorithms in place. The problem from
the perspective of the customer is that these trade-offs
may not be known by the fraud investigation team. For
instance, while the weakness of UK cards in offline
transactions is well known, other vulnerabilities might
exist as a consequence of one department making a
cost saving, without informing other departments.
Cost-benefit trade-offs may have been considered
during the design of EMV if the vulnerability was
identified then, but if the vulnerability was discovered
during the implementation phase, a decision would
have been made not to fix it, because it was not cost
effective for the banks. Other vulnerabilities are not
inherent to all systems that implement EMV, but are a
property of a particular implementation; again, these
may be because of an oversight or due to a deliberate
design decision.
Static PIN
One inherent design decision in EMV is to use a single
PIN for the card, which must be entered in its entirety.
This means that if someone can see the PIN being
entered by the customer, and subsequently steals the
card, the criminal can easily commit fraud. Other
countries, for example Brazil, have adopted a different
approach. In addition to the PIN, an ATM prompts the
customer for a number of letters from a password. This
makes it unlikely that if a person is able to look over a
customer’s shoulder, that they will obtain enough
information to commit fraud.
It may also be possible for a criminal to guess the
right PIN for a card. From a single guess, if it is assumed
that every combination of PIN is equally likely, a thief
who steals a card has a 1 in 10,000 chance of guessing
the PIN (and perhaps even more because some PINs are
much more popular and the issuer may not permit
certain easy-to-guess combinations of numbers). But
the thief actually has six guesses because the card
permits three tries before the card will lock, and an ATM
will permit a further three, making the chance of
success 1 in 1,666. If the customer has multiple cards
with the same PIN (a practice recommended by banks to
prevent customers having to write down their PIN), the
odds for criminals can be even better. With four cards in
a stolen wallet, the thief could have five attempts on
each card without locking them, and thus have a 1 in
500 chance of finding the PIN, and if successful, they
will then be able to use all the cards.
These estimates are assuming that each card only has
one PIN which will be accepted. This is certainly the
case (assuming the card functions correctly) for PoS
transactions where the card verifies the PIN. However,
this is probably not the case for ATM transactions if the
PVV (PIN verification value) technique of verifying PINs
is used. This approach is used to reduce the risk that a
compromise of the authorization system will lead to
PINs being discovered. Rather than storing the PIN, the
customer’s PIN is encrypted and then truncated to 4
digits of ciphertext – the PVV. The PINs entered at the
keypad are also encrypted, truncated, and compared to
the PVV. If the correct PIN is entered, the two will match,
but if an incorrect PIN is entered, there is still a chance
of a match. Most cards will have two or more PINs which
will trigger a PVV match, and some will have as many as
ten.15
Yes cards 
During the process of card authentication, the card
presents a cryptographic certificate to prove that it is a
legitimate card. This certificate can be verified with
information which is available publicly, and therefore
can be carried out even by PoS terminals which are
offline. However, in order to allow anyone to verify the
certificate, the card must also permit anyone to read its
certificate and all the other information it presents.
Therefore anyone who can read the certificate can, for
most UK cards, produce a cloned smart card that will
present identical information, and so pass card
authentication. Criminals could produce such a clone by
reading data from a Chip & PIN card and writing it to a
15 Mike Bond and Jolyon Clulow, Encrypted?
Randomised? Compromised? (When
Cryptographically Secured Data is Not Secure),
Workshop on Cryptographic Algorithms and their
Uses, July 2004, (Queensland University of
Technology), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/
research/Enc-Rand-Comp.pdf.
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17 Chris Mitchell, ‘Payment and e-commerce
applications (Part B2)’, Lecture notes for IY5601,
2005 (Royal Holloway, University of London),
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/cjm/IY5601/IY5601_B_06
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generic smart card. Equipment and software to achieve
this, along with programmable smart cards, are
commercially available, and cloned smart cards created
in this way have already been found in Europe.16
For PoS transactions, verification of the card-holder is
performed by the card. The terminal sends the PIN
entered to the card, and the card responds whether it is
correct. Therefore a criminal does not need to know the
correct PIN when using a cloned card, because clones
can be made which simply respond that any PIN is
correct – known as ‘Yes-Cards’. Clones such as this
would not contain the correct keys for generating the
ARQC or TC, and so could be detected by the issuer.
However, the TC is not sent to the bank until long after
the transaction for offline transactions, so by that stage
the thief will have left with the goods, although the
fraud can be detected afterwards. For online
transactions, the incorrect ARQC should be detected
and the transaction declined.
Copying the certificate to circumvent card
authentication, as described above, is possible in cards
which support static data authentication (SDA). As of
2009, most UK cards are of this type, but some banks
are distributing out a more secure alternative – dynamic
data authentication (DDA). This provides some
resistance against card cloning, but was not issued in
the UK, in part due to concerns about the increased
costs of the cards and longer transaction times. DDA
works by adding an additional step to card
authentication, where the card proves that it is the
legitimate owner of the certificate it presents. This
feature requires giving the card an asymmetric key
(both the public and private half), and the ability to
produce its own digital signatures, which is more
expensive, because asymmetric cryptography is much
more complex than the symmetric cryptography used in
transaction authorization.
The wedge attack
However, DDA does not prevent yes-cards completely,
because card authentication can occur before card-
holder verification, and so may not include the result of
the PIN verification. A simple yes-card cannot be used,
because it would fail card authentication, but an
alternative technique might still be effective against
offline transactions. Here, a stolen card is plugged into a
device (a ‘wedge’) that can modify the data as it flows
between the terminal and the card. The terminal is
permitted to communicate directly with the legitimate
card during card authentication, which will therefore be
successful. But during card-holder verification, the
wedge suppresses the messages as they are sent to the
card and, regardless of the PIN entered by the thief, the
wedge tells the terminal that the PIN was correct. The
wedge can either pass through the TC from the real
card, or create a fake one of its own. In this way, a
criminal who has stolen a Chip & PIN card (SDA or DDA)
can use it in offline transactions without knowing the
correct PIN.17
The wedge attack also works against online
transactions, due to an oversight in the design of the
transaction authorization stage. In the EMV
specification, the ARQC and TC message includes the
result of card-holder verification. However, the result
only indicates whether the verification was attempted
but failed; it does not distinguish between whether the
verification succeeded or whether it was not attempted.
Therefore a wedge could suppress card-holder
verification, and then relay the ARQC and TC between
the legitimate card and terminal. The issuer would
receive these cryptograms, and since they were from the
legitimate card, the authorization would succeed and
the bank would accept the transaction.
This flaw was eventually identified, and banks
produced a proprietary extension to EMV which
included an additional result in the ARQC and TC,
stating whether PIN verification was attempted; a
similar extension was later included in the revised EMV
specification, but has yet to be widely implemented.
However, these only allow the issuer to establish that
PIN verification was not attempted; in the wedge attack,
the merchant’s PoS terminal will still believe PIN
verification succeeded, even though the wrong PIN was
entered. A further extension – combined DDA and
application cryptogram generation (CDA) – can prevent
the wedge attack even in offline transactions by
combining card authentication and transaction
authorization, but this further extension has yet to be
adopted, at least in the UK.
Stand-in authorization
As noted in the discussion above, transaction
authorization is of critical importance: it is the only way
to reliably detect cloned cards and whether the correct
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PIN has been entered. Most transactions in the UK
(estimates of 80–90 per cent have been given) are
processed online. Despite this, the issuer may not
process the authorization message, because of the
possibility of ‘stand-in authorization’. Here, if the issuer
cannot be contacted in sufficient time, an intermediate
party such as the payment system or an outsourced
processing centre may authorize the transaction on
behalf of the issuer. The party that provides the
authorization is sometimes contractually obliged to
accept liability for the transaction if it is fraudulent.
However, if there is an equipment failure, it still may be
more cost-effective to authorize the transaction and
accept the risk without performing all the checks.
Issuers may not be aware of their own policy (or that of
any outsourced provider) on how authorizations are
handled when equipment fails, or the times at which
such failures may have occurred. They may even fail to
disclose this information to customers who are
disputing a transaction.
Where the transaction value is low, and the costs of
communications are high, it may be cost-effective to not
attempt to contact the issuer at all. This is especially
likely to happen in international transactions, but the
prevalence is decreasing because of improved reliability
and the lower cost of data communications. Each type
of intermediate party is able to check different aspects
of the transaction. For instance, some have the keys to
verify the ARQC and TC, some can verify the PIN (for ATM
transactions), some can check if the card is reported
stolen, and some may not be able to check any of these.
Issuers will have different policies on which types of
intermediate party is able to perform stand-in
authorization. In addition to establishing liability,
contracts will also impose service level agreements that
will set out the speed by which an authorization
message must be processed, and in such a manner
control the circumstances in which stand-in processing
is appropriate.
Fallback
Another set of vulnerabilities exist because the
magnetic stripe system is still operational, even with
Chip & PIN cards. UK cards continue to have magnetic
stripes, to enable them to work in terminals and ATMs
without chip readers (e.g. outside the UK), or when the
chip or chip reader has failed. UK PoS terminals also
have magnetic stripe readers for use with foreign cards
or as a backup when the chip cannot be read. This
means a criminal who cannot clone a chip can simply
copy the magnetic stripe from a smart card, and
produce a magnetic stripe clone. From the perspective
of an ATM or PoS terminal, this clone will appear to be a
legitimate card, but the chip on the card might be
damaged, or the chip reader in the terminal might have
failed. Since chips regularly break and chip readers
frequently get dirty and fail, this is not very suspicious,
and the transaction may be permitted to proceed
regardless. This is known as a ‘fallback transaction’.
The criminal does not have to read the magnetic
stripe to clone the card, because the chip contains a
copy of the data on the magnetic stripe. This data is
also commonly sent to the issuer during a transaction.
Therefore a criminal who can read the chip or intercept
the communication between a terminal and the issuer,
can also copy the magnetic stripe. A criminal who can
intercept the communication between the PoS terminal
and chip can copy the same data, and also can obtain
the PIN entered by the customer, as it is sent to the chip
during card-holder verification. PoS terminals have
tamper resistance measures to prevent this, but due to
design errors, it is quite simple to circumvent the
protection in place and connect a ‘tap’ built with off-the-
shelf electronic components.18 This device reads all the
information necessary to produce a cloned magnetic
stripe card and use it in an ATM. Chip & PIN terminals
have even been discovered with taps having been
added during or soon after manufacture.19 For these
reasons, more recent cards do not store the full CVV on
the chip, instead replacing it with an alternative termed
the ‘iCVV’.
This general approach has been widely exploited for
committing both fraudulent ATM and PoS transactions.
For instance, Maxwell Parsons was convicted in
November 2006 of having collected card details by
connecting a MP3 player to the back of ATMs. With this
information he was able to produce cloned cards, and
use them to perform unauthorized transactions.20 In
18 Saar Drimer, Steven J. Murdoch, and Ross
Anderson, Thinking Inside the Box: System-Level
Failures of Tamper Proofing, Proceedings of the
2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
(2008, IEEE Computer Society Washington, DC,
USA), 281–295, available at http://www.cl.cam
.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-711.pdf. A
demonstration of this attack on a Chip & PIN
terminal was filmed by BBC Newsnight, and aired
on 26 February 2008, 22:30, BBC Two.
19 Henry Samuel, ‘Chip and pin scam ‘has netted
millions from British shoppers’’, The Daily
Telegraph, 10 October 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/polit
ics/lawandorder/3173346/Chip-and-pin-scam-has-
netted-millions-from-British-shoppers.html.
20 ‘Cash machine bug scam expert jailed’,
Manchester Evening News, 15 November 2006,
http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/s/
228/228286_cash_machine_bug_scam_expert_jail
ed.html; Stephen Mason, editor, Electronic
Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility,
4.10.
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October 2008, Anup Patel was convicted of committing
fraud to the value of £2 million. This was achieved by
defeating the physical protection put in place to protect
Chip & PIN terminals, and to record both PINs and card
details. This attack was so successful that it enabled
cloned magnetic stripe cards to be produced.21
Back-end failures
The description of the vulnerabilities in the section
above assumed that the back-end systems controlled by
the card issuer, together with other processing
infrastructure, operate correctly. However, if the bank
systems are not perfectly designed and correctly
operated, these assumptions will not be true. It is likely
that there may be weaknesses in the card processing
infrastructure because of the complexity of the system,
and because it is continually being upgraded to
accommodate new equipment and additional
operational requirements. A recent illustration of a
failure was demonstrated where a couple in Essex, UK,
discovered that they could withdraw cash from a
particular ATM without the transaction being recorded
against their account. Even though these transactions
should have been declined because the couple’s
account was overdrawn, a failure at some point in the
processing allowed them to be accepted. This failure
eventually became public when the couple were
convicted, having withdrawn over £61,000 in this way.22
For online transactions, if the ARQC or TC is wrong,
the issuer should decline a transaction, and for offline
transactions an incorrect TC should be detected when
the terminal goes online at a later time, the fraud
discovered, and the customer refunded. In this way,
customers should not lose money from the use of yes-
card attacks, although for offline fraud, the merchant
will probably have to pay once the fraudulent
transaction is reversed. But if the issuer fails to detect
an ARQC or TC which was generated with the wrong key,
or contains the wrong information, the use of a yes-card
or wedge attacks will not be detected for online or
offline transactions. This failure could occur simply
because of a programming error, but it could also be an
intentional decision; for example if the HSMs which
validate the ARQC and TC are overloaded, the issuer
may decide to accept transactions without checking.
Also, in some circumstances, the ARQC or TC will be
corrupted before being sent to the issuer; in these
situations the issuer may decide to accept the
transaction rather than risk insulting the customer by
declining it, and accept the risk of fraud. Such
corruption can occur due to random errors, or because
of a format translation error such as the one believed to
be the reason that Visa debited customers’ accounts by
US$23 quadrillion.23
Because almost all UK cards, ATMs and PoS terminals
have been upgraded to support Chip & PIN, it is
common for the issuer to automatically decline fallback
transactions on cards which have a chip when used in
the UK. However, a failure in processing may also allow
a fallback transaction to succeed when it should be
declined. This could be because the issuer is informed
that a fallback transaction has occurred, but a software
bug causes it to be accepted. Alternatively, a bug in the
ATM or PoS terminal may cause it to identify a fallback
transaction as a chip transaction, and the authorization
system does not decline the transaction on the basis of
it having a missing or incorrect ARQC or TC.
Alternatively, a criminal could modify the ‘service code’
on the magnetic stripe to indicate the card does not
have a chip, and hence a fallback transaction should be
permitted. The issuer should detect the tampered
service code, but in 2005 someone working for the
London Programme made a magnetic stripe clone or a
smart card, altered the service code, and successfully
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used it for an ATM cash withdrawal.24
Logging failures
Most banking systems produce extensive log files that
record their actions, which makes it easier to identify
malfunctions and understand the cause. When
transactions are disputed by the customer, these logs
may be examined. However, the systems which produce
the log files are complex, and their output often requires
further processing before it can be easily understood. It
is therefore common to have reporting systems, which
take the raw log input (potentially from multiple
sources), interpret them, and produce a new file which
is intended to be easier to understand. A failure in
either logging or reporting systems could cause the
result of a transaction to be misinterpreted; for example
the operator may believe it to be a Chip & PIN
transaction when in fact it was fallback. If a malicious
person has gained access to logging or reporting
systems, they could also tamper with the result in order
to cover their tracks, because these systems are
commonly less well protected than authorization
systems.
Even after a reporting system has processed a log file,
it can still be difficult to interpret the output. Output is
generally presented using terse codes, and their
meaning must be found within documentation.
Sometimes this documentation is not available, or it
may be out-of-date following changes to the system
concerned. Therefore, the operator may interpret them
by comparing the log output with similar output
observed in the past, and then they may draw
conclusions. For example, in the case Job v Halifax plc,25
the witness for the bank examined the format of the log
entry of the disputed transaction, and pointed out that it
was similar to other legitimate Chip & PIN transactions,
and different from other legitimate fallback
transactions. From this, the witness inferred the
disputed transaction must have been a legitimate Chip
& PIN transaction. The bank did not refer to any
documentation on the meaning of the data, or discuss
what the log entry would look like should one or more
security checks have failed.
PIN verification
As discussed with respect to the yes-card attack, for
PoS transactions, the card is responsible for verifying
the PIN, and if a cloned card is used, the criminal need
not know the correct PIN. In contrast for ATM
transactions, the PIN is sent back to the issuer or a
stand-in processor for verification. Even so, the criminal
would not need to know the correct PIN if a stand-in
processor that cannot verify the PIN authorizes the
transaction. If there is a malfunction which allows
transactions to be authorized if the PIN verification is
not attempted or fails, a card could be used without the
correct PIN. An insider may also try to trigger such
failures, for example by gaining access to the
authorization system.
Terminal failures
The discussion above has been about failures of the
processing and authorization systems. These are very
important, because the correct functioning of these
systems is of critical importance to the integrity of the
Chip & PIN system. PoS terminals and ATMs are relied
upon to a lesser extent because they are under the
control of potentially untrustworthy merchants, and
their correct functioning cannot be guaranteed. It is for
this reason they are tamper resistant, to prevent
malicious people from extracting confidential
information (although these measures can easily be
overcome as noted above, and criminals have been
caught doing so). Nevertheless it is still possible to
commit fraud because the terminal fails to operate
properly.
During transaction authorization, the PoS terminal or
ATM generates an unpredictable number. The number is
sent to the card, and incorporated into the
cryptographic process which generates the TC and
ARQC. If this number is predictable, a criminal could
clone a card by asking the legitimate card for a number
of TC and ARQC cryptograms, then writing these values
to a generic smart card. This clone could then be used
for a transaction, and provided the thief guessed a
correct value for the unpredictable number, the clone
can produce a TC and ARQC which will pass the check
by the issuer. In this way, the criminal can put through
online Chip & PIN transactions at both PoS and ATMs,
given only temporary access to the legitimate card. The
criminal may, however, need to know the correct PIN if
cryptograms are required that indicate that card-holder
verification succeeded.
While there are well established techniques for
24 Chip and PIN security flaw uncovered, London
Programme, ITV1 London, 15 March 2005,
19:30–20:00.
25 Job v Halifax plc, Nottingham County Court (case
number 7BQ00307), 30 April 2009, the judgment is
published on page 235.
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29 Personal communication.
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Publishers, 1995).
31 Professor Jacques-Louis Lions and others, Ariane
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securely generating unpredictable numbers, it is
notoriously difficult to verify whether a generator is
working correctly, so failures do regularly occur. For
example, one version of Linux had a feature which was
supposed to generate unpredictable random numbers,
but was in fact relatively easy to predict. This flaw was
introduced in 2006, but remained undetected until
2008.26 Linux is used in both ATMs and PoS terminals,
but it is not clear whether such devices ran an affected
version. A criminal can also tamper with an ATM or PoS
terminal to reduce the unpredictability of the random
number generator. Research has shown that it might not
even be necessary to open the device to do so;
manipulating the power supply or transmitting a radio
signal may be sufficient.27
Whistleblowing and insiders
Examples of security failures in banking systems are
hard to find for a variety of reasons, such as the
restrictions imposed by non-disclosure agreements; the
banks are reluctant to admit vulnerabilities and the
complexity of systems, thus making it challenging to
discover vulnerabilities in the first place. The examples
discussed above became public either because a
customer noticed, or because of legal proceedings. In
other fields, most notably safety critical systems such
as aerospace and medical equipment, there are legal
requirements on companies to report failures, and to
investigate serious failures. The banks are not subject to
such requirements; only whistleblowers and
researchers acting outside the banking system can
notify the public of problems.
However, there are substantial obstacles to this. For
example, a French engineer, Serge Humpich, discovered
a way to make forged banking smart cards, and
reported this to the banks involved. Having
demonstrated his technique worked by purchasing ten
Paris Metro tickets at the request of the banks, he was
arrested and convicted for counterfeiting.28 Also, a
journalist in the UK whom the author assisted with
reporting on vulnerabilities in Chip & PIN was
threatened by his own bank that they might cancel his
mortgage (though the bank in question eventually
withdrew the threat).29 Cases such as this create a
chilling effect, preventing people from testing the
existence of vulnerabilities or reporting those they
become aware of.
Banking insiders who are aware of security
weaknesses may decide to exploit the vulnerability for
fraudulent purposes. They may discover the problem
directly, or be notified of it in a security testing report.
Discovering a vulnerability does not, however, require
insider information; while one of the criminals in the
Essex case referred to above worked for a bank, it is
believed they discovered the vulnerability by accident.
The ATM in question was old, which offers a possible
explanation as to how the fraud happened. In order to
integrate legacy infrastructure with new systems, an
established technique developed by Brodie and
Stonebreaker is to build a ‘gateway’,30 which translates
between the old and new conventions, but potentially
loses information in the process. This component is
then modified to fix bugs until it passes the necessary
tests.
Integrating legacy systems is notoriously difficult, and
tests cannot be guaranteed to find every problem.
Although it can only be hypothesized that this class of
flaw allowed the fraud, another example of where
integrating a legacy component causes failure is with
the Ariane 5 satellite launch vehicle. Here, despite
extremely rigorous testing, an integration problem
between software originally designed for Ariane 4 and
the Ariane 5 navigation system remained undiscovered,
until it caused a failure soon after launch, destroying the
rocket.31 The writers of the software made assumptions
that were true at the time the component was designed,
but were invalidated when the surrounding system was
upgraded, leading to its catastrophic failure.
Evidence in Chip & PIN cases
When a transaction is disputed, there may be
disagreement between the customer and the bank as to
who should be liable for it. A common example is where
the bank believes that a customer’s real card and PIN
have been used, and hence argues that either the
customer performed the transaction (and is attempting
to defraud the bank), or has been negligent in
protecting their card or PIN or both card and PIN. The
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customer may believe that they did not carry out the
transaction, and they were not negligent with their card
or PIN, and argue that the transaction is due to an error
having been made by the bank, or a security
vulnerability having been exploited by criminals.
Evidence may be requested to corroborate each party’s
position, but drawing conclusions from it must be
performed with care. The evidence itself could be
insufficient, and mistakes in interpretation might be
made. Also, bank employees might try to cover up
embarrassing security failures, and criminals may
attempt to tamper with evidence.
Evidence can be collected from all the systems that
have been discussed in this article, commonly in the
form of log files. These include the manufacture and
personalization facilities, where the chips are produced,
placed on cards and loaded with data. The PoS terminal
or ATM will also contain a log, generally on paper and
informally called the ‘till-roll’, which records
transactions and other important events. The card itself
also contains useful information, such as the ATC, but
depending on the bank, there may also be summary
information available about transactions. The most
important logs are kept at the authorization centre,
recording the type of transaction and result of
authorization. However, because there is potential for
errors in all of these items due to mistakes or
tampering, it is prudent to collect as much evidence as
possible in order to show that records are consistent.
Audit and compliance
Another way to establish the reliability of evidence is to
examine whether the system producing the logs was
operating correctly. This is commonly achieved through
an audit, where experts (possibly internal to the bank or
external) will examine documentation or the system
itself (or both the documentation and the system), and
check it against requirements. The result of the audit is
a report, which can be very informative as to the
dependability of the system. If any potential problems
are identified, it will highlight these, and where an
external audit is undertaken (by a payment system for
instance), the auditor may require the bank to
undertake changes. However, if a vulnerability
discovered by a payment system is considered to only
affect the bank itself and not other members of the
scheme, it may be possible for the bank not to deal with
the problem and accept the risk.
Not only is the report itself important, but also the
changes which were carried out in response to the
report. For each change, there should be information on
how and when the modification was applied, and how it
was established that the modification properly fixed the
issue that was identified. The methodology for
performing the audit is also significant, because
approaches vary in how effective they are at identifying
problems. One very effective technique is penetration
testing, where a skilled team are given access to the
system and given the task of finding security
vulnerabilities in any way they see fit. At another
extreme, some audits only examine documentation and
not the system itself, and so will miss implementation
errors. However, regardless of the methodology, audits
do miss critical vulnerabilities; for example the OpenSSL
cryptographic library was subjected to an extensive
audit under the FIPS 140-2 scheme, and passed, even
though a serious security vulnerability existed in the
random number generator.32
Logs of changes to bank systems are important, even
if modifications were not the result of an audit report.
This is especially true if the modification was known to
have an effect on security, but even apparently
innocuous changes can cause security vulnerabilities
which are hard to identify. Obtaining documentary
evidence is important because there may be a dispute,
even within a bank, as to when a particular change is
32 OpenSSL FIPS Object Module Vulnerabilities, 29
November 2007, http://www.openssl.org/news/
secadv_20071129.txt.
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33 Demonstration on ITV Manhunt, aired on ITV1, 29
May 2007.
34 Statement from APACS, in response to BBC
Newsnight, 26 February 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight
/7265888.stm.
made. For example, in the case of Job v Halifax plc, a
number of dates were given as to when magnetic stripe
transactions were disabled. The witness for Halifax, Ian
Brown, stated in paragraph 5.4 of his statement dated 6
February 2008, that ‘If the transaction is presented in
‘fallback’ mode, then the transaction will be declined.’
The inference of this comment was that Halifax had
disabled fallback before February 2006 (the date of the
disputed transactions). The expert witness for Halifax
plc, David Baker (Head of the APACS Cards Technical
Unit), stated in paragraph 5.1 of his second expert’s
report dated 14 February 2008 that ‘To our knowledge
all UK issuers will routinely decline transactions flagged
as magnetic stripe read and have been doing so since
2005.’ When Mr Brown gave evidence, his barrister
questioned him about the statement he made in
paragraph 5.1, and he amended his evidence to the
effect that the comments he made were correct in
September 2006. The author has confirmed that some
banks permitted fallback as late as May 2007.33
One explanation for this discrepancy is that there can
be a delay between when a change is mandated, and
when it is actually applied; this has also been seen with
iCVV, which APACS announced to be fully in place by
2008:34
‘All UK issued cards issued after 1 January 2008
include an updated iCVV (Integrated Circuit Card
Verification Value) which means that if one of these
cards were compromised in the method described,
the data would be useless to the fraudster (i.e. a fake
magnetic stripe card created via a compromise of this
type would not work in a cash machine, even overseas
in a non-chip and PIN country).’
The author has confirmed that several banks, including
Halifax Bank of Scotland (with a card issued in March
2008) and Barclays (with a card issued in February
2008), have not implemented iCVV, and they were still
issuing cards that do not comply with the iCCV standard
past this date.
Before a card transaction can take place, the chip
must be manufactured and the software loaded. Logs
from this process will be useful to establish which
version of the chip hardware and EMV software was
used. Internal audit reports may indicate if any versions
were known to be vulnerable to attack. Even if these
audit reports do not exist, it would be informative to
examine the ‘change log’ documentation accompanying
the chip software, as this should indicate the
differences between versions. If this documentation
indicates that a new version of software was released in
order to fix a bug in a prior version, the possibility that
such a bug would allow a fraudulent transaction should
be investigated.
The personalization process is another area in which
logs would be valuable, for example whether a cloned
card was produced because the first one might
apparently fail quality assurance. Procedures should
also be examined, to ensure that cryptographic keys are
being safely handled. Also, audit reports and change
logs for the software which configures cards should be
examined, to ensure it properly locks the card to protect
confidential data.
Logs of the transaction and authorization process will
be available from a number of places, and the
information they contain will be somewhat different.
The ATM or PoS terminal will be able to indicate
whether the transaction that is in dispute actually took
place, and how it was authorized. However,
interpretation of these can be difficult. For example, in
the Essex fraud case, the bank that operated the ATM
originally believed that members of staff were stealing
the money. This suspicion must have arisen because
logs are maintained of how much money was loaded
into the ATM and how much was withdrawn, and the
totals were inconsistent. In fact, the CCTV surveillance
put in place to catch the thief, actually showed the
couple who were later convicted.
During the authorization process, messages are sent
via a number of intermediate parties: the acquiring bank
who is contacted by the merchant; the issuer (or stand-
in processor) which generates the authorization; and
the payment system which allows acquiring banks and
issuers to communicate and transfer funds. All of these
parties probably keep logs, especially the payment
system. This is because they are responsible for
providing the communication infrastructure, and they
also offer dispute resolution services between their
members. In these cases, where there is an
inconsistency in the records of two members, the
payment system can examine their logs to establish the
facts. The logs of payment systems are particularly
valuable in this case, because they are from a neutral
party. Similarly, in the case of customer disputes,
collecting logs from a third party increases the chance
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of detecting insider attacks.
Transaction authentication is the most important step
of the EMV transaction, and for this stage the logs are
kept with the issuer. These should include a description
of the transaction, the result of authorization, and the
cryptograms involved (ARQC, TC, and ARPC). The
description should include all the usual information,
such as the amount and date, but also will have the
result of card-holder verification, and importantly
whether PIN verification was attempted and whether it
succeeded. Two versions of this are given: one by the
terminal in its description of the transaction, and one by
the card as part of the ARQC and TC, in its issuer
application data section (IAD). These should be
compared to establish consistency. Because of the
cryptographic processing, these logs can be subjected
to enhanced verification, but they do not replace the
other logs discussed above, because they do not
contain all the necessary information and still can be
tampered with.
Principles for design of secure systems
In the field of computer security, the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) is the part of a system which must be relied
upon in order for the overall system to function securely.
A widely accepted principle of security engineering is to
minimize the size of the TCB, in order to improve the
robustness of the system.35 Following this principle
means that during the design and implementation of a
system, the available testing resources can be focused
more intensely on the TCB, increasing the chances of
identifying bugs. Additionally, this principle aids
forensic analysis, because if a component can be shown
to be outside the TCB, there is no need to waste effort in
establishing whether it is functioning correctly. In EMV,
there is no clearly defined TCB, but analyzing the
system from this perspective is a helpful way of
deciding what system components should be examined
and what they can be relied upon for.
In disputed transaction cases, the issuer will typically
have almost all the evidence that is presented to the
court or adjudicator. Sometimes audit reports are made
public, as occurs for the banking smart cards issued in
Germany and evaluated under the Common Criteria
scheme.36 However, in banking, it is more common to
keep audit reports and system documentation secret
than in other areas of security engineering.
In discussing what evidence should be presented,
there may be a question as to whether a bank, by giving
an opposing expert witness access to an item of
information, would harm the security of the system. An
accepted best practice in security engineering is that
the security of a robust system should not depend on
secrecy of its design. This is because it is difficult to
keep design documents secret, and if the detailed
functionality of a system cannot be described, questions
may be raised as to whether it is in fact secure. It is for
this reason that it is common to openly publish details
of security systems, often including the source code
from which they are built. Even if source code is not
published (e.g. Microsoft Windows), lists of known
security flaws are publically available.
This practice is historically known as Kerkhoffs’
principle,37 where it was applied to military
communication systems. With respect to banking
systems, the same principle is described by APACS (the
UK banking industry representative body), in their PIN
Administration Policy:38
‘The PIN Administration process must not only be
secure, but also be demonstrably secure. If PIN
Security is publicly challenged, either in the media or
in a court of law, it must be possible to respond to
such a challenge and for the response to be
supported with evidence. Furthermore, the use of that
evidence in the public domain must not in itself
compromise security.’
Verifying authorization logs
If there is a disputed Chip & PIN transaction, it can
safely be assumed that the bank authorization system
shows that the correct card and PIN were used
(otherwise the customer would be immediately
refunded). In which case, the next step in examining the
evidence would be to establish whether these logs can
be relied upon in concluding that the customer’s card
and PIN were used. Some generic approaches have
been described above, such as corroborating different
items of evidence and examining documentation
relating to the systems relied upon. However, there is
one particularly useful set of techniques which can be
applied to authorization system logs, because the EMV
35 Butler Lampson, Martín Abadi, Michael Burrows
and Edward Wobber, ‘Authentication in Distributed
Systems: Theory and Practice’, ACM Transactions
on Computer Systems, Volume 12, Issue 1
(February 1994) (ACM Press), http://research.
microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/blampson/45-
authenticationtheoryandpractice/acrobat.pdf.
36 Certification Report for ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.2,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0341-2006, 13 June 2006 (BSI),
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/
0341a.pdf.
37 Auguste Kerckhoffs, ‘La cryptographie militaire’,
Journal des sciences militaires, 9 January 1883,
http://www.petitcolas.net/fabien/kerckhoffs/.
38 APACS PIN Administration Policy, January 2004
(APACS), http://www.apacs.org.uk/resources
_publications/documents/PIN_Administration_Poli
cy.pdf.
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cryptograms act as a audit log, allowing their
authenticity to be established without having to rely on
the authorization system.
Validating the ATC
The simplest item to validate is the ATC, which is sent
along with each cryptogram. It will therefore be stored
in the authorization system, and may also be recorded
by the payment system and at the PoS terminal or ATM.
The ATC is a number stored by the card, and
incremented by one each time a transaction is initiated.
Therefore, logs of transactions should show the ATC
increasing by one for each transaction, in chronological
order of the transaction time. The ATC may pass over
values if a transaction is initiated but aborted before the
cryptogram is sent to the issuer, but it should never
decrease. Large jumps should be viewed with suspicion.
It is important to examine the ATC sequence for both
disputed and non-disputed transactions, because if a
clone is being used, and a criminal is not very careful,
there will be inconsistencies in the pattern. For example,
suppose the criminal creates a cloned card and uses it
for a transaction. If the ATC produced for this fraudulent
transaction is lower or equal to that of the last
legitimate one, logs of ATC values would show up a
discrepancy. Even if the criminal is able to guess the
correct value of the ATC to use, the logs will still show a
discrepancy when the customer next uses the legitimate
card, unless it happened to leave out a value due to an
aborted transaction.
While the authorization system should detect grossly
irregular sequences of ATC values, when investigating
disputed transactions, it is advisable to perform more
rigorous examination of the information than the
authorization system would normally perform. This is
because criminals will generally attempt to circumvent
the fraud detection measures, but no more (so as not to
waste effort). If the process of analyzing logs for
disputed transactions is merely to repeat the same
checks which it would have had to pass in order for the
transaction to succeed, no new type of fraud would ever
be detected. Authorization systems might also not
enforce tight constraints; for example the author has
tested cards which have worked despite large gaps in
the ATC sequences.
However, the criminal can still circumvent the process
if he has access to the legitimate card. First, the criminal
uses the cloned card a few times while the customer is
not using the legitimate one. Then the thief obtains the
legitimate card, increments the ATC the same number of
times that he used the cloned one, adds a few more
additional ones, and then returns it to the customer.
Finally, the criminal can use the cloned card more times,
provided that its ATC remains less than the one he set
on the legitimate card. In this way, the thief can
interleave two groups of fraudulent transactions,
without causing disruption to the pattern of ATC values.
With more regular access to the legitimate card, the
criminal could effect further fraudulent transactions.
EMV cards can, optionally, contain a record of the ATC
value when the card last successfully completed online
transaction authentication. This value can be used to
help detect whether a criminal has incremented the ATC
as described above; in such a case, there would be a
significant gap between ATC and the last online ATC.
Many UK cards have this feature enabled, and it has
proved a useful forensic tool. Another optional feature
which would be especially useful for investigating
disputed transactions is the transaction log. Here, the
card maintains a record of recent transactions, and will
return the list when requested. Unfortunately, the
author is not aware of any UK bank which has adopted
this feature.
Even without the optional additions, the ATC is a useful
tool in validating transaction logs, and the interleaving of
disputed transactions with non-disputed ones, with a
consistent ATC pattern, was used by the First Trust Bank
as evidence against their customer in a disputed ATM
withdrawal case.39 While the ATC logs are held by the bank
(and potentially other parties), the customer can partially
validate this information himself, because ATC values are
sometimes printed on receipts. Additionally, if the
customer has retained the card which his bank states was
used for the disputed transactions, he or someone acting
for him can read the current ATC value using specially
designed software. The author has attempted to do this in
three cases so far, but in two the issuer instructed that the
card be destroyed (in one case by the customer, and in the
other by the bank which had retained the card in an ATM),
and in the third, the bank sent a message to the card
instructing it to permanently disable itself before the
author could obtain access to the card.
Validating the cryptogram
A further item that can be validated is the cryptogram
(ARQC or TC or both). First, having a cryptogram
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contributes towards evidence that it was a Chip & PIN
transaction, not fallback. The transaction data which
accompanies the cryptogram includes the type of
transaction, date, value, etc. as seen by the card, which
should be compared against the version that was sent
to the issuer. Most important is the IAD, which is
generated by the card and incorporates details on
whether the PIN was entered correctly, and if the card
has detected any unusual activity. This is the only way
to verify whether card-holder verification succeeded;
because of the wedge attack, the PoS terminal may
have been misled. The detailed meaning of the IAD is
specific to the issuer, but it generally follows one of the
standards produced by Visa, Mastercard, or the EMV
consortium.
However, the records of both the IAD and ATC could
be manipulated by the authorization, reporting, or
logging systems and networks, so they cannot be
trusted unless the reliability of these can be assured.
But following from the principle of minimizing the
trusted computing base, it is possible to eliminate
consideration of these systems by validating the
authentication code using independently implemented
software, based on the public standards for cryptogram
generation (such as one written by the author).40
Checking a cryptogram requires the UDK of the card,
which needs to be kept confidential while the card is
active, but after the card is cancelled it can be safely
disclosed. This is because knowing the UDK of one card
is of no assistance in discovering the UDK of another.
This key could, for example, be obtained by requesting
the HSM, which generates keys for personalizing newly
issued cards, to generate a key for just one card. The
key can also be validated by checking an ARQC
generated by the card (if the customer still holds it), or
receipts which show the ARQC or TC.
Nature of disputes
From the above description, it is clear that the
complexity of EMV substantially changes the nature of
disputes between customers and banks over
unauthorized transactions. While the addition of
cryptography offers greater resistance to fraud, this also
makes it more likely that customers will be denied
refunds by their bank. Not many of these cases make it
to court in the UK, because the sums the customers
claim for are typically a few hundred to a few thousand
pounds, and the claimant risks an order to pay costs
that can be significant, should they lose. For example, in
Job v Halifax plc, the disputed transaction was £2,100,
but the bank proved their case to the satisfaction of the
judge, and Mr Job was ordered to pay £15,000 in costs.
Prosecutions also occur, such as that of Jane Badger,
who disputed a transaction and was subsequently
charged with making a false statement. She was
acquitted, but at the time of writing, the bank (Egg)
continues to refuse to refund the disputed transaction.
Despite only a few cases making it to court, the
consumer rights organization Which? reports that 20 per
cent of customers are not refunded after claiming to be
the victim of fraud.41 There are difficulties with the way
customers can seek a resolution in respect of disputed
transactions. Initially, they have to defer to the bank’s
internal dispute resolution process, and then consider
adjudication by the Financial Services Ombudsman.
However, the customer is in a fairly weak position,
because neither the bank nor the Financial Services
Ombudsman produces the evidence, unless the
customer makes a request under the provisions of the
Data Protection Act 1998. The Banking Code is also not
very helpful. It states that banks are liable for fraudulent
transactions, but this only applies if the bank believes
the customer has been either negligent nor is acting
fraudulently. A common position taken by banks over
disputed transactions is that if a transaction is Chip &
PIN, and it does not match the standard patterns of
known frauds, then the customer is considered liable.
However, the criteria banks use for identifying patterns
are not subject to public scrutiny, and may vary between
banks and individual fraud investigators.
Another frequent problem during disputes is that
evidence is destroyed by the time the case is
adjudicated or when legal proceedings are initiated. As
mentioned above, in the cases where the author has
attempted to read the ATC from cards, the bank has
requested that this evidence be destroyed. This appears
to be standard procedure, but seems to be unwise now
that cards can contain useful forensic evidence.
Similarly, in the case of Job v Halifax plc, the transaction
logs which included the ARQC were destroyed by Halifax
after 180 days, even though the transactions were in
dispute. Since there was only one log of the transaction
presented as evidence, any inconsistency which might
have existed would not have been detected. While the
40 The author wrote this software in order to be able
to verify any cryptograms that might have been
produced in Job v Halifax plc. It is not, as yet,
publicly available.
41 ‘Fraud victims struggle to get money back: One in
five financial fraud victims not reimbursed’,
Which?, 25 June 2009, http://www.which.co.uk
/news/2009/06/fraud-victims-struggle-to-get-
money-back-179150.jsp.
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Policy Research, 16 January 2008,
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judgment in Job v Halifax plc went in the bank’s favour,
the judge cautioned that in future cases, the fact that a
bank destroys evidence may be considered differently
by another judge in different circumstances.
Obtaining evidence held by third parties can also be
problematic, such as CCTV footage. A common scenario
is that upon reporting a disputed transaction to their
bank, a customer is immediately refunded. The
customer is then satisfied with the outcome, and does
not take the case further. Simultaneously, an internal
investigation is initiated by the bank, which could take
many weeks. If this investigation decides against the
customer, the refund will be reversed. At this point, the
customer will be motivated to obtain CCTV evidence and
logs from third parties, but by this stage they may have
been deleted. Even if they still exist, the CCTV owner
may only respond to an application by the police, and
since April 2007 the police will only investigate if
requested to do so by the bank. From the bank’s
perspective, a case in which the customer has had their
refund denied is resolved, so they are unlikely to take
any further action.
These problems have led to many customers
contacting the press, and stories on Chip & PIN attract
high levels of interest from their audiences. Investigative
journalists have worked with researchers in order to
discover and demonstrate security vulnerabilities. In
some cases they have also contacted bank insiders and
reformed criminals to ask for assistance. In this respect,
the press performs a valuable role by protecting sources
from potential recrimination. The media can also be
helpful in obtaining refunds for disputed transactions. For
example, Barclays refunded Suzanne Lewis £1,400
following the intervention of BBC Watchdog in February
2007.42
The Financial Ombudsman has been criticized for
accepting assurances from the banks that Chip & PIN
cards cannot be cloned.43 The banks’ opinion is based
on their experience that criminals have not been caught
either using cloned Chip & PIN cards, or exploiting
failures in authorization systems. Care must be taken to
ensure that such arguments are not circular: if the
definition of a cloned card is one which will evade
detection by the bank’s anti-fraud measures, then of
course they will not have been caught by banks.
Similarly, in this article, a number of examples of
failures in bank computer systems and procedures have
been given, that have become public only because
either the customer reported the problem, or there was
an associated criminal prosecution. Even though these
cases are not complete explanations for how cloned
smart cards could be produced, it might be that others
exist which have not become public, and which could be
exploited by criminals.
Conclusion
A theme throughout this article has been that Chip &
PIN greatly increases the complexity of banking
systems. This helps deter criminals, but also greatly
increases the amount of preparation work necessary
when disputed transactions involving Chip & PIN are the
subject of litigation. The fact that logs, CCTV footage,
and other useful information may be destroyed
suggests that requests to preserve evidence should be
sent and pursued quickly, even if the disputed
transaction is initially reversed. For this reason, and so
that opportunities to challenge the evidence are not
missed, it is also prudent for customers disputing
transactions to obtain legal representation early on in
their case.
On the technical side of disputes, the complexity of
Chip & PIN offers both advantages and difficulties. The
extra evidence available can, potentially, help support a
particular interpretation, but the technical nature of the
evidence is such that it needs greater precision and
effort to interpret and analyze. However, for the
evidence to be subject to analysis and interpretation, it
must be disclosed. In addition, it is also necessary to
adduce sufficient information to establish its reliability,
and what conclusions may safely be drawn from it. This
presents challenges both to litigators and expert
witnesses. It is anticipated that this article provides
assistance to both these audiences, should they be
involved in such a case.
© Steven J. Murdoch, 2009
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Introduction 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) provide access to
cash, confidential information and services for service
users of all types, cultures and abilities, across the
globe. The standard authentication mechanism by
which these users gain access to ATMs consists of use
of a token (in the form of a bank card) combined with a
password known as a personal identity number (PIN),
that can be between 4 and 12 digits (for instance, 4
digits are used in the UK, 5 digits are used in South
Africa and 6 in France). Yet this mechanism, which is
based on knowledge retained by the person, is
unsatisfactory. Passwords are easily forgotten. Users
deal with this problem by behaving in a manner that
reduces the security: by writing down their PIN, or
making them all the same, or disclosing them to friends
and family.2 Whilst security administrators may blame
the user for the failure in securing their PIN, in reality
the method of authentication chosen by banks as a
means of authentication at the ATM disregards users’
innate cognitive abilities and limitations. Awareness is
emerging of the need to design authentication with
these abilities and limitations in mind, with researchers
at IBM describing this as ‘a critical area for research’.3
NCR, a leading ATM manufacturer, employs experts to
address these issues specifically.
This article explores the literature in respect of current
Western authentication systems, together with an
overview of some of the main authentication
alternatives. In considering current and proposed
authentication mechanisms, information is drawn from a
range of sources, including journal articles, conference
proceedings, company reports and sales literature for
security products designed for use on mobile
telephones and the internet. These mechanisms are
examined under the following headings: authentication;
pervasive mechanisms and known user behaviours;
usability and universal design at the ATM; how we
remember, and a taxonomy of alternative authentication
methods.
Throughout this article, reference will be made to the
term ‘usability’. ‘Usability’ is a quality that can be
measured in relation to the ease of use of a computer
application. The elements that make up usability
comprise the following:
a.Learnability: this tests the ease with which users
can complete basic tasks the first time they
encounter the computer system.
b.Efficiency: this measures how quickly users can
perform tasks once they are familiar with the
system.
c. Memorability: this tests how easily users can re-
establish competence after a period of not using the
system.
d.The number of times users make mistakes are
measured, as is the extent of the errors that are
made by users.
e.Measures of satisfaction establish if users find the
system enjoyable to use, and utility measures
whether the system does what the user needs it to
do.
Authentication: pervasive mechanisms and
known user behaviours
In this section, how people use authentication
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mechanisms and their known behaviours are reviewed
across the broad range of prevailing mechanisms, rather
than limiting the review to ATMs. Whilst ATMs have very
specific requirements for speed, security and usability in
a small space, knowledge-based authentication
mechanisms in general share common issues,
regardless of which form of device the person is
required to interact with. It is pertinent that an account
can be viewed through an ATM, the internet, the counter
at a bank, and from point of sale machines in retail
outlets. A different authentication mechanism might be
required for each avenue by which a person can obtain
access to their account. This can cause problems for the
person, such as memory interference, which in turn
causes memory confusion, which in turn leads to
insecure behaviour towards ATM security.4 By
understanding the broader picture, it is possible to
more fully understand the behaviour of users when
interacting with authentication mechanisms, which in
turn helps to formulate future research.
Context
ATMs provide access to cash, confidential information
and services to consumers across the globe. Machines
may be located indoors or outdoors, in a wide range of
climates, but are usually in a public place. The banks
authenticate a customer with the use of a token, in the
form of a bank card, and a PIN.
Mechanism
Current user authentication systems are based on the
knowledge of the user, yet this approach is known to be
error-prone.5 Knowledge-based authentication systems
require selection of a strong password to resist attack.
Ideally, a password should consist of a set of eight or
more randomly allocated characters, incorporating
upper and lower case characters, digits and special
characters.6 Yet this is extremely difficult for users to
remember. Similarly, a numeric password – or PIN
number – made up of a series of digits appears
challenging for users to remember, and can be easily
changed to a code that is easy to crack. In addition, up
to 50 per cent of users write down their PIN number and
store it in close proximity to the matching bank card.7
An extra layer of complexity is introduced by the
variety of mechanisms applied to a single account,
depending on how the customer is required to obtain
access to the account. For example, one leading UK
bank requires customers to use four different
mechanisms to obtain access to the same account:
At the bank: presentation of the bank card, plus a
manuscript signature, is considered adequate.
ATM: presentation of the bank card and entry of the
correct PIN number.
Internet: a combination of customer number, a
random selection of digits from the user identification
code (this is different to the PIN number or the
account number) plus ‘secret’ personal information.
Making a payment via the internet: in addition to the
above, the customer must insert their bank card into a
separate card reader supplied by the bank, enter their
PIN, then enter the random number displayed on the
card reader into their internet banking session.
From the bank’s perspective, this may be simple to
administer, but from a usability perspective, it is
doubtful that it provides user satisfaction. For instance,
in a study of Canadian banks, on-line banking
customers reported that they found documented
security practices confusing and extremely difficult to
comply with.8
People
People involved in the use of authentication systems
can be divided into three groups: administrators,
legitimate users and unauthorized users.
Administrators understandably want to protect ‘their’
systems from attack by unauthorized users. It is
common for security departments in organisations not
to have any contact with their legitimate users, and to
fail to communicate with them. Such detachment can
lead to a failure to understand users’ needs and
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objectives, resulting in the creation of unusable security
systems. It may seem reasonable to an administrator to
create a system that enforces regular password
changes, because users are unlikely to change them
otherwise. Yet the same system may be perceived as a
hindrance by users, because frequent password
changes add to the burden placed on human memory,
known as ‘memory burden’. Similarly, administrators
may assign individual passwords when it may be more
appropriate to share a common password across an
organisational unit. A parallel may be found in joint
bank accounts, where each card holder is given a
different PIN or password to the same account.
As a result of security being forced upon them by the
organisation rather than tailored to their needs, users
do not consider themselves to be accountable for
security as much as the bank might wish them to be.
When the purpose of the security mechanism is unclear
or inappropriate, the motivation to comply is weakened,
thus eroding the culture that ought to accompany
security. The system may be perceived as an obstacle to
‘real’ work, which therefore must be circumvented.9 The
failure is compounded when security administrators
advise users to write down their passwords: this is a
clear indication that the authentication mechanism is
not viable.
The error rate, a measure of usability, may be high
because legitimate users have difficulty remembering
passwords that are less vulnerable to cracking – known
as ‘strong’ passwords. While 94 per cent of users can
remember semantic passwords, they can remember
syntactic passwords only 35 per cent of the time.10 The
‘Power Law of Forgetting’ explains that not only do
individuals forget a great deal quickly, but their memory
is further eroded over time.11 For a password to be
remembered without resort to an insecure aide-memoir
of some form (usually by writing it down), it must be
encoded within long term memory. To achieve this, the
password must be meaningful or easy to work out,
practiced, based on information that is personal to the
user that is already familiar, and incorporated into a
special memory scheme. It is difficult to apply these
criteria to strong passwords.
Given that most people in the twenty-first century are
required to remember a number of passwords for
different purposes, users may mix up which password
applies to which authentication mechanism. This
phenomenon is known as ‘interference’. At one industry
site, where users had 16 different passwords for use
within the organisation, it was extremely common to
forget passwords, or mix up which password was used
for which system, because of intra-password
interference.12 An added layer of confusion is also
generated when different rules for the creation of
passwords are enforced in different systems.
Standing at an ATM in a public place and observed by
others, users may feel pressurised when trying to recall
their password. This pressure can itself adversely affect
recall. Failure to recall their password can generate
embarrassment in the user when they are observed by
others, but it may also generate a suspicion of wrong-
doing amongst observers.13 Further pressure may be
added if a user is aware of the risks of being observed
either directly or by a hidden camera when entering
their password: a phenomenon known as ‘shoulder-
surfing’.
The card holder may give another person authority to
use their card and PIN. The authority may be given
expressly or by implication, such as how they deal with
their card within the family, for example. A person that
has authority to use the card and PIN is not expected to
use the card beyond the authority given to them by the
card holder. When a user shares their password with a
colleague, friend or family member, they are in effect
sharing the method by which they are authenticated
and, by extension, authorisation to use the facilities that
may be afforded to the user when using an ATM, for
instance. Depending on the terms and conditions of
use, the organisation operating the authentication
mechanism may consider this practice to be insecure.
However, it may be reasonable from the perspective of
the user to share their authentication details with
others. It is certainly extremely common – 36 per cent of
users admit to sharing their PIN with someone,
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although the real percentage is likely to be higher.
Some users even view it as desirable that they share
their authentication details.14 The card holder authorises
the other person to act within the scope of the authority
grated by the person whose password is used. For
instance, the woman manages the finances in 70 per
cent of households, thus it may not be acceptable for
her to refuse to tell her partner the PIN for the family
bank account. Disabled users may be unable to obtain
access to the ATM because of cognitive or physical
limitations. By necessity, they may need to divulge their
PIN to enable a helper to obtain access to the ATM with
their authority. Using knowledge-based authentication
mechanisms that are easily communicated verbally or in
writing means it is difficult to prevent passwords from
being shared.
People posing as legitimate users can exploit poor
usability. When organisations routinely ask users for
their password in order to resolve usability difficulties
with the security mechanism, they open the way for
malign users to trick legitimate users into divulging
their passwords. The poor design of a security system
often requires users to share their passwords with an
administrator. This in turn enables an attacker to use
various social engineering techniques to trick legitimate
users into divulging their passwords. An ATM with a
mouse or clearly displayed fixed position keys,
facilitates shoulder-surfing, sometimes known as
‘observer attack’.15 Software applications that help
thieves are common, but the threat is poorly understood
by legitimate users. Multilingual dictionary attack
software can break 85 per cent of passwords through a
simple exhaustive search. Rule-based attacks extend
this capability further, altering known words according
to a number of rules, for example searching on words
written backwards.16
Design for ATM users
Characteristics of ATM users
There is no such thing as a ‘typical’ user at the ATM.
Young, old, able-bodied and disabled may all wish to
use ATMs. Yet ability and disability are not distinct
categories. A wide range of physical, cognitive and
sensory abilities may be displayed by users. Abilities
may fluctuate, affected by circumstance at any given
point in time. This makes it difficult to provide a
universal design. For example, consider an elderly
person who is holding a number of bags of shopping.
Without the bags of shopping, they are normally able-
bodied and alert, yet when carrying the bags of
shopping, they are temporarily ‘disabled’. Their physical
function is hampered by tangible external constraints,
as they juggle shopping bags whilst entering their PIN.
Furthermore, older adults generally find it more difficult
to use computer software than younger people.17
Usability of current mechanisms
As previously discussed, the prevailing knowledge-
based authentication mechanisms are not very good.
Users are generally not very satisfied with them, and
there are high error rates. Further problems include
difficulty in memorising passwords and learning how to
use authentication systems.
Knowledge-based authentication mechanisms place a
requirement on people that passwords be recalled
correctly, otherwise the user will fail to obtain access to
the service or system. People find it difficult to
remember passwords, because not enough
consideration is given to the difficulty that people
experience in recalling passwords that are not
frequently used. The cognitive ability to remember
imprecisely is not taken into account. The policy of
many knowledge-based mechanisms is that if the user
fails to key in the correct password on the third attempt,
they are denied access to the service or system,
regardless of a realistic security appraisal of security
requirements.18 When an account holder wants to check
the balance on a seldom-used account without
withdrawing cash, for instance, it is a matter of debate
as to whether their bank card should be revoked if they
get one digit wrong on the PIN number.
When a user chooses a new password, they find it
very difficult to learn the new password if it is created in
the random way that is usually required. The lack of
understanding of what constitutes a strong password
can lead to the creation of weak passwords that are
vulnerable to attack. It is rare for training to be provided
on how to create a secure password. Without
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appropriate help and advice when a weak password is
selected, the user’s inaccurate understanding of security
remains uncorrected, and security is undermined. This
means that the utility of the mechanism that is designed
to help provide for security is poor. This in turn reflects
on the inability of those people responsible for security
to understand that the very measures they have
implemented are not secure, and illustrates their failure
to design truly secure systems.
Conflict between security and usability
The need to provide for security whilst also providing a
system that is relatively easy to use can be in conflict.
For an authentication mechanism to be secure, it must
use passwords that are secret, and there must be a very
wide range of possible passwords available for users to
use. For example, if a password can only be two
characters in length, it will be far easier to guess than
one that is six characters long. Further, the security of a
password should be rated for the ability of a potentially
malign user to observe the code, guess the code and
record the code. Users can be perceived by
administrators as undesirable, because they undermine
secure systems. They allow their passwords to be
observed. They create weak, guessable passwords.
They record them in obvious places. Users feel justified
in adopting such insecure, apparently careless,
behaviour by systems that are poor to use, and that
seem inadequately matched to user needs. In contrast,
part of the success of hackers can be attributed to the
attention that they pay to users and their behaviour.19
Users do have a shared purpose with the system and
its administrators, but a perceptual divide exists. It is in
the interests of both administrators and users to protect
data. Unfortunately, there is little dialogue or shared
understanding between the two groups regarding what
security needs really exist. System designers follow a
simplistic approach to security. Users are thus subjected
to an impossible burden to memorise complex
passwords, forced to remember multiple passwords,
and often given no guidance on what makes a password
secure.20
Reducing conflict
If authentication mechanisms are to become more
usable, they must incorporate usability considerations
from the start. Knowledge-based systems could use a
single sign-on for a whole system and also reduce
forced changes, thus reducing the burden on memory.
Alternative approaches to authentication, such as
graphical or biometric authentication, are also possible.
A shift of emphasis needs to occur. Rather than users
and security designers being in conflict, a partnership
might be promoted, with an emphasis on shared aims.
Communication is essential. By involving users from the
start, security system designers can understand users’
needs and develop systems that are compatible with
their requirements. The degree of security can be
appropriate to the risk. Systems can be evaluated for
usability with users before being implemented. Cost
savings can be made by paying attention to the needs
and abilities of users. As passwords are forgotten less,
there is less need to spend corporate time and effort
resetting them. Moreover, satisfied users are more likely
to abide by the security rules.
The value of training users to create strong passwords
is disputed: Sasse and her colleagues found that user
training increased usability of security systems,21 yet Yan
and others found that this did not significantly improve
the strength of the passwords that were created.22
Online guidance during the process of creating a
password may be a better approach. This method is
now used by some online service providers. For
example, GoogleMail provides real-time feedback to
show if a password is weak, fair or strong. The use of
colour coding and a bar chart helps to reinforce the
comments offered in respect to a password used by a
customer. The security software reviews the proposed
password as the user types it in. For example, in the
process of typing the password ‘secret12’, the following
comments are provided:
‘secret1’ is reported as ‘too short’
‘secret12’ is reported as ‘fair’
‘Secret12’ is reported as ‘strong’, because of to the
inclusion of an upper case letter
Further advice is given to users on creating a strong
password if the user clicks on a link on the same web
page, entitled ‘Password strength’. Whilst such online
guidance forces users to choose a strong password, it
19 Anne Adams and Martina Angela Sasse, ‘Users
are not the enemy’, Communications of the ACM.
20 Martina Angela Sasse, Sacha Brostoff and Dirk
Weirich, ‘Transforming the weakest link - a
human/computer interaction approach to usable
and effective security’, BT Technology Journal.
21 Anne Adams and Martina Angela Sasse, ‘Users are
not the enemy’, Communications of the ACM;
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Weirich, ‘Transforming the weakest link - a
human/computer interaction approach to usable
and effective security’, BT Technology Journal.
22 Jianxin Yan, Alan Blackwell, Ross Anderson and
Alan Grant, ‘The Memorability and Security of
Passwords – Some Empirical Results’, Technical
report No. 500 (Cambridge University Computer
Laboratory, 2000).
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can also be used to provide the rationale for security,
and enable the user to understand what makes up a
strong password.
How we remember
Limitations in the way people remember make it difficult
to recall alphanumeric passwords. The ‘Power Law of
Forgetting’23 describes how an individual may
experience rapid forgetting immediately after learning,
followed by a further gradual decay. Over time, recall
becomes progressively more inaccurate. This inaccuracy
is a particular problem when password authentication
demands total accuracy. Retroactive interference, where
new additions to memory disrupt existing memories,
adds to the problem. It may be inferred that multiple
passwords are particularly prone to retroactive
interference.
Recall is easier when distinct items are familiar, and
when they are associated with each other. Mnemonics
are useful in exploiting this feature of memory. Amongst
the mnemonic systems of memorization, two commonly
used techniques are loci and PegWords. Using the loci
technique, locations serve as retrieval cues for the
information being recalled. PegWords entail learning a
series of words that serve as ‘pegs’ on which memories
can be hung. Both techniques have been used in trials
of authentication mechanisms.24
In contrast to their imperfect ability to recall, ‘humans
have a vast, almost limitless memory for pictures’ – an
ability known as the ‘Picture Superiority Effect’.25 Unlike
recall, picture recognition appears to be relatively
unaffected by the process of ageing. There remains
some debate as to why pictures are significantly easier
to remember than words. The Dual-code theory
suggests that the advantage springs from the brain
remembering pictures simultaneously in two different
ways, using an image code and a semantic code.
Another possibility is that pictures generate a more
detailed memory, and are thus easier to extract from
long term memory.26 Regardless of this debate, the brain
has a proven greater capacity to store and recognise
pictures over letters and numbers. This makes images
an excellent candidate for authentication mechanisms,
especially given the acknowledged failings of current
knowledge based authentication mechanisms.
Alternative authentication mechanisms
Despite the prevalence of knowledge-based
authentication at the ATM and online, research
continues into alternatives, such as graphical
authentication and mechanisms that monitor an
individual’s behaviour and include additional security
checks when their behaviour deviates from its normal
pattern. The use of biometric measurements is a further
option, but is outside of the scope of this article. Further
details on biometric measurements can be found in the
dissertation from which this paper is drawn.27 No
mechanism is perfect: all have limitations. The ideal
password should be easy to remember but hard to
guess. As Renaud comments, ‘any authentication
mechanism teeters between memorability and
predictability requirements’.28
Personalisation and behaviour
An emergent trend in security mechanisms is the
tracking of patterns of user behaviour. If a user who
travels relatively little takes a holiday abroad, they may
be surprised and inconvenienced to find their card
disabled, when security software notices an abnormal
transaction. Conversely, the same user may be relieved
when the system prevents their account from being
used by a thief. Sasse highlights the desirability of
determining the method of authentication after taking
into account the nature of the task.29 For instance, a user
could be asked for less stringent authentication if they
are performing a task that fits their normal behaviour
pattern, and a more stringent method of authentication
if their behaviour is unusual. For example, a customer
consistently withdraws £20 from her local ATM. If she
tries to take out £200 from a different ATM, she will be
prompted for extra authentication. This approach is
consistent with current societal trends that demand
speed and an individual approach from technology
services. They may provide increased customer loyalty
as a result. The approach does not provide
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memory’, Psychological Science, 2, 1991, 396-408.
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from http://www.csd.abdn.ac.uk/~wmoncur
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2006.
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has many separate graphical passwords are small in
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authentication in itself. It must be combined with other
approaches, such as knowledge-based or graphical
authentication before it can be assessed for
memorability and predictability.
Graphical authentication mechanisms
Graphical authentication mechanisms use picture
recognition to authenticate the user. This is based on
the understanding that people remember images far
better than words.30 They can remember more images,
more accurately, and with less adverse effects from the
process of aging. An attractive feature of graphical
authentication mechanisms is that they are harder to
disclose than PINs and semantic or syntactic
passwords. Research into the potential of graphical
authentication continues.
Graphical authentication systems have their own
requirements relating to usability. It is recognised that
images used must be concrete, nameable and distinct.31
Each image displayed must be visually dissimilar, and
from a separate semantic category. For example, if a
user is shown ten images, ideally they should each be
from a separate category such as transport, mammals,
faces, architecture, to prevent the user from mixing
images of a similar nature. Conceivably, they should not
be shown two pictures of the same item, such as
flowers on the same screen, because this can cause
confusion. The effects of interference on memorability
when a user has many separate graphical passwords
are small in comparison to that exhibited when a user
has multiple knowledge-based passwords.32
Immaturity of authentication systems
Successful authentication mechanisms should provide a
balance between security and usability. Yet no current
authentication mechanism fits all the requirements:
every mechanism has its failings. Providers of secure
systems must look to their users, and to understand
and accept their innate cognitive and physical
limitations, if they are to create authentication
mechanisms that are usable, and thus less flawed. In
the meantime, users will continue to exhibit insecure
behaviours, circumventing the best intentions of secure
systems.
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Introduction
The risks associated with the internet have changed
significantly. A recent study claims that a typical
Microsoft Windows machine is subjected to
autonomous infiltration attempts – not just mere pings
and probes – from worms and botnets looking for
clients once every six minutes.1 Stealth – not
exhibitionism or hubris – characterizes this breed of
attacks and concomitantly deployed malicious software.
Unbeknownst even to experienced human operators,
surreptitious attacks are able to insert malicious code
deep within the bowels of individual computers and the
wider supporting internet communication and control
infrastructure such as wireless access points, home
routers, and domain name servers.2 In addition to
stealth, social engineering via e-mail, Instant
Messaging, and social networks plays an important
part, as well: unsuspecting users are coaxed to initiate
actions that infect their computers and usurp their
digital identities.
These attacks are powerful because of the havoc that
is causes to the owner or user of the computer or
computer network. The effects range from mere
nuisance, to the appropriation of sufficient information
to impersonate an individual, that can, in turn, lead to
financial ruin, up to and including criminal charges
against the innocent.3 They are also powerful because,
in many instances, neither individual computer owners,
nor the sophisticated network controlled by a
government can prevent all of the malicious code from
penetrating their computers or networks.
In the past, the actions of hobbyists and isolated
mischief makers merely caused disruptions. Now
organized and highly technically competent criminals
with financial incentives as the primary motivator have
taken over. In addition, semi-independent state-
sponsored groups occasionally launch attacks on
another state. The ramifications of this shift are
worrisome: that a person may subscribe to an anti-virus
software product from one of the many vendors on the
market does not mean that their computer is protected
from or necessarily free of malicious software.
Modern malicious software has been shown in tests
carried out in independent laboratories to be highly
resistant to being identified by anti-virus (AV) products.
In addition, these empirical results are consistent with
theoretical findings, in that detecting complex malicious
software is beyond the effective modelling capabilities
of current AV products,4 and as such is becoming
1 Gabor Szappanos, ‘A Day in the Life of An Average
User’, Virus Bulletin, January 2009, 10-13, available
at http://www.virusbtn.com/.
2 Most users do not bother to change the default
passwords on home devices such as routers.
Browser vulnerabilities can then be exploited by
malicious software to alter the DNS settings of the
router, thereby directing any name lookup query to
a DNS of the attacker’s choice. This may be used
to spoof a bank web site, for instance. See Sid
Stamm, Zulfikar Ramzan and Markus Jakobsson,
‘Drive-By Pharming’, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 4861, (Springer, 2007), 495-506 and Hristo
Bojinov, Elie Bursztein, Eric Lovett and Dan Boneh,
‘Embedded Management Interfaces: Emerging
Massive Insecurity’, Blackhat Technical Briefing,
Blackhat USA 2009 (Las Vegas, USA, August 2009),
available at http://www.blackhat.com/
presentations/bh-usa-09/BOJINOV/BHUSA09-
Bojinov-EmbeddedMgmt-PAPER.pdf.
3 For examples of people charged with offences, see
Patrick v Union State Bank, 681 So.2d 1364 (Ala.
1995); Vic Lee, ‘ID Theft Puts Innocent Man In San
Quentin’, 21 February 2007, ABC7News, available
at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=
news/local&id=5052986 and Mary Pat Gallagher,
‘Identity-Theft Victims Owed Duty of Care in Bank
Fraud Investigations, N.J. Court Says’, Law.com, 11
September 2008, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=1202424426977.
4 Yingbo Song, Michael E. Locasto, Angelos Stavrou,
Angelos D. Keromytis and Salvatore J. Stolfo, ‘On
the infeasibility of modelling polymorphic
shellcode,’ Proceedings of the 14th ACM
conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2007, 541–551.
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increasingly difficult to detect in practice, and
worryingly, also in principle.5 To put it simply, anti-virus
software does not prevent all forms of malicious
software from penetrating computers and networks –
some malicious software will not be identified by anti-
virus software, which is why this is an important topic
for lawyers and judges to understand.
The aim of this article is to introduce the technical
issues surrounding modern internet attacks, anti-viral
software and malicious software to the individual that
has no technical knowledge, and who needs a working
understanding of the pertinent issues. As such, its
primary goal is to raise awareness, not
comprehensiveness. The interested reader is referred to
a recent book by Markus Jakobsson and Zulfikar
Ramzan, Crimeware. Understanding New Attacks And
Defenses, (Symantec Press, 2008) for further study.
Software vulnerabilities
Coding errors6 in software can lead to vulnerabilities.
Software vulnerabilities are program weaknesses which
malicious software can exploit. The relationship
between coding errors, vulnerabilities and exploitation
is illustrated by the following analogy: the US Tariff Act
of 1872 was to include a list of duty-free items: Fruit
plants, tropical and semi-tropical. A government clerk
duly transcribed the Act, but erroneously moved the
comma: Fruit, plants tropical and semi-tropical. Shrewd
businessmen argued that the law, as promulgated,
exempted all tropical and semitropical plants from duty
fees, resulting in $500,000 loss to the US Treasury.7 For
the purposes of this discussion, the erroneous
placement of the comma is the equivalent of a software
coding error. The vulnerability resulting from this error
manifests itself as an opportunity for alternative
interpretation, and the exploit is represented by cleverly
taking advantage of duty-free imports of tropical and
semi-tropical plants.
Since errors in software coding errors permit
malicious exploitation, it seems obvious that efforts
should concentrate on writing error-free code.
Unfortunately, industrial software has exhibited the
same code error density for the past twenty years; on
average six faults (errors) for every thousand lines of
source code.8 However, the general increases in the
amount of code (Windows Vista has an estimated 80
million lines, whereas Windows 2000 had 35 million
lines), as well as the complexities of modern software
(interactions between components and protocols, as
well as very large applications like Adobe Acrobat
Reader with 2 million lines of code) have exacerbated
the situation.
The survival time of an unpatched Windows system
may serve as corroborating evidence.9 In 2003, an
unpatched Windows PC would last approximately 40
minutes on average, before it would succumb to probes
from (presumably) malicious software. In 2004, survival
time was reduced to 16 minutes and by 2008, the time
window had shrunk to mere 4 minutes.10
Just as a motor car needs regular tune-ups to keep
running smoothly, maintenance of installed software is
performed through regular updates. Since software
vulnerabilities are the root cause of many malicious
software infections, updating (or equivalently patching)
minimizes the number and severity of software
vulnerabilities that malicious software may exploit. The
poor quality of software code explains in part why anti-
virus software is required in the first place (another
factor is ubiquitous connectivity). Anti-virus software,
however, has problems of its own.
The problem with anti-virus software 
Most commercial AV products rely predominantly on
some form of signature matching to identify malicious
code. In the context of AV, a signature is the rough
software equivalent of a fingerprint – it is a pattern that
identifies malicious software. It is possible to derive a
pattern from software code, that is, a static snippet of
code (or a uniquely reduced version of it, such as a
hash). The fragment is taken as the pattern that
identifies the code. A static signature is, in its simplest
incarnation, a fixed sequence of characters somewhere
5 Grégoire Jacob and Eric Filiol and Hervé Debar,
‘Malware as interaction machines: a new
framework for behavior modelling,’ Journal in
Computer Virology, Volume 4, Number 3, August
2008, 235-250.
6 For an overview of such errors, see Katrina
Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw, ‘Seven
Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software
Security Errors’, IEEE Security and Privacy, Volume
3, Issue 6, (November 2005), 81-84.
7 See ‘Forty-Third Congress; First Session Feb. 20’,
New York Times, February 21, 1874, at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9902EFD8173BEF34BC4951DFB4668
38F669FDE.
8 Compare John Musa, Software Reliability
Measurement Prediction Application (McGraw-Hill,
1987) with Parastoo Mohagheghi and Rediar
Conradi, ‘An empirical investigation of software
reuse benefits in a large telecom product’, ACM
Transactions on Software Engineering
Methodology, Volume 17, Issue 3 (June 2008), 1-31.
9 A patched system denotes a computer on which
the latest software updates (normally for the
Operating System, but also for Office suites and
media software) have been installed.
10 See John Leyden, ‘Unpatched Windows PCs own3d
in less than four minutes’, The Register, 15 July
2008 at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/
07/15/unpatched_pc_survival_drops/ and Survival
Time at http://isc.sans.org/survivaltime.html.
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in a file or in memory and may look something like this:
C3 7C FD 1D 31 C0 6F OF 96 18 A4
The rationale underlying these character patterns is that
they are more likely to be encountered when analyzing
malicious software rather than innocent programs.
Hundreds of thousands of these signatures are stored in
local AV databases (AV signature updates are received,
hopefully, at least once a week). An AV scanning engine
then tries to match pre-defined file areas against this
signature database. These areas are typically located at
the beginning and the end of the file, and after what is
called the executable entry point of a program.
Strict matching of the byte sequence pattern was
most popular in the early 1990s. This method has since
been augmented, because those responsible for writing
malicious code took action to avoid being noticed by the
AV products. They approached their evasion in a
straightforward way. Because of time constraints (users
tend not to wait more than a couple of seconds), it is
not usual to scan the whole file. Malicious authors took
advantage of this fact and moved the malicious code to
locations in the file that would probably not be scanned.
Furthermore, they tweaked their malicious code to
make the byte pattern mismatch. One way of doing this
is by equivalent instruction substitution. An example
will illustrate this point. In the signature above, the
substring pattern 31 C0 represents Intel machine code
xor ax, ax. Its purpose is to set register ax to 0. A
substitution that preserves this functionality would
replace the substring with 29 C0 (which is machine
code for sub ax, ax) or B8 C0 00 (which is machine
code for mov ax,0).
Generic matching was introduced to add some
‘fuzziness’ to the signature in order to catch malicious
software that is slightly altered so as to evade the
stricter matching. Using the example above, the second,
third, fourth and ninth bytes are replaced with a
wildcard (a ‘blank’, do-not-care byte) denoted by ‘??’:
C3 ?? ?? ?? 31 C0 6F OF ?? 18 A4
When searching for this pattern, the ‘??’ directs the AV
scanner to ignore whatever byte value is present in the
second, third, fourth and ninth bytes of character strings
it encounters while scanning the file. For example the
string below:
C3 99 A0 BB 31 C0 6F OF 77 18 A4
would match, as well as:
C3 A1 22 00 31 C0 6F OF FF 18 A4
Hence, wildcards try to lower AV false negative
detection rates by ‘softening’ the signatures to
counteract some of the evasive coding tactics that
malicious software is programmed to use to avoid
detection. The problem with casting a wider net to catch
‘bad’ programs is that ‘innocent’ (that is non-malicious)
programs may be identified incorrectly; in other words,
there is an increase in the false positive rate.
For an accessible overview of more AV signature
detection enhancements, the reader is encouraged to
peruse chapter 11 of Peter Szor, The Art of Computer
Virus Research and Defense, (Addison Wesley, 2005).
Static signatures, as we have discussed them so far,
are derived from program code, reflecting the byte value
make-up of a program. Malicious software detection at
the beginning of the twenty-first century started to
incorporate behavioural heuristics approaches; that is, a
notion of how a given software program interacts with
its embedded environment. For instance, a program may
interact with a file system (by opening, creating or
deleting a file), or the network (opening a connection to
a server or setting up a receiving server). These and
other interactions of the program can be monitored in
what is called a ‘sandbox’. A sandbox is a controlled,
instrumented container in which the program is run and
that records how it interacts with its environment. A
sample sandbox output is set out below:
[ General information ]
* Display message box (sample) : sample, tikkun olam!
* File length: 18523 bytes.
* MD5 hash: 1188f67d48c9f11afb8572977ef74c5e.
Here some general information about the file (its length
and its hash) is made visible, together with what is
displayed on screen (a message box with the caption
‘sample’ and message ‘tikkun olam!’). The next phase is
for the malicious software to carry out instructions to
delete a file and place a substitute file in place of the
file that has been deleted:
[ Changes to filesystem ]
* Deletes file C:WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\kern32.exe.
* Creates file C:WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\kern32.exe.
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Here we see that the first action of the program is to
delete a file and recreate one with the same name,
kern32.exe. This is suspicious. Then it is necessary to
enter the internal Windows database (the Windows
registry). This is illustrated below. This entry makes the
file kern32.exe run when system startup begins as the
computer is switched on:
[ Changes to registry ]
* Creates key
"HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce".
* Sets value "kernel32"="C:WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\kern32.exe -
sys" in key " HKLM\Software\ Microsoft\Windows
\CurrentVersion\RunOnce".
This is very suspicious behaviour, in that the system is
instructed to intercept the strokes used on the keyboard
and pass it on to a custom function:
[ Changes to system settings ]
* Creates WindowsHook monitoring keyboard activity.
There follows the network activity: the program
connects to a server at address 110.156.7.211 on port
6667, a typical port for Internet Relay Chat (IRC) chat
server, logs in and joins a chat channel:
[ Network services ]
* Connects to “110.156.7.211” on port 6667 (TCP).
* Connects to IRC server.
* IRC: Uses nickname CurrentUser[HBN][05].
* IRC: Uses username BoLOGNA.
* IRC: Joins channel #BaSe_re0T.
In the example above, interactions occur with the file
system, the Windows registry (the internal Windows
database) and the establishment of a TCP network
connection to an IRC chat server. Connecting to a chat
server is anomalous enough behaviour that it should
raise a concern that something is not correct. Taken
together, this set of activities is consistent with the
suspicious program being a bot, connecting to a botnet
through the IRC server.
Thus, behavioural heuristics seek to establish an
‘activity’ profile. It is also possible to derive a
‘behavioural signature’ from such an activity profile (as
opposed to the byte-value approach discussed earlier).11
Just as there are different ways of rewriting instructions
(as seen with the xor ax,ax example above), there
are ways of effecting the same or similar behaviour: a
Windows program may open a file by means of user
mode API NtOpenFile()/OpenFile(), kernel-
mode API ZwOpenFile() or may even bypass the API
completely and directly access the disk driver with
IoCallDriver() with manually constructed IO
packets. How well these signatures approaches work in
practice will be discussed below.
Practical AV concerns: false negatives
A number of independent laboratories regularly test
updated AV scanners against millions of malicious
software specimens. These scanners predominantly use
byte-value signature approaches, though almost all of
them today incorporate some form of (much slower)
behavioural detection. Some empirical data for sixteen
well-known, reputable AV products are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Miss rates of up-to-date scanners. 
Table generated by the author from AV-comparatives.org data
The reader is requested to note how quickly AV
signature databases go out-of-date. After failing to
update signatures for one week, the best AV tested
missed between 26 and 31 per cent of the new
malicious software, the worst missed upwards of 80 per
cent. The empirical test results from http://www.av-
comparatives.org/comparatives reviews indicate that
the claims made by vendors of AV products must be
soberly assessed.
There is preliminary hope pinned on ‘cloud
computing’ environments, where vendors promise
reactive signature generation times on the order of
11 For a review of behavioural based scheme and a
recent prototype of a behaviour based signature
approach (using a system-call-data flow
dependency behaviour graph), see Clemens
Kolbitsch, Paolo Milani Comparetti, Christopher
Kruegel, Engin Kirda, Xiaoyong Zhou, and Xiaofeng
Wang, ‘Effective and Efficient Malware Detection at
the End Host’, in USENIX Security ‘09, Montreal,
Canada, (August 2009), available at
http://www.iseclab.org/publications.html.
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Report Date AV
Signature
Update
MW Corpus 
Date
False
Negative
(%)
Scan Speed
(MB/sec)
2009/05 Feb. 9th Feb. 9th -16th [31-86] N/A
2009/02 Feb. 9th Feb. 1st [0.2-15.1] [24.0-3.7]
2008/11 Aug. 4th Aug. 4th -11th [29-81] N/A
2008/08 Aug. 4th Aug. 1st [0.4-13.5] [22.2-2.9]
2008/05 Feb. 4th Feb. 5th -12th [26-94] [25.5-1.6]
2008/02 Feb. 4th Feb. 2nd [0.2-12.3] N/A
The ability to disguise malicious software becomes
more subtle and unpredictable in the light of the
different methods by which devices now
communicate with each other.
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minutes, not days, through active internet connections.
This remains to be seen, as the race between AV
companies and malicious software writers continues.
The problem with modern malicious software
Modern malicious software is interactive, polymorphic
and metamorphic. All these terms have to do with the
methods used to bypass the approach used by AV
products to detect malicious software (and other
signature-based defences such as intrusion detection
systems). Polymorphism and metamorphism are both
techniques to mutate the computer code of the
malicious software while keeping its malicious
functionality unchanged. The purpose of this is to evade
the signatures of AV.
Though the terms are sometimes used
interchangeably, there are technically different:
polymorphic malware typically uses encryption on parts
of its code containing its malicious functionality. This
code must be decrypted by a decryptor routine before it
can be executed. Typically, both the encryption and
decryption loops can be identified (in unencrypted form)
in the malicious software, although it is possible to out-
source this function to a remote server – called server-
side polymorphism. Hence, the main characteristics of
truly polymorphic malicious software are the use of
encryption and a fixed decryptor routine.
For detection purposes, encrypted code has a distinct
general signature (it has high entropy because of the
diffusion property of good encryption); as such, AV can
discern the existence of encrypted code, if not its
purpose or functionality. Benign code may also be
encrypted (and commonly is for intellectual property
reasons), thus limiting the usefulness of high entropy
detection approaches. The fixed decryptor routine of
truly polymorphic code can easily be picked up by byte-
pattern signature-based AV. It is for this reason that
writers of malicious software have devised schemes to
generate mutated, but functionally equivalent
decryptors in subsequent generations, leading to what
is called ‘oligomorphic’ code. Oligomorphic decryptor
mutation approaches in turn lead to the development of
‘metamorphic’ code.
Metamorphic code strives to change its appearance
from generation to generation, whilst ensuring that it
continues to function as it was designed to.
Metamorphic malicious software typically does not use
encryption. Instead, it is written in such a way that it
attempts to re-arrange the relative position of its code,
substitute certain instructions, register re-assignments,
changes sequence permutation and uses other
substitution or permutation techniques. Part of the
malicious code incorporates a metamorphic engine that
performs these alterations, or the malicious software
contacts a server for the task. If the latter, it makes
detection harder. Similarly to the truly polymorphic
case, a transformation engine residing in the code offers
more opportunities for detection purposes.
The ability to disguise malicious software becomes
more subtle and unpredictable in the light of the
different methods by which devices now communicate
with each other. In the widest sense, almost any form of
external input might cause malicious software to
become active or, more distressingly, provide a missing
piece of code to turn apparently innocuous fragments of
code into malicious software. Time is used as a
mechanism to cause malicious software to become
active through internal system clocks (the 1992
Michelangelo virus was activated in this way on the
anniversary of his birthday, 6 May), and human activity
in using the computer, opening a file or browsing a
website can also be used to activate malicious software.
As previously noted, the problem of identifying
malicious software is also exacerbated because of
ubiquitous connectivity. The vast majority of computers
are constantly interacting over the network (end users
have little choice in the matter, because software
licenses tend to be remotely attested), and at any
KNOWN KNOWNS, KNOWN UNKNOWNS AND UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS: 
ANTI-VIRUS ISSUES, MALICIOUS SOFTWARE AND INTERNET ATTACKS FOR NON-TECHNICAL AUDIENCES
128 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
moment, passive (as in a simple packet) and active (as
in code) prompts can be added to the recipient’s system
with no prior indication of what this single piece of code
will induce. A recent example was provided by the
fourth generation of the Conficker worm, when millions
of people waited to see what the code would do on the
1 April 2009.12
Theoretical AV concerns: detection complexity 
As the empirical results suggest, meta- and polymorphic
coding techniques pose an aggravated detection
challenge for AV. In addition, malicious software has
become increasingly modular (utilizing ubiquitous
connectivity), and exhibits what is called ‘staged
downloads’. Staged downloads involve an initial
compromise in which a small piece of code is installed.
This is effected, for instance, by an network worm
exploiting an Operating System vulnerability (such as
the 2008 Gimmiv.A worm that targeted the Windows
MS08-67 vulnerability13) and depositing an initial
payload. It could also be effected by the user opening e-
mail attachments with malicious code attached, and
increasingly, through vulnerabilities in web browsers on
computers. The initial infection is subsequently followed
up with the installation of more malicious code to fulfil
one or more of the objectives that the code is designed
to carry out (among them spam relay, stealing of
personal information, industrial espionage). Almost 80
per cent of potential malicious code infection exhibit
these staged downloads.14
Malicious code communicates with its environment
for the purposes of propagation and to receive
instructions and download new binary code. As a result,
the AV detection problem becomes much more difficult.
It becomes much harder (impossible in the general
case) for AV to decide whether fragments of code are
malicious, since not all the pieces may have been
assembled. The changing dynamics of malicious code
and how it is created and disseminated (complete or in
small pieces, and then assembled), means that reliable
detection cannot realistically be achieved within time
constraints of seconds, if it can be done at all.
Anti-virus: epilogue
Because of the metamorphic and polymorphic
dissimulation techniques and the modular staged
downloads, current AV is not able to ascertain (within
acceptable false negative rates and time limits, and
sometimes not in principle) whether code is malicious
or not. Worse still, the methods by which an individual
can inadvertently download malicious software not only
include programs that might be explicitly installed, but
code that is installed and executed surreptitiously from
a visit to perfectly respectable websites, unbeknownst
to the user. The TDSS rootkit serves as an informative
case study that demonstrates how malicious software is
capable of being installed in seemingly innocuous parts
(in the form of a legitimate but maliciously patched DLL)
which enables the subsequent downloading and
execution of any other arbitrary (malicious) component.
Of further interest are the multiple methods of infection
used to infect a system (including website
vulnerabilities, peer-2-peer networks, video viewing and
other software).15
The user is faced with stark choices, none of which
mitigate the effects of these threats completely. She
may disable the functionality that makes web browsing
a rich experience to minimize the risk of attack. This
means, in effect, reverting back to using the web with
1995 technology.16 The user might decide to set up a
virtual environment that enables the computer to be
returned back to a known un-infected state, though this
demands a level of discipline that few users are capable
of. The Google Chrome web browser is a step in this
direction. It incorporates a light-weight virtualized
environment called GreenBorder that sets up a
protected browser that seeks to shield the computer
system from actions originating from browsing the
internet.17 The last choice is the worst and alas, the most
common: taking a deep breath, clicking away and
trusting anti-virus software to an extent that is not
warranted.
Inviting attacks from the internet
There are indications that some safe computing
procedures have begun to be understood by end users.
For instance, many users now know better than to open
e-mail attachments, and they are more mindful of
keeping their system patches and AV signatures up-to-
date. These measures offer some limited protection.
12 For a recent, sophisticated example of binary code
updates that is encrypted and electronically
signed, see Phillip Porras, Hassen Saidi, and Vinod
Yegneswaran, An Analysis of Conficker’s Logic and
Rendezvous Points, (SRI International Technical
Report), 2009 at http://mtc.sri.com/Conficker/ and
http://mtc.sri.com/Conficker/addendumC/index.ht
ml.
13 See http://www.microsoft.com/technet/
security/Bulletin/MS08-067.mspx for the
vulnerability and http://www.f-secure.com/v-
descs/trojan-spy_w32_gimmiv_a.shtml for a
description of the worm.
14 For which, see Symantec’s annual Global Internet
Threat Report at http://www.symantec.com/
business/theme.jsp?themeid=threatreport.
15 Alisa Shevchenko, ‘Case Study: The TDSS
Rootkit’, Virus Bulletin, May 2009, 10-14.
16 One example of a text-only web browser is lynx
(http://lynx.isc.org/).
17 GreenBorder was bought by Google in 2007.
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However, the act of browsing the web is more fraught
with danger than commonly assumed. Web clients are
now increasingly used for banking, health care,
governmental services, and retail shopping from the
comfort of one’s home. Contemporary browsers, such as
Internet Explorer, Opera and Firefox incorporate more
functions than the mere display of text and images,
including rich dynamic content comprising media
playback and interactive page elements such as drop-
down menus and image roll-overs. These features
includes web browser extensions such as Javascript
programming language, as well as additional features
for the browser, such as application plugins (Acrobat
Reader, QuickTime, Flash, Real, and Windows Media
Player), and Microsoft-specific enhancements such as
Browser Helper Objects and ActiveX (Microsoft
Windows’s interactive execution framework). Some of
these extensions have security vulnerabilities that can
maliciously exploited (ActiveX, Flash, and QuickTime
make up the vast majority of plug-in vulnerabilities),18
some are general programming languages or
environments that can be tampered with for malicious
purposes.
The fundamental issue is one of trust. When the user
goes to a website from his browser, he types in a URL,
and initiates the connection. Assume the user is visiting
an on-line merchant, and assume an encrypted HTTPS
connection is established (which is considered ‘safe’
browsing). The user logs on with his name and
password, and a cookie is created. This cookie stores
user preferences, such as session information and
information about what the customer has purchased,
and this cookie is typically placed on the user’s
computer. Once connected, a relationship of trust is
established: the user and the website (the user initiated
the connection, and now trusts the page and content
display) and conversely, the site and the user (in
executing actions from the user’s browser). It is this
trust, together with the various features incorporated
into the browser that attackers try to subvert through
what is called Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site
Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks.
Cross-site scripting attacks mostly use legitimate web
sites as a conduit, where web sites allow other
(malicious) users to upload or post links on to the web
site. Such links may contain malicious content (such as
Javascript in obfuscated form) within them. They are
then presented in an appealing manner (‘Click here to
view pictures!’) to entice the victim to click on them. The
malicious script in the link is executed in the victim’s
browser, and can copy cookie information, change user
preferences, write information to files, or (in the form of
a CSFR) obtain the data relating to log-ins to merchants
and banks to perform actions that purport to be
initiated by the customer. It is not only web servers can
serve as a conduit: in 2005, a user named Samy Kamkar
placed malicious Javascript on his MySpace profile.
When a user viewed his profile, an XSS attack would
add the user as a friend and place the malicious code in
the viewer’s profile. In twenty hours, over a million
MySpace users were infected.19
Prevention of XSS attacks requires both server and
client diligence. With respect to the server, software
developed for web applications should check links
posted by users for potentially malicious content, such
as embedded Javascript and HTML code. Since code in
such links would be executed in the browser of an
innocent user, failure to validate (potentially malicious)
input by users represents a software vulnerability that
developers should address as a matter of course. Where
users are concerned, they should exercise judicious care
when clicking on a link. They may also take steps to be
much less susceptible to XSS attacks. This can be
accomplished by disabling JavaScript, Java, Flash,
ActiveX and other dynamic content features in the
browser. However, users will incur a severe usability
penalty, since many websites depend on these features
for to be viewed at their best.
Cross-site Scripting attacks are often used as a
stepping stone with more insidious CSRF attacks in
which a user’s credentials are used for unauthorized
transactions. For example, assume the victim is logged
into a bank site. There are valid credentials, stored in
form of a cookie on the victim’s computer. The victim
might casually surf a news site where an attacker was
allowed to insert code of the sort illustrated below in a
18 In May 2009, the web-based Gumblar/JSRedir-R
trojan (which accounted for over forty per cent of
malicious content found on websites in the first
week of May) used obfuscated JavaScript via web
browsers to exploit vulnerabilities in Acrobat
Reader and Flash Player. See Erik Larkin, ‘New
Wave of “Gumblar” Hacked Sites Installs Google-
targeting Malware’, PC World, May 14, 2009 at
http://www.pcworld.com/article/164899/new_wave
_of_gumblar_hacked_sites_installs_googletargeti
ng_malware.html.
19 See Justin Mann, ‘MySpace speaks about Samy
Kamkar’s sentencing’, TechSpot.com, January 31,
2007, where the following was noted: ‘Samy
Kamkar (aka ‘Samy is my Hero’) plead guilty
yesterday in Los Angeles Superior Court to a
violation of Penal Code section 502(c)(8) as a
felony and was placed on three years of formal
probation, ordered to perform 90 days of
community service, pay restitution to MySpace,
and had computer restrictions placed on the
manner and means he could use a computer – he
can only use a computer and access the internet
for work related reasons’ at http://www.techspot.
com/news/24226-myspace-speaks-about-samy-
kamkars-sentencing.html.
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posting or comment on the web site:
http://www.bankoflondon.com/transfer.p
hp?account=686868&amount=25000
If the attacker succeeds in inducing the victim to click on
this link (‘Click here to look at Michael Jackson’s shroud’
might work), a transaction request from the user’s
browser to the bank would be generated, attempting to
transfer $25,000 to (presumably) the attacker’s account
number 686868.
Sometimes, it is not necessary to click on link on a
web site. The news web site might contain HTML code
(posted by the attacker) of the sort (purportedly to load
an image) as illustrated below:
<img src=
"http://bankoflondon.com/transfer.php?
account=686868&amount=25000 width="1"
height="1" border="0">
With this code, the browser will try to load a miniscule
image. This is a standard procedure to render images in
web pages. But the image is not an image: it is actually
a HTTP request to the fictional Bank of London,
attempting to transfer $25,000 from the victim to the
attacker’s account number 686868. There is no image
available, which means an error (crossed-out) image will
be rendered by the browser to the user’s screen. The
reason for setting the size at 1 pixel by 1 pixel is to
suppress this error image, and thus allay any suspicion
of the victim.
The nature of transactions that are possible to effect
depend on the site for which the credentials are valid.
This can range from a posting to a message board with
the user’s identity; performing bank transactions, to
changing the DNS settings of the home router (called
drive-by-pharming) and buying stocks. In February
2008, 18 million users of an e-commerce site in Korea
were affected by a CSFR attack.20
Similar to the XSS example, CSFR attacks can use
other conduits (Adobe Acrobat, MS Word, RSS),
provided these data formats allow for scripting. It must
be emphasized that from the point of view of the user,
neither HTTPS (the encrypted channel with the little lock
in the browser that denotes ‘safety’) nor logins protect
against XSS or CSRF attacks. In addition, unlike XSS
attacks which necessitate user action by clicking on a
link, CSFR attacks can be executed without the user’s
involvement, since they exploit explicit software
vulnerabilities on the server. However, it is to be notes
that CSFR attacks can be executed without the user’s
involvement, because they exploit explicit software
vulnerabilities (predictable invocation structures) on the
server. As such, it is suggested that the onus to prevent
CSFR attacks falls squarely on the developers of such
applications. Some login and cryptographic token
approaches, if conscientiously designed to prevent
CSFR attacks, can be of help.21
Epilogue
The wide variety of features that are included in
everyday programs (such as web browsers and
document viewers such as Adobe Acrobat Reader) are a
serious concern: almost no user is aware that merely
clicking on a URL, handling a PDF document22 or simply
20 For which see ‘WHID 2008-10: Chinese hacker
steals user information on 18 MILLION online
shoppers at Auction.co.kr’ at
http://www.webappsec.org/projects/whid/byid_id_
2008-10.shtml.
21 See the Secret Token scheme reviewed in Adam
Barth, Collin Jackson and John C. Mitchell, ‘Robust
Defenses for Cross-Site Request forgery’, in
Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security
(Alexandria, Virginia, USA, October 27-31, 2008).
CCS ‘08. ACM, New York, NY, 75-88, available from
http://flyer.sis.smu.edu.sg/srg/ and
http://www.adambarth.com/.
22 See http://blog.didierstevens.com/2009
/03/04/quickpost-jbig2decode-trigger-trio/ for an
example where merely looking at PDF files in
Windows Explorer (not opening them by double-
clicking) launches the malware.
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It must be emphasized that from the point of view of the
user, neither HTTPS (the encrypted channel with the little
lock in the browser that denotes ‘safety’) nor logins
protect against XSS or CSRF attacks.
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surfing on to a webpage23 may lead to a stealthy
compromise and install powerful malicious software. As
stated previously, a user has some protection against
malicious software by keeping their system
conscientiously patched, and maintaining up-to-date AV
software. AV performs best if signatures are
continuously updated, otherwise the practical detection
rate plummets very quickly. Interactive malicious
software, as well as user expectations,24 significantly
increases the difficulty of detection for AV software.
Hardware-based malicious code, which can be hidden
in underlying integrated circuits (manufactured in China,
and possibly compromised in the factory), will cause
even more problems. Hardware subversion is not within
the ability of AV software to deal with (in fact, it is an
open research problem as to how to detect such
malicious code in hardware at all). Hence, AV has its
limitations, and care must be taken to ensure a digital
evidence specialist, when examining a hard disk or live
RAM memory, is aware of the various methods by which
malicious software can be placed on a computer without
the knowledge or authority of the owner or user.25
© Daniel Bilar, 2009
23 Niels Provos, Dean McNamee, Panayiotis
Mavrommatis, Ke Wang, and Nagendra Modadugu,
‘The Ghost in the Browser: Analysis of Web-based
Malware’, Proceedings of the 1st conference on
First Workshop on Hot Topics in Understanding
Botnets (USENIX Association Berkeley, CA, USA,
April 2007), available in electronic format at
http://www.usenix.org/event/hotbots07/tech/full_p
apers/provos/provos.pdf.
24 Whether reasonable or not, users are not willing to
wait more than a couple of seconds to ascertain
whether they can open, execute or view a file, or
safely browse a website; nor are they willing to put
in the time or effort to gain reasonable safety
proficiency to operate what is increasingly complex
hardware and software.
25 By way of addendum, an investigation by
Associated Press has found a number of people in
the USA where a third party has caused abusive
images of children to be downloaded on to their
computer, which often results in criminal charges
that might or might not be withdrawn: Jordan
Robertson, ‘AP IMPACT: Framed for child porn —
by a PC virus’, AP Technology 8 November 2009 at
http://tech.yahoo.com/news/ap/20091108/ap_on_
hi_te/us_tec_a_virus_framed_me.
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Introduction
In the realm of civil discovery (‘disclosure’ in some
jurisdictions) most attorneys in the United States tend
to adopt a flexible approach to discovery, because the
rules tend to encourage cooperation and give parties
significant flexibility to jointly agree on a set of
discovery practices. In general, this practice makes
sense, because courts only become involved when there
is a dispute. Otherwise the parties conduct discovery in
a manner that fits the case and the resources they have
available. However, the process presumes that
attorneys for both sides are qualified to address the
numerous issues that arise during discovery. While it is
true that clients are ultimately responsible for the
competency of their attorneys, it is also true that the
legitimacy of our litigation process is undermined each
time attorneys conspire, usually unwittingly, to impose
unnecessary costs and an unreliable discovery process
on their clients due to their lack of understanding of the
information they are seeking to discover, the tools that
are available to them, and the potential consequences
to third parties.
Such a scenario is a daily occurrence in the area of e-
discovery where attorneys for each side will negotiate
away large swaths of data repositories within a
company, accept data without any chain of custody,
ignore meta data, and show no concern about the
format that the data is produced. All this is not designed
to limit discovery to what is important and to control
costs. Instead, it is designed to keep matters on a level
that they can understand and that their frequently
underfunded and litigation support team that does not
have the necessary skills can accommodate. Anecdotal
comments from judges bear out the fact that such
practices are common, and if both attorneys agree,
there is little judges can do other than offer advice.
Where this behaviour affects only the two parties, it is
fair to say that there are more important things to worry
about. However, litigation rarely occurs in a vacuum.
Third party interests are often implicated. In discovery,
all documents in the possession of each party are
usually open to being seen by the other side. This could
potentially include third party information that may be
more valuable to the third party than the litigants.
Additionally, privacy laws frequently limit the purposes
for which such information can be used and require
special authorization for use in litigation, particularly
when the subject or data owner is not a party to the
case.
As technology evolves, the implications for litigation
must also evolve. Traditionally, discovery meant that a
requesting party requested information relevant to the
litigation with some degree of specificity, and the
responding party then set about finding, collecting, and
ultimately producing that data after reviewing it for
relevancy and privilege. The process was fairly
straightforward and limited by how the information was
collected. Because the traditional method involved
paper documents that were typically in the possession
of a single person, usually known as the document
custodian, it made sense that attorneys would simply
issue a legal hold memorandum to such persons
notifying them of the litigation, identifying the kinds of
documents that would be relevant, requesting such
documents be preserved, and providing a mechanism to
deliver the documents or have them photocopied. In
most cases, it was the document custodian who
searched and delivered the relevant documents.
Whether he or she was also responsible for doing the
photocopying, sorting, or delivery, the law understood
the location of the document custodian and the location
of the documents to be synonymous. Discovery rules
focused on the fact that a person under the jurisdiction
of the court, usually as a function of their being the
employee of one of the parties, was under an
obligation, and sometimes compelled, to produce the
documents. The document reviews, photocopying,
Bates stamping, sorting, packaging, and delivery are all
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support functions that flow from the obligations of the
custodian of the document.
While courts may not always have direct jurisdiction
over custodians of documents, particularly if they reside
in another state or a foreign country, they still impose
the obligation on the custodian indirectly through the
jurisdiction they assert on the custodian’s employer. The
court will require the employer to direct its employees
to produce a particular document. In addition to
producing a clear chain of responsibility, it also allows
any assertions based on privilege, privacy laws, export
controls, or a sovereign’s outright rejection of the
litigation to be heard with respect to the document
being requested. Because the same sovereign has
immediate jurisdiction over both the custodian of the
document and the document itself, it is in a good
position to restrict its transfer and eventual production.
Until recently, the same concept applied to
electronically stored information. While the internet has
provided people with instantaneous access to
information world-wide, the data most frequently
requested in litigation is still modeled after the paper
method. The custodian of the data, usually a system
administrator or designated data owner, is still
requested to produce the information, and significantly,
that custodian is usually located within close proximity
to where the data is stored. Such proximity may be in
another room or another building, but there is a good
chance that it is still within the same jurisdiction.
Moreover, based on the method typically used to collect
the data that is discussed below, the litigation support
team, in conjunction with the custodian, usually collects
the data directly from the computer that it is stored on
or over the network on a computer nearby. Either way,
those collecting the data for the purposes of discovery
are usually present in the jurisdiction where the data is
stored even if it is collected and then loaded onto a
repository in another jurisdiction.
What this article seeks to examine is the changing
nature of both e-discovery and how data is stored. As
new e-discovery technologies are deployed, the
potential for widespread collection using remote means
not facilitated by a local data custodian is becoming a
reality. Because discovery in the United States does not
typically involve the court for matters relating to the
collection of discoverable material by the producing
party, case law is rather limited and discussions about
the significance of the location of electronically stored
information and any possible restrictions on remote
collection are non-existent. In fact, ‘no court has
squarely addressed where electronic materials are
“located” for discovery purposes.’1 Because jurisdiction
and the ability to effectively adjudicate discovery
disputes involving both litigants and third parties is
generally a product of location in most common law
countries, it is important that the law catch up with the
technology.
Framing technology issues
The gathering of evidence for litigation is typically
directed by counsel whereby the likely locations of
relevant information and their custodians are identified.
Then legal holds are issued to the custodian who can
include both the imputed data owner, which may be a
business manager charged with overseeing the
business processes that generated or collected the
data, and potentially a data custodian, who may be an
IT manager or system manager but who is just as likely
to be an employee who is simply storing the relevant
data on his or her desktop or laptop. Similarly, in the
physical world, there are imputed document owners and
document custodians. In both situations, both the
custodian and the data owner are frequently situated at
the same geographic location and usually in the same
jurisdiction. In some cases, centralized mainframe
computers had required some physical separation.
However, in discovery matters, the person physically co-
located with the system was usually the person given
the task with extracting the data that was required.
Additionally, despite the ability to obtain access to the
date remotely, there was little question of its location.
The only type of remote discovery that has been
considered somewhat routine, is the collection of
publicly available information available on the internet.
In this case, production is hardly necessary, because the
requesting parties can simply search the internet to
collect whatever information they choose.
Consequently, for the purposes of this article, remote
discovery involves the collection and eventual
production of non-public information. This includes
desktops and laptop computers, servers with directly
attached storage, storage area networks, and removable
media. Almost by definition, remote access to these
storage devices involves some sort of network, either
through a traditional circuit-switched telephone
network, or dial-up, and, more typically, via a packet-
1 Gary B. Born and Peter B. Rutledge, International
Civil Litigation in United States Courts (4th edition,
Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, 2007), 930.
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based network such as the internet or similar sub-
networks within an organization with connectivity being
provided locally by the organization or over long
distance using internet or private leased line
connectivity. In either case, higher level protocols using
encryption, circuit virtualization, authentication, and
other means can ensure that such connectivity remains
private. Within these private networks, the conventional
notions of storage and application services are radically
changing. No longer is storage tied to a single
processing device. It can serve multiple application
servers all at once. Moreover, the storage can be
distributed across national boundaries as needed.
Using sophisticated data mapping technology, what
appears to an end user to be a single file or directory at
one location could actually be bits stored on multiple
devices in several different countries. Moreover, the
application retrieving the file for processing and
eventual output to the user could also have components
residing in multiple locations and potentially owned by
a third party. These are called cloud computing
applications. While in essence they are a throw-back to
mainframe computing concepts of shared processing,
cloud computing will probably revolutionize computing
and fundamentally alter the notion of electronically
stored information. The change is not so much that
remote discovery is now possible. In some form, the
potential for remote discovery of electronic data has
existed as long as there have been computer modems.
Instead, the fundamental change is that some discovery
can only be achieved remotely, given how some
applications and their data are now structured.
Even if the notions of cloud computing and
geographically distributed storage are yet to become
commonplace, other factors are making remote
discovery an all but unavoidable scenario in litigation.
Due to the globalization of many corporations and the
need to collaborate, the operation of largely
autonomous subsidiaries organized by country has
largely vanished. High network bandwidth over long
distances has meant that information technologies can
simultaneously use data stored in multiple places and
the need to have ‘local’ copies of all data needed by the
local users has all but vanished in many large
organizations. Moreover, enterprise search technologies
are being deployed in a way where data owners can
authorize data custodians to grant access to
appropriate parties and refrain from overseeing such
access. They are no longer the go-between in satisfying
requests for data. Instead, once access is granted, the
data can be available world-wide, subject to export
control and privacy laws. Individuals often have no
concept of where the data is physically located, nor do
they care. They may be aware that a particular
document was written by an employee residing in
another country, but they have no way of knowing if it
was actually drafted in that other country. Also, in the
spirit of collaboration, documents are routinely edited
and data is supplied from a number of countries. This
means that to argue that the data falls under the
sovereignty of a particular nation or US state based on
the nationality of the author or the location of
authorship is a misnomer. While privacy and export
control laws may dictate some degree of data
segregation by country, such laws are rendered otiose
by the vast amount of data involved in commercial
litigation that does not fall into those categories.
Additionally, with the Safe Harbor provisions,2 privacy
laws, arguably, may no longer require that covered data
honour national boundaries.
Traditional legal issues with cross border
discovery
Aside from the logistical challenges brought by new
technology, legal issues also present challenges of their
own. Because there is limited legal precedent for
remote discovery, the focus will be on drawing parallels
with cross border discovery decisions. From a statutory
and administrative perspective, discovery is the same
whether the activity is conducted in the United States or
abroad. Unless a judge is asked to compel discovery,
litigants are free to request and conduct depositions
and request production of information wherever it might
reside.3 When a court orders foreign discovery,
additional considerations may need to be addressed. As
described below, the court jurisdiction will usually be
the primary arbiter in deciding whether discovery can be
compelled. The potential interests of third parties, when
2 Under provisions of Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, OJ L281, 23.11.95,
p. 31 (EU Data Protection Directive), and its
national implementing laws, countries such as the
United States may be allowed to hold private data
on European citizens if the country provides for
legislation that legally obligates organizations
receiving such data to follow the provisions of the
Data Protection Data Directive and guidance from
individuals nations with respect to dissemination
and uses for that data. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21,
2000), http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/
SH_Privacy.asp.
3 Fed. Rule Civ.Proc. Rule 28(a)(1) provides for
depositions in a foreign country and may require
some notice depending upon how the deposition
is procured.
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no challenge is raised, are usually not considered in the
absence of a third party being added to the
proceedings. Because most discovery efforts are carried
out with little or no public notice, third parties typically
have no way of effectively intervening. This presents
some interesting privacy and sovereignty considerations
that are discuss below.
Ultimately, the issue is often that non-US jurisdictions
find the American discovery process unwieldy and
fundamentally flawed. They see its stated goal of
learning the truth through exhaustive review of all
relevant information as simply a charade meant to mask
the true intent of the litigants, which is to conduct
fishing expeditions designed to increase the other
party’s costs, expose embarrassing facts that are only
tangentially related to the matter at hand, and engage
in countless acts of gamesmanship and chest thumping
to distract the fact finder from the case and enhance the
image of the attorneys. While the statistics that show
only a small percentage of cases reaching trial would
seem to support the claim that the American litigation
system is unwieldy, it is misleading to suggest that such
an outcome is based on the system’s overwhelming
discovery burdens or the publicity sought by attorneys.
When used effectively, discovery can be the mechanism
that unearths corruption, holds large organizations
accountable, and gives litigants with limited means the
opportunity to make their case. While true smoking
guns are rare, discovery often forces settlement
because the information produced by each side
provides overwhelmingly evidence that favours one
party or the other. The fact that litigants in civil
proceedings routinely produce incriminating information
that it likely to be used against them is a testament to
not only the effectiveness of the discovery process, but
of their adherence to ethical conventions and the rule of
law. That said, the process is not without its faults. The
process can certainly be expensive and unwieldy, with
many of its failures not a product of its fundamental
principles, but rather adherence to inefficient processes
and poor use of technology. Nonetheless, as the
processes and revised and the technology is improved,
it must be recognized that streamlining processes to
more efficiently adhere to these principles may have the
unintended effect of denigrating the principles that
others hold dear. While compromising principles may
not be an option, the methods chosen can be open to
compromise.
E-discovery issues 
State level
While most legal issues with remote electronic
discovery involve the movement of data across national
borders, there are a few issues that are relevant
between US states. While states are typically obliged to
honour requests made by courts of other states and
generally show deference to depositions and document
productions that originate from litigation in another
state, it remains the expectation that some protocol
should be followed. For example, where a judge
authorizes a party to seize evidence from the other
litigant in another state, it is expected that local law
enforcement will be engaged and perhaps even local
courts will enforce the order.
Recently, some states have passed laws requiring that
computer forensics examinations that are part of
litigation be performed by licensed private
investigators.4 While this particular requirement is
problematic on a number of levels, it does reflect states’
desire to assert some quality controls over the process
of collecting evidence and to retain oversight over the
process. However, the laws are unclear whether they
4 2008 American Bar Association Section of Science
& Technology Law, Report to the House of
Delegates 301, available at http://www.abanet.
org/scitech/301.doc (noting specific PI licensure
requirements for performing computer forensics in
Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Georgia, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, North Carolina (pending),
Massachusetts, Nevada, New York).
When used effectively, discovery can be the mechanism
that unearths corruption, holds large organizations
accountable, and gives litigants with limited means the
opportunity to make their case. 
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would apply to remote electronic discovery. While the
South Carolina Attorney General has asserted that any
computer forensic examinations performed in other
states must be conducted by a South Carolina licensed
private investigator when the evidence is gathered to be
used in a South Carolina court proceeding, there is no
such guidance for evidence remotely gathered using a
computer forensics process on a device located in a
state with such a private investigator requirement where
the information is to be used in a matter outside that
state.5 This is despite the fact that some of these states
have asserted that licensed private investigators be
used when computer forensics is performed in their
jurisdiction regardless of where the evidence will
ultimately presented and even applies if no litigation is
anticipated. It is one of many examples where laws are
written too simplistically to resolve a perceived problem
rather than to address the true objectives of the
situation. The quality of computer forensic examination
is certainly an issue that needs to be addressed.
However, the solution proposed and implemented is not
always the most appropriate. Rather than passing a law
that is enforceable in the least costly manner possible
but ineffective at accomplishing the objective, states
should recognize that the true solution may be to learn
more about the problem, seek consensus where
possible, and regulate last. Failing to do so simply leads
to circumvention and higher costs and ultimately causes
more harm to the very people it seeks to protect.
Aside from forensic examinations, the very notion of
remotely collecting data in other states raises a number
of issues relating to the state’s desire to accord
privileges to its citizens. Because most state privacy
laws target personal data about its citizens without
regard to location, the privacy aspects seem not to be
implicated. Moreover, constitutional protections of
interstate commerce would seem to preclude a state
from restricting the flow of such data. However, because
this data may be destined for a court, practitioners
should be wary of state specific privileges that may
arise. Conflict of law principles are far from settled in
this area as it is unclear whether privileges apply to
data at the point it is generated or in the state where
the court is located.
International
By far the most significant legal issues with remote
discovery involve data that passes across international
borders. Because remote discovery typically does not
require anyone in the foreign country to facilitate the
data transfer, such transfers can be transferred with
relative ease. Typical foreign discovery challenges
usually involve conducting depositions in another
country or requesting someone in that country to
produce a document. For the most part, there is little
authority on the issue of whether the fact that no one
involved in the discovery need be present in that
country raises any concerns. The typical remote
discovery scenario would be where relevant information
resides on a server in a branch office of a multi-national
company that was outside the United States. Assuming
that personnel in the United States already have remote
access to the data, then a foreign government has
limited ability to prevent access, because it cannot
sanction anyone under its jurisdiction for the immediate
transfer. After all, ‘[t]he location of the person, not the
document, is also a hallmark of discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “Persons resident or
found within the United States may have in their
possession or under their control evidence located
abroad. It has long been recognized that such persons
may be required to produce such evidence in courts in
the United States.”’6 However, if a local employee of the
company is required to grant access or otherwise
facilitate the transfer before it can be sent, then foreign
law may pose some challenges depending upon the
data at issue, because the facilitator risks violating their
own law or causing their employer to violate US law.
Beyond the unique circumstances associated with
remote discovery, the challenges posed by discovery of
information in a foreign country for use in a US
proceeding can be daunting. As mentioned above, many
countries, particularly those using the civil law system,
show a particular distaste for the American discovery
process. ‘As of 1986, some 15 states had adopted
legislation expressly designed to counter United States
efforts to secure production of documents situated
outside the United States.’7 These have taken a number
of forms, from providing mechanisms for its citizens to
5 Deb Radcliff, ‘Computer Forensics Faces Private
Eye Competition’ Baselinemag, January 2, 2008, p
1 http://www.baselinemag.com. (‘In April [2007],
the state attorney general opined that even if you
never set foot in South Carolina, if you're collecting
evidence to be used in court here, you still need a
South Carolina [PI] license’, says Steve Abrams, a
licensed independent PI and computer forensic
examiner based in Sullivans Island, S.C. ‘Licensing
authorities in New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and
Oregon have opined the same way.’)
6 Charles McClellan, America, ‘Land of
(Extraterritorial) Discovery: Section 1782 Discovery
for Foreign Litigants’, 17 Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems 809, 822 (2008) (quoting
Hans Smit, ‘American Assistance to Litigation in
Foreign Aid and International Tribunals: Section
1782 Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited’, 25 Syracuse
Journal of International Law and Commerce, 1, 10
n.46 (1998)).
7 Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 442,
Reporters’ Note 1 (1987).
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refuse requests, to prohibiting its citizens from
cooperating altogether in the case of France.8 The
process generally acceptable to most countries is
through the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.9 That
treaty calls for letters of request to be issued by the
court having jurisdiction over the matter and sent to the
relevant authority in the country where evidence is
being sought. While this process has assisted litigants
who previously had no recourse when seeking discovery
of witnesses or documents located in a foreign country,
the US Supreme Court noted in the seminal case of
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. District
Court10 that the use of the treaty is not mandatory in
foreign discovery matters and that it does not override
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.11 In this case, the
Supreme Court took a pragmatic view in suggesting that
the treaty was merely in place to protect the rights of
foreign litigants and that where both parties are
amenable to the discovery request, there is no need to
involve foreign authorities in the matter. Justice
Blackmun’s dissent clearly alludes to this perception
and argues that with the civil law system, in particular,
the process by which evidence is collected, normally by
a judge rather than the litigants, is as much a part of the
analysis as the willingness of parties to comply with the
request. He notes judges are often entrusted with the
role of balancing the rights of the parties as well as the
rights of the public as a whole, including affected third
parties, when deciding whether to transfer that
evidence to a foreign court.12
Considering the view of the majority and similar
holdings in other courts that effectively suggest that the
treaty’s procedures should be the last resort rather than
the first, it would be safe to conclude that remote
discovery would probably be a matter requiring little, if
any, consultation with foreign authorities as far as US
courts are concerned. In effect, what little related case
law on this subject tends to bear this out. For example,
in 2002, Vasily Gorshkov was convicted of stealing
credit card numbers by a Seattle-based federal court.
The evidence in the case was gathered by FBI agents
who lured Gorshkov and his accomplice into the United
States from Russia, where through an undercover ruse,
they asked the two men to type their username and
password into a computer the FBI was monitoring. The
account credentials were for a computer located in
Russia. The agents then used the credentials to gain
access to that computer and download the evidence
implicating the two in multiple cases of fraud. Because
the FBI used its own computer, told the defendants they
wanted to watch them, and obtained a search warrant
before viewing the downloaded file, the Federal District
Court Judge ruled that the evidence was admissible and
that the FBI had done nothing wrong. He further
asserted that the fact that the agents’ action violated
the law of the Russian Federation was not relevant
because the law of the Russian Federation did not
apply.13 It transpires that the Russian authorities did not
agree, and filed a criminal complaint against the agents,
while the agents received the Director’s Award for
Excellence as a result of the successful sting operation.14
While such a flagrant flaunting of another nation’s
laws may result in the exclusion of evidence in civil
matters, courts have nonetheless shown that US
interests, particularly those of the litigants, come first.
In response to blocking statutes, courts have adopted a
five factor test for considering whether a party should
be compelled to produce information that resides in
another jurisdiction, particularly in cases where the
party needs to travel to that country to retrieve it or
request employees in the foreign country to facilitate its
delivery even when the foreign nation specifically
forbids it. The factors include: (1) the importance to the
litigation of the information requested; (2) the degree of
specificity of request; (3) whether the information
originated in the United States; (4) the availability of
alternative means of securing the information; (5) the
extent to which failure to comply would undermine the
interests of the United States or compliance with the
request would undermine the interests of a foreign
sovereign nation.15 However, case law suggests if the
8 James Chalmers, ‘The Hague Evidence Convention
and Discovery Inter Parties: Trial Court Decisions
Post Aerospatiale’, 8 Tulane Journal of
International and Comparative Law 189, 213 (2000)
(noting that ‘[i]t is difficult to take the French
‘blocking statute’ at face value given that, taken
literally, it appears to prevent French nationals
doing business abroad from taking court action in
foreign tribunals. Instead, it appears that the
statute was intended to assist French nationals
involved in litigation abroad by providing them
with a reason for refusing to disclose
information.’)
9 Opened for signature, 18 March 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, T.I.A.S. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
10 482 U.S. 522 (1987)
11 482 U.S. 522 (1987) at 544 (declining to hold to
hold, as a blanket matter, that comity requires
resort to Hague Evidence Convention procedures
without prior scrutiny in each case of the particular
facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that
resort to those procedures will prove effective).
12 482 U.S. 522 (1987) at 548 (Blackmun, J,
dissenting) (‘In my view, the Convention provides
effective discovery procedures that largely
eliminate the conflicts between United States and
foreign law on evidence-gathering. I therefore
would apply a general presumption that, in most
cases, courts should resort first to the
Convention.’).
13 Mike Brunker, Judge OKs FBI hack of Russian
computers, ZDNet, 31 May 2001,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-115961.html.
14 Lawyer to challenge FBI in Russian sting, Reuters,
25 August 2002, http://news.cnet.com/Lawyer-to-
challenge-FBI-in-Russian-sting/2100-1002_3-
955251.html.
REMOTE ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
138 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
discovery request could be satisfied without leaving the
United States or requesting the aid of someone in a
foreign country through a means such as remote
discovery, courts are not likely to even consider treaty
requirements or blocking statutes when deciding
whether to grant the request to compel.16
While the court’s inclination to ignore the wishes of a
foreign government in both civil and criminal cases is
certainly the most expedient means of resolving a
discovery dispute when that foreign government’s
assistance is not needed, it is nonetheless troubling.
Disregard for international comity can arise in other
forums that are not directly of interest to the court or
the litigants but could have a chilling effect on future
cross border litigation and even the transfer of data
across borders outside litigation. For example, under
provisions of the EU Data Protection Directive17 and its
subsequent enforcement of member nations, the
default position is that the United States does not have
sufficient data protection laws for the protection of
personal data to permit the transfer of such data.
However, under the Safe Harbor provisions negotiated
with the US Department of Commerce,18 an organization
can voluntary submit to such provisions that the
Department of Commerce will then enforce as a
condition of receiving personal data on EU citizens.
However, the Safe Harbor provisions are problematic
within the context of discovery, because the provisions
only apply to data transferred to another country but
within the same organization. Because the purpose of
discovery is to disclose data to another party, the Safe
Harbor provisions do not provide adequate protection.
Additionally, while consent of the subject of the data is
usually sufficient to exempt the application of privacy
laws, where the consent is by an employee, EU
authorities typically view such consent as coerced and
therefore not allowed.19 As an alternative, the EU Data
Protection Directive does allow for transfers outside the
Safe Harbor protection where ‘the transfer is necessary .
. . for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal
claims.’20 However, such transfers must be ordered by a
European judicial authority pursuant to a letter of
request, such as provided for under the Hague
Convention.21 Based on recent precedent, litigants are
not likely to make such a request if the information can
readily be obtained by simply obtaining access to a
remote computer.
As a result, the situation is difficult. As technology
advances to the point that multinational corporations
can easily resort to these self-help measures without
risking sanctions or even awareness by foreign
governments that this is going on, the pattern will
continue, with the criteria for compliance being US
privacy laws that Europeans, in particular, find
inadequate. However, it may take one significant and
public privacy breach to convince European
governments that the Safe Harbor provisions are
relatively weak within the US legal system and may be
rescinded, making cross company communications
problematic across borders. Other implications could be
outright refusal to allow US persons direct remote
access to the personal data of EU citizens residing on
systems within an EU country. Ultimately, distributed
storage and cloud computing may either make that
discussion moot, or laws could effectively limit the use
of such technology across national borders. Given the
undesirable consequences that could result from direct
regulation of such technology for the regulating country,
it is to be hoped that a more efficient solution that
preserves international comity and the rights of each
country’s citizens while satisfying the demands of the
US discovery system will come about. The models
described above could work, but no one currently has
the incentive to implement them.
© Gib Sorebo, 2009
15 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §
442(1)(c) (1987)
16 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working
Document 1/2009 on pre-trial discovery for cross
border civil litigation at 5, 00339/09/EN, WP 158
(Feb. 11, 2009) (noting ‘that if the company is
subject to US law and possesses, controls, or has
custody or even has authorized access to the
information from the US territory (via a computer)
wherever the data is “physically” located, US law
applies without the need to respect any
international convention such as the Hague
Convention.’).
17 EU Data Protection Directive at 31–50.
18 U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles (July 21, 2000),
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Privacy.asp.
19 Carla L. Reyes, ‘The US Discovery-EU Privacy
Directive Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered
Compliance Strategy’, 19 Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law 357, 374-78
(2009) (discussing limitations of Safe Harbor
provisions and consent); but see Stanley W.
Crosley, Alan Charles Raul, Edward R. McNicholas
and Julie M. Dwyer, ‘A Path to Resolving European
Data Protection Concerns With U.S. Discovery’, 6
Privacy & Security Law Report 1, 5 (Oct. 15, 2007)
(suggesting that consent, particularly when
obtained in advance of the litigation, may be
sufficient).
20 EU Data Protection Directive, art. 26(1)(d).
21 Carla L. Reyes, The US Discovery-EU Privacy
Directive Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered
Compliance Strategy, note 17, at 365-66.
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The digital era has had profound effects on the
practice of litigation in the United States, not the
least of which is the paradox that lawyers and
their clients have faced trying to protect legal
privileges during electronic discovery (e-
discovery). The legal gymnastics that must be
undertaken in order to protect the relationship
between lawyer and client have proven
inordinately time-consuming, expensive and
fraught with errors. Concerns have been raised by
attorneys, who must protect client confidences
within the disclosure framework of U.S. discovery
law; judges, who have to resolve increasingly
complex e-discovery disputes; and clients, who
have to pay.
Reform has already occurred. The U.S. Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were updated in 2006 to address the
complexities of e-discovery, and the Federal Rules of
Evidence were subsequently revised in 2008 in an
attempt to reverse the trend toward escalating e-
discovery review costs. However, some problems
remain, and critics call for additional reform. The U.S.
litigation bar, its clients, the courts, and the rule makers
have focused their efforts to date on procedural
protection in an attempt to mitigate the effect of
breaches of legal privilege. It is the heuristic aim of this
article to suggest an alternative to the procedural
approach.
Legal privileges in the United States
The laws of the U.S. afford special evidentiary
protection to information and communications that arise
out of the working relationship between a lawyer and
client. These protections come in the form of two closely
associated legal rules:
The Attorney-Client Privilege preserves the secrecy of
communications between client and legal counsel.
The Work-Product Doctrine shields works created by
or for counsel in the context of litigation.
The protections under these rules are afforded by
excluding privileged information from disclosure and
from being introduced into evidence. The exclusions
under the U.S. rules are absolute and are exercised
without consideration of the materiality or probative
value of the underlying information. They are
compelling protections, particularly in light of the broad
scope of U.S. discovery. Current underlying policy
considerations for maintaining the breadth of the legal
privileges are that compliance with the law is
encouraged by fostering an open relationship between
attorney and client based on trust, and the quality and
By Daniel R Rizzolo
LEGAL PRIVILEGE
AND THE HIGH
COST OF
ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY IN
THE UNITED
STATES: SHOULD
WE BE THINKING
LIKE LAWYERS?
ARTICLE:
140
The complications and uncertainties posed by what has
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thoroughness of an attorney’s preparations are
improved when she need not fear that her work will fall
into the hands of adversaries.
Together, the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-
Product Doctrine bind the lawyer-client relationship. As
such, attorneys in the U.S. are cautious to a fault when
trying to preserve the legal privileges.
Legal privilege law in the U.S. is complex and well
developed. There has been voluminous inspection and
interpretation by law makers, courts and
commentators.1 The application and scope of the
privilege protections often vary by jurisdiction and are
particularly susceptible to the volatilities of judicial
interpretation. The volume of information causes
additional complications during the e-discovery process.
The complications and uncertainties posed by what has
become a byzantine maze of U.S. privilege law forces a
disproportionate allocation of costly resources to what
is essentially a clerical exercise in procedure.
The Attorney-Client Privilege
The Attorney-Client Privilege is designed to protect
confidential communications between a client and
attorney, and is very broad in scope. There are five
commonly recognized elements that must be present to
claim that a communication is subject to the Attorney-
Client Privilege:
A client – the person or entity asserting the privilege
must be a client or must be attempting to become a
client at the time of disclosure. Under U.S. law, the
definition of a client includes private individuals,
corporations, and other private organizations.
Governmental bodies and public officers are also
protected as clients to the extent that the public
interest in open government is not outweighed.
An attorney – the person to whom the communication
is made must be a licensed attorney and must be
acting as an attorney with regard to the
communication. The U.S. definition of an attorney
includes outside counsel, and is generally expanded
to include in-house attorneys. Communications to
agents and subordinates working under the direction
of counsel are also generally protected by the
privilege.
Confidentiality – the communication must be related
to the attorney or subordinate by the client or
prospective client in confidentiality and outside the
presence of strangers. Confidentiality is the
requirement most often contested under privilege law.
It takes on new dimensions and must be carefully
protected when digital communications are involved.
For example, an e-mail or voicemail copied or
forwarded to a party outside the attorney-client
relationship may be deemed a breach of
confidentiality and therefore a waiver of the privilege.
The intent to obtain legal advice – the primary
purpose of the communication must be to obtain legal
advice or services. The mere fact that an attorney is
involved does not automatically make a
communication privileged.
A right of claim – the client or prospective client must
have asserted the privilege, and the privilege must
not have been waived either deliberately or
inadvertently.
Once the Attorney-Client Privilege attaches, its
1 See generally Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-
Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine (5th
edn, 2007, ABA) for an excellent and
comprehensive survey of Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work-Product Doctrine law.
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protections are absolute. They cannot be overcome by a
showing of need.
The Work-Product Doctrine
The Work-Product Doctrine extends protection to works
created in anticipation of litigation by or under the
direction of counsel. It is a more recent concept in
American jurisprudence than the Attorney-Client
Privilege. The Work-Product Doctrine was first
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in
1947 in Hickman v. Taylor,2 and has subsequently been
codified at both the Federal and state levels.3 There are
three threshold questions that must typically be
addressed in order for work-product protection to take
effect, as discussed below.
Whether the information sought is protected 
The most commonly cited formulation of the Work-
Product Doctrine is found in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3) (Rule 26(b)(3)). It applies to
‘documents and other tangible things.’ This definition
has been interpreted to include information committed
to a physical format such as hard copy writings,
photographs, and diagrams. It has also been extended
to digital information. In addition to format, there is a
further question of content type, which is weighed on a
sliding scale. An attorney’s mental impressions and
thought processes are afforded an almost absolute level
of protection, while at the other end of the spectrum,
purely factual information is afforded none.
Whether the work was created in anticipation 
of litigation
While the Attorney-Client Privilege protects
communications regardless of the type of legal work,
protection under the Work-Product Doctrine is limited to
works prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial.
Whether the work was created by an attorney or
an attorney’s representative
The common law formulation of the Work-Product
Doctrine protects works created by an attorney,
members of the attorney’s staff, and non-lawyers
working under the attorney’s direction. It is worth noting
that in Federal civil proceedings, Rule 26(b)(3) extends
protection to the work-product of non-lawyers working
on behalf of the client, whether or not an attorney
supervises them. The works of consultants,
investigators, insurers, physicians, employees, and
others may be afforded protection providing they were
created in anticipation of litigation and not in the
ordinary course of business. As a matter of practice, this
last distinction is subject to interpretation by the courts.
This means that supervision of non-lawyers by counsel
significantly reduces the likelihood that a work will be
found to have been created in the ordinary course of
business.
An important distinction between the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine is that
protection of work-product is not absolute. An adversary
may obtain discovery of attorney work-product upon a
showing of substantial need and material hardship in
obtaining the information elsewhere. Should a court
decide that work product is discoverable, it must still
‘protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's
attorney or other representative.’4
Digital discovery and the increased risk of
privilege waiver
The protections of the legal privilege rules are lost
through acts that constitute waiver. A waiver may be
deliberate or inadvertent. It may be caused by the acts
of the attorney, the client, or third parties. The variations
and minutiae of U.S. waiver law are seemingly endless.5
The focus of this article will be the risks posed by
inadvertent waiver during discovery.
An inadvertent waiver may occur when counsel
accidentally turns over privileged materials in the
course of discovery. In such cases, remedies are limited,
and the results can be calamitous for both attorney and
client. When the question of inadvertent waiver is
adjudicated, the U.S. courts will enter into an analysis
to determine whether and to what extent privileges
have been waived. The jurisdictions are split into three
schools of thought on the effect of inadvertent
disclosure:6
Lenient – a small group hold that there is no waiver
when an inadvertent disclosure occurs.
2 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
3 For instance, see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) for the
Federal enactment of the Work-Product Doctrine
used in civil proceedings.
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B).
5 See generally Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-
Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine
390-636 (5th edn, 2007, ABA) for an overview of
the multiple waiver variations that may come into
play under Attorney-Client Privilege law, and
Volume 2, 1027-1122 for an overview of waiver law
applicable to the Work-Product Doctrine.
6 Laurie A. Weiss, ‘Protection of Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product in the E-Discovery Era’,
in Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., Attorney-Client
Privilege in Civil Litigation: Protecting and
Defending Confidentiality 163, 166-168 (4th edn,
2008, ABA) for additional discussion of the split of
authority in U.S. privilege law.
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Moderate – the largest group uses a balancing test to
determine whether a privilege waiver has occurred.
Factors taken into consideration include the
reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent a
disclosure, the extent of the disclosure, and the
promptness with which remedial actions were taken.
If a waiver is found, the court determines the extent of
the waiver. It will be typically limited to the disclosed
documents but can be extended at the court’s
discretion.
Strict – a small minority adhere to a strict liability
approach to waiver. They hold that an inadvertent
disclosure of privileged materials will constitute a
waiver of the privilege with regard to the documents
produced and also with regard to the breadth of
subject matter covered in those documents (Subject
Matter Waiver).
Even in situations where no waiver is found and
documents are returned, the result for the client whose
privileged materials have been disclosed is not
satisfactory. Attorneys describe this situation to trying
to put a genie back in the bottle (or as other critics have
noted, like trying to un-ring a bell,7 or ‘closing the barn
door after the animals have already run away’8). The
damage has been done, and client confidences or
litigation strategy have been exposed to an adversary.
The client’s position may have been weakened, or the
client may have been exposed to new risk outside the
pending litigation. The consequences for the disclosing
attorney can be catastrophic. Loss of client, fee
disputes, malpractice claims, and bar sanctions are all
foreseeable results. To make matters worse, the digital
era has fundamentally changed the privilege landscape.
E-discovery has become a significant problem in the
U.S. litigation system because of the volumes and
complexities of digital data, a constantly changing
landscape, and the fear of breaching client
confidentiality. The result is a skittish litigation bar that
proceeds with extreme caution during discovery.
Electronic discovery in practice 
A brief account of U.S. e-discovery practices is
warranted at this point. In the context of commercial
litigation, a representative exercise will follow from the
issuing of a subpoena to the production of documents
as follows:
Problems with the current process become apparent
when data volumes and costs associated with this kind
of discovery exercise are considered. At current pricing
and productivity rates, representative estimates for the
process described above might be as set out in scenario
1 below.
Scenario 1 – Electronic Discovery in 20099
Records 
remaining 2009 Cost Percent of
Stage after Stage (U.S. $) 2009 Cost
Notice 1,696,105,350 19,520 1.0%
Identification 
and preservation 30,000,600 44,784 2.2%
Collection 20,000,400 100,200 5.0%
Processing 1,038,981 220,550 11.0%
Document Review 42,598 1,515,542 75.8%
Production 42,598 99,855 5.0%
Total cost US$ 2,000,451 100.0%
These figures are representative of a moderately
complex e-discovery exercise as it would be conducted
7 Ashish S. Joshi, ‘Clawback in Commercial Litigation
Agreements: Can You Unring a Bell?’, Michigan Bar
Journal, December 2008, 34, 36.
8 Victor Stanley Inc. v. Creative Pipe Inc., 2008 WL
2221841 at 28 (D. Md. May 29, 2008).
9 For the model and detailed analyses used to
develop the data presented in the tables in this
article, see Daniel R. Rizzolo, Representative
Ediscovery Exercise Corporate Response to
Discovery in Commercial Litigation (2009),
http://www.rizzologroup.com/publications.html.
Stage Description
Notice
The defendant is served with a subpoena or other
request for digital records. Counsel is engaged.
Identification
and
Preservation
The defendant issues a notice to its employees
indicating litigation has begun, and that documents are
not to be destroyed or deleted; works with its counsel
and consultants to identify potential sources of relevant
information, and negotiates discovery terms with
opposing counsel. These terms may include a non-
waiver agreement, which will be discussed at a later
point in this article.
Collection
The potentially relevant information is collected in a
forensically sound manner and forwarded to a specialist
in litigation data processing.
Processing
The specialist, following specifications provided by
counsel, culls the data using software filters, and
removes duplicate records.
Document
Review
The remaining information is loaded to a tool designed
for legal Document Review and is screened by the
defendant’s counsel.
Production
Privileged records are segregated and logged. The
remaining responsive records are prepared to
negotiated specifications and produced to the
requesting party.
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in 2009 for a business named as a party in commercial
litigation. They assume that forty employees of the
business have been identified as witnesses and that
archival media (e.g. backup tapes) are not included in
the scope of discovery. Because of the size of the case,
it is also assumed that junior attorneys in a law firm,
rather than contract attorneys would perform a review
of documents. The amounts shown include costs for in-
house counsel and IT staff, as well as fees from law
firms, forensic consultants and e-discovery service
providers.
The major share of the expenditure is allocated to the
manually intensive process of ‘Document Review’.
Before the electronic records may be turned over to an
opponent, standard practice requires that a party’s
counsel review them, one item at a time, to determine
whether they are relevant to the issues in the dispute
and responsive to the requests in the subpoena
(Relevance Review), and protected by the Attorney-
Client Privilege or the Work-Product Doctrine (Privilege
Review).
During the stages of Document Review and
Production, privileged records are digitally flagged,
segregated from the responsive population, scrutinized
by counsel, and recorded at a summary level on a
privilege log. This log is provided to the opposing party
and the court as part of the eventual document
production.
Interestingly, significant cost efficiencies have been
realized in e-discovery in recent years. However, they
have bypassed the task of Document Review. Had the
discovery exercise described above been performed five
years earlier using 2004 pricing, the results would have
been as set out in scenario 2 below.
Scenario 2 – Electronic Discovery in 200410
Records 
remaining 2004 Cost Percent of
Stage after Stage (U.S. $) 2004 Cost
Notice 1,696,105,350 14,792 0.4%
Identification 
and preservation 30,000,600 33,924 1.0%
Collection 20,000,400 111,444 3.2%
Processing 1,038,981 2,080,957 59.2%
Document Review 42,598 1,194,450 34.0%
Production 42,598 76,944 2.2%
Total cost US$ 3,512,511 100.0%
The nominal cost of the Processing stage would have
dropped 89 per cent between 2004 and 2009, due
primarily to improvements in technology,
standardization of techniques, and competition. For the
same period, nominal Document Review costs would
have increased by 27 per cent.
The high price of electronic Document Review has
afflicted the U.S. litigation system. The economic effect
is significant. Accurate statistics on the annual U.S.
expenditure for discovery related Document Review are
not available, however the magnitude of the problem is
demonstrated by considering the following data:
One analysis published in the U.S. projects that US$4
billion will be spent with e-discovery consultants and
vendors in 2009.11 This does not include the costs of
Document Review or other fees paid to law firms. Nor
does it reflect the investments that U.S. organizations
are making in preventive measures.
A 2006 study published by the accounting firm KPMG
estimated that attorney Document Review accounts
for 58-90 per cent of total expenditure on e-
discovery.12
Research conducted by the RAND Corporation
Institute for Civil Justice in 2008 estimated that the
cost of attorney document review is 70-90 per cent of
total e-discovery expenditure.13
It is possible to extrapolate from this data that the
approximate range of annual U.S. expenditure for
Document Review is in the region of US$14-20 billion.
Whether accurate or not, the estimate provides an
illustration of the size of the problem.
There are other effects that result from the costs
involved with e-discovery. The RAND Corporation report
previously cited suggests that the cost of e-discovery
has changed settlement models and negotiating power
in U.S. litigation. This is manifest in a variety of ways,
including a situation where a party with few digital
documents to consider may take a more aggressive
stance with an opponent that has a great deal of data.
Parties that are prepared for e-discovery also have an
advantage over parties that are not. There is also a
disparity in cases where e-discovery costs are likely to
10 Daniel R. Rizzolo, Representative Ediscovery
Exercise Corporate Response to Discovery in
Commercial Litigation (2009),
http://www.rizzologroup.com/publications.html.
11 George Socha and Tom Gelbmann, ‘Mining for
Gold’, Law Technology News, August 2008,
available at http://www.lawtechnews.com/r5/
showkiosk.asp?listing_id=2117297, in which the
Sixth Annual Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery
Survey is discussed.
12 KPMG LLP, A Revolution in e-Discovery: The
Persuasive Economics of the Document Analytic
Approach, (2006), 10, available at
http://www.kpmg.ch/docs/20060812_A_Revolution
_in_E-Discovery_Eine_Revolution_im_Bereich_e-
discovery.pdf.
13 James N. Dertouzos, Nicholas M. Pace ad Robert H.
Anderson, The Legal and Economic Implications of
Electronic Discovery Options for Future Research
(Rand, 2008), 3, available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP183.pdf.
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exceed the value of the claim. A recent example of this
is the case of Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, where e-
discovery costs tripled the total amount at issue.14
Attorneys are quick to embrace tactical advantage, and
it should be no surprise that knowledgeable litigators
have begun to use the high cost of e-discovery
offensively.
The cost of Privilege Review is also affecting non-
parties that are subpoenaed for records. Under U.S.
rules, a litigant may not subject a third party to undue
burden in complying with a subpoena. Should a third
party feel that an onerous burden is being forced upon
it, the third party may appeal to the presiding court for
relief. U.S. courts tend to be more open to burden
objections and cost shifting arguments when the
recipient of a subpoena is a non-party. However, survey
results published by the Sedona Conference in 2008
indicated that 73 per cent of the respondents had
witnessed situations where non-parties were subject to
undue burden in complying with a subpoena.15
The problems a third party faces in respect of discovery
were demonstrated in the recent Federal appellate
decision in the matter In re: Fannie Mae Securities
Litigation. The U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO), a government agency, failed to object
in a timely manner to a third party subpoena for e-
discovery. The lower court ordered OFHEO to comply, and
the appellate court concurred. While OFHEO was not a
party to the action, the agency was required to spend
over US$6 million, representing nine percent of its annual
budget, to meet the request. The bulk of the expenditure
went towards Document Review.16
Finally, the high costs associated with Document
Review lead to undue weight and consideration being
given to what should essentially be mundane
procedural exercises. As will be demonstrated in the
next section, the strategic components of Document
Review lend themselves to enhancement through
technology. Unfortunately, the process is currently
mired in expensive and time consuming manual tasks
designed to avoid privilege waiver. This practice is
draining resources that could be allocated to the
substantive merits of a case.
The slow advance of automated Document
Review 
E-discovery has benefitted from significant
technological efficiencies over the last five years. It is
curious that the figures discussed above show an
increase in the costs of Document Review between 2004
and 2009. This is primarily due to the effects of inflation
and the increased billing rate of lawyers over that
period. The productivity gains become clearer when the
fiscal fluctuations are removed from the equation. A
comparison of the real costs of Processing and
Document Review, rather than the nominal costs, is
illustrative. After adjusting for the increases in billing
rate and inflation (and converting to equivalent 2009
dollars), the cost model shows as follows:17
2004 costs Percent
(in 2009 2009 costs increase 
Stage U.S. $ (in U.S. $) /decrease
Processing 2,297,368 220,550 (90.4%)
Document Review 1,564,250 1,515,542 (3.1%)
While significant productivity gains have been realized
in Processing, the productivity of Document Review has
stagnated. The reason why Document Review has not
benefited from the types of efficiencies that have
affected e-discovery Processing is because of the nature
of the technologies that are available for each task.
The principal purpose of the Processing stage in e-
discovery is to reduce the number of documents by
using automated filters. Commonly used data culling
tools include programs that identify and eliminate
duplicate files, text search engines for key word
filtering, date extraction and query tools to limit the
review population to a defined period, and programs
that select or exclude specified file types. While these
are powerful and increasingly sophisticated tools, their
functionality is limited to a well-defined set of problems
(e.g. find all records that are a bit-for-bit match, find all
occurrences of a specified text string within the data
population). The solutions to these problems, while
technically challenging, are essentially mechanistic. The
tasks they perform can be precisely defined. They lend
themselves to solution through structured computer
programs, which have become relatively generic and
reusable across different types of data.
Automated Document Review (ADR) tools must solve
problems that require complex analysis. The problems
are issue and fact specific. They are greatly influenced
by the nuances of human thought and language. Even a
basic explanation of the rules to be followed in a
14 2008 WL 4758604 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2008), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88103 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2008);
Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, “Spieker II”, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62073 (D. Kan. July 21, 2009).
15 The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Non-
Party Production and Rule 45 Subpoenas 9 (2008).
16 In re: Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 9 (D.C. App. Jan. 6, 2009).
17 Daniel R. Rizzolo, Representative Ediscovery
Exercise Corporate Response to Discovery in
Commercial Litigation (2009),
http://www.rizzologroup.com/publications.html.
